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Abstract 
 
Adopting a theoretical framework grounded in politics of development, 
this thesis addresses the linkages between China’s engagements in Africa and 
local processes of development, utilising Madagascar - an under-researched 
country marked by repetitive political crises and a multidimensional history of 
Chinese involvement - as a case study. My original contribution to knowledge is a 
study of contemporary China - Madagascar relations. Due to a lack of existing 
research on the subject, this thesis explores the entirety of China’s presence in 
Madagascar, including its historical, political, economic, and social dimensions. 
This dissertation is structured into two parts and comprises seven chapters. Part 
one clarifies the theoretical and contextual framework and is composed of 
chapters two and three. Chapter two provides a historical overview of 
Madagascar’s economic, social, and political development trajectory since 
independence in 1960, and chapter three highlights the importance of politics to 
development by discussing to what extent the Malagasy government under 
President Marc Ravalomanana from 2002 until 2008 could be considered 
developmental. Part two deconstructs China’s engagements in Madagascar. 
Chapter four discusses relations at the state level, chapter five explores Chinese 
migration to Madagascar, and chapter six analyses the negative impacts that arise 
from China’s increasing engagements on the island. Chapter seven summarises 
the key findings, discusses their implications, and draws out their relevance for 
the study of China’s engagements in developing countries more generally. I seek 
to show that since development impacts of China’s engagements in Madagascar 
are incredibly varied, they ultimately depend on underlying structural and 
political issues that are endemic to Madagascar. I found that levels of local Sino-
Malagasy interactions significantly help determine how China’s engagements 
impact development processes, and that the role of the Malagasy state is crucial in 
managing the engagements and mitigating the negative impacts that do arise from 
them. This suggests that the development impacts of China in Africa depend to a 
large extent on how these are managed and regulated by African host 
governments.  
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Chapter 1: Interrogating the Sino-Malagasy relationship  
 
Introduction 
 
 In November 2010, Madagascar’s internationally unrecognised 
government, the High Authority for the Transition (HAT), announced that it had 
created a holding company called the Madagascar Development Corporation 
(MDC) with the China International Fund (CIF) to implement several large-scale 
infrastructure and investment projects around the country. 1  These projects 
included the creation of the largest cement factory in the Indian Ocean; a tram 
system for the capital, Antananarivo; 10,000 units of low-income housing in and 
around the capital; and an upgrade of the national Air Madagascar fleet.2 The 
schemes were to be financed in part by a signature bonus worth between United 
States (US) $100 million and US $140 million that the HAT had received from 
the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation (WISCO), one of the largest Chinese steel 
producers, for the exploration rights to an iron-ore deposit near Mahajanga earlier 
that year.3 If the WISCO project becomes operational, Madagascar is anticipating 
a total inflow of US $8 billion, which would represent the country’s biggest 
foreign investment to date. Addressing the suspension of all non-humanitarian 
development aid by traditional Western donors since 2009 one month later, Andry 
Rajoelina, the leader of the HAT, proclaimed that, “the future is bright… if the 
West wants to strangle us, we will go breathe towards the East”. More 
specifically, he asserted that Madagascar ought to turn towards China if it wishes 
to position itself at the cutting edge of technology and global economic 
developments. 4 
 
As elsewhere in Africa, China’s engagements in Madagascar are 
multifaceted and growing rapidly. In 2005, Madagascar accounted for 13% of 
Chinese imports to Africa and ranked seventh in terms of Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to African countries. In 2003, China became Madagascar’s 
                                                
1 The Malagasy regime assumed the title “HAT” after the political crisis of 2009, but it was altered 
to “Government of National Unity” (GUN) in March 2011. It is still referred to widely as the 
HAT, and this abbreviation will be utilised throughout this dissertation to connote the current 
government of Madagascar.   
2 Two Air Madagascar Boeing airplanes were banned from European airspace in 2011 due to 
safety concerns.  
3 The WISCO consortium consists of WISCO, Guangdong Foreign Trade Group, and Kam Hing 
International Holdings, who hold stakes of 42%, 38%, and 20%, respectively. Africa-Asia 
Confidential, 2012.  
4 Chauprade, “Sauver Madagascar”, Realpolitik.tv 
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primary source of imports, and it is currently the island’s fifth largest destination 
of exports. 5 Chinese companies have a significant presence in a wide range of 
sectors, including the extractive industries, manufacturing, construction, 
telecommunications, retail, real estate, hospitality, financial services, and 
electronics. Diplomatic and development relations, established in the 1970s, have 
matured concurrently. 52 economic, technical, and political accords were signed 
between the two countries between 1999 and 2009, compared with 15 between 
1991 and 2000.6 China cancelled all of the debt owed to it by Madagascar in 
2005, it picked Madagascar as one of 20 African countries with which to launch a 
hybrid rice centre in 2007, and its state-owned companies (SOEs) have 
constructed several large-scale infrastructure projects, including an International 
Conference Centre (ICC), a new turbine on a hydroelectric dam, and a number of 
roads, schools, hospitals, and sanitation facilities.  
 
In addition, since the late-1990s, Madagascar has been experiencing a 
significant influx of Chinese migrants. The majority of Chinese immigrants arrive 
in Madagascar through personal kinship or business networks and work as small-
scale traders of goods manufactured in China. They either launch their own 
import-export company or work as a salesperson in a friend- or family owned 
shop. They generally settle in the urban areas of downtown Antananarivo, and to 
a lesser extent in the eastern port town and economic hub of Toamasina. Although 
most of the migrants are either transitory or circular, meaning that they are 
temporary, some have become so economically successful that they have 
diversified into other sectors of the economy, and may end up residing in the 
country on a more permanent basis. Quantifying Chinese migrants in Africa is 
notoriously difficult, but the number of Chinese nationals residing currently in 
Madagascar is estimated to be between 70,000 and 100,000, which is relatively 
high compared with the number of Chinese immigrants in most other African 
countries.7 A number of factors specific to Madagascar have facilitated private 
Chinese migration to the island. These include the signing of a bilateral 
immigration agreement between China and Madagascar in 1996, economic 
growth under the regime of former President Marc Ravalomanana, and the 
inauguration of a flight between Antananarivo and Guangzhou, China, in 2008.  
 
                                                
5 Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana, and Rajaobelina, Impact of Investment Relations, and “La 
Chine Premier Partenaire de Madagascar”, Midi Madagasikara, 2012. 
6  Government of Madagascar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. 
7 This number is based on information acquired from existing data, author interviews, and 
informed speculation. Total estimates for the number of Chinese migrants in all of Africa range 
from around 580,000 to over 800,000. See Park, Chinese Migration in Africa, p. 3.  
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  Madagascar is also host to a sizeable community of locally born Malagasy 
residents of Chinese descent, whose existence has made the island especially 
attractive to the new Chinese migrants by allowing the latter to more easily 
integrate into the local economy. Madagascar has the second largest number of 
resident Chinese in Africa and the Indian Ocean.8 The resident Sino-Malagasy 
community composes around 60,000 individuals, or approximately 0.3% of a total 
population of almost 21 million.9 The four states (South Africa, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, and Reunion) that experienced significant earlier waves of Chinese 
immigration now have higher rates of new immigration and display more social, 
economic, and political integration between the new migrants and local 
communities.10 The arrival of the new Chinese immigrants has led to a distinction 
between the “old” and the “new” Chinese, or as they are known locally, “les 
anciens et les nouveaux Chinois”. 11 The old and new Chinese are two distinct 
groups of people. They speak different languages and occupy divergent roles in 
Madagascar’s economy. The old Chinese are well integrated into local society, 
possess Malagasy passports, speak Malagasy, French, and Cantonese, and 
conceive of themselves as Malagasy first and Chinese second, while the new 
Chinese generally view Madagascar as a short-term economic opportunity.  
 
 Despite the progressively catholic nature of Sino-Malagasy relations, local 
perceptions of how the growing Chinese presence affects the daily lives and 
economic prospects of the majority of Malagasy are quite negative. Madagascar is 
one of the poorest countries in the world, and it consistently ranks towards the 
bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI). In 2012, it was classified 151 
out of 187 countries.12 Approximately 70% to 80% of the population lives in rural 
areas under subsistence conditions on an average Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita of US $950.13 The country’s economy is dependent on donor funding. 
In 2008, aid flows accounted for 70% of state revenues, approximately 40% of the 
                                                
8 South Africa possesses the largest community, with close to 200,000 Sino-South Africans in the 
country, and Mauritius has the third largest, numbering close to 40,000. See Park, A Matter of 
Honour, and Sautman and Yan, “Friends and Interests”, 75-114. 
9 Interview with the president of the Chinese congregation on October 5th, 2010. Mauritius, not   
Madagascar, is often thought to have the second largest resident Chinese community in the 
region, but this is only true when the community is conceived of as a percentage of the whole 
population. In Mauritius, which only has a little over one million residents, the Sino-Mauritian 
community accounts for 3% of the population. 
10 See Mohan and Tan-Mullins, “Chinese Migrants in Africa”, 588-605. 
11 Throughout this paper, the “new Chinese” refers to the Chinese migrants who have settled in 
Madagascar since 1990. The term “old Chinese” denotes the community of locally born 
descendants of Chinese immigrants who were already living in Madagascar before 1990. 
12 The HDI measures and compares life expectancy, literacy, education, standards of living, and 
quality of life among all the countries worldwide. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
13 World Bank Databank. See http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. 
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government budget, and 75% of investments in public spending.14 Politics have 
been characterised by two post-colonial attempts at state-led development, an 
ongoing transition to democracy that began in the early-1990s, and a series of 
deep political crises in 1971-72, 1990-91, 2001-02, and 2009. Political structures 
are permeated by ethnic and class-based social dynamics that were inherited from 
the pre-colonial era and exacerbated by French colonial policies. A small group of 
elite families from the capital and the surrounding highlands largely dominates 
the politics of development on the island. Since the formal transition to 
democracy, successive democratic presidents have manipulated the democratic 
process to legitimise their own power and bolster their wealth, while the bulk of 
the population has remained poor.  
 
Approaching this study from a politics of development perspective, I 
maintain that China’s engagement in Madagascar is not inherently positive or 
negative, but contingent on the way the host state manages it. The extent to which 
elements of China’s engagement can be exploited to the benefit of local 
development thus depends to a significant degree on state policy, presence, and 
withdrawal.  Under Ravalomanana’s presidency, the Malagasy government 
broadly deployed some of its institutional strengths to further economic growth. 
While Ravalomanana’s government appropriated some of the gains from China’s 
investments for itself, in general China’s engagement in Madagascar during this 
time was constructive. In contrast, after 2009, as Madagascar’s productive sectors 
were re-oriented to benefit those in power with little positive spillovers onto the 
local economy, the Sino-Malagasy relationship became increasingly 
dysfunctional. The political crisis resulted in a weakened regulatory framework, 
which contributed to economic stagnation outside of the extractive industries and 
the proliferation of political scandals involving the HAT and Chinese SOEs. This 
is especially the case in relation to environmental degradation issues and the 
trafficking of precious wood, of which the latter has transpired with the collusion 
of local and high-level government officials.  
 
 In this dissertation, I explore the developmental effect of China’s 
engagements in Africa, utilising Madagascar as a case study. While cognisant of 
existing controversies and potential negative impacts, I seek to argue that China’s 
engagement is conducive to African development prospects for several reasons. 
My hypothesis has three, related components. First, I maintain that China 
enhances the policy space within which African leaders can determine their 
country’s development paths. This is because China’s approach raises important 
                                                
14  Ploch, Madagascar’s Political Crisis, p. 8, and Bachelard and Marcus, Country at the 
Crossroads, p. 3.  
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questions about the efficacy of development orthodoxy and the role of the state in 
development, and provides African governments an alternative to the neo-liberal 
prescriptions of traditional donors. Second, China’s engagement provides African 
societies with some of the basic infrastructures needed for local private sector 
growth, especially in the domains of health, agriculture, and energy and transport 
infrastructures. Third, the expansion of Chinese companies and traders in Africa 
is contributing to the establishment of new Chinese business networks and supply 
chains that local entrepreneurs can harness. In the proceeding sections of this 
introductory chapter, I discuss the issues relevant to this thesis within the 
literature on China-Africa relations before examining the small body of work 
debating the Chinese presence in Madagascar more specifically. I then outline my 
research methodology and provide an overview of the argument and thesis 
structure.  
 
Issues in China-Africa development relations  
 
A recurring theme in the literature on China and Africa is that China is 
approaching African countries as economic partners with tremendous growth 
opportunities instead of as developing nations in need of assistance. However, the 
vital issue of how this is impacting local development processes is controversial. 
A point of contention is that China is not a donor in the traditional sense, meaning 
that it does not adhere to the post-colonial and Western concept of development 
aid. China is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Donor Assistance Committee (DAC), which is the forum 
for the coordination of development aid among the established donors, which 
include mostly Western countries. DAC member states have common objectives 
concerning the implementation of their aid programmes, and generally follow 
DAC guidelines in the management of development aid. The DAC defines aid as 
official finance intended to promote economic development and welfare that is 
concessional in character, and which contains a grant element of at least 25%.15 
Development aid must be proffered by official development agencies, including 
state and local governments, and not by profit-making companies. DAC donors 
include subventions for foreign students, debt relief, and administrative subsidies 
as part of their definition of development aid, while China does not.16 Instead of 
pursuing “purposive development interventions by multilateral agencies and 
NGOS”, China provides direct budget support to African governments 
predominantly in the form of loans, interest-free credit lines, technical assistance, 
                                                
15 Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power, “Redefining Aid”, 857-881.   
16 Grimm, Transparency of Chinese Aid.  
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and donations.17 The construction of sports facilities, military assistance, and 
subsidised loans for joint ventures are defined as development aid by China, but 
not by the DAC.  
Debates over the politics of Chinese engagement with African 
development have been marked by increasing concern over China’s use of aid in 
exchange for natural resources.18 Chinese budget support is closely linked to other 
financial flows such as trade and investment, which focus on infrastructure and 
other project-based “motors of investment” as levers for economic development 
in Africa.19 The two largest beneficiary sectors of Chinese infrastructure projects 
are power (mainly hydropower) and transport (mainly railroads). 20  Chinese 
infrastructure finance is often extended through the China Export-Import Bank 
(Exim Bank), which has an explicit mission to promote trade and investments. 
Created in 1994, the Exim Bank provides finance export and international loans to 
African governments to hire Chinese companies mainly for the purpose of 
infrastructure construction. The interest rates offered under Exim Bank’s 
concessional loans are often lower than those of multilateral donor agencies, have 
longer repayment periods, and no political conditionalities. 21  Often, the 
mechanism of the loan disbursements are specifically structured so that the Exim 
Bank retains control of the expenditures and pays the Chinese company that has 
undertaken the project directly. Sometimes, Chinese loans are repaid with natural 
resources. This is reflected in the concentration of Chinese loans. In 2008, 
approximately 70% of Chinese infrastructure finance was allocated to just four 
countries: Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia, the first three of which are oil-
exporting states.22 The most widely publicised preferential oil deal occurred in 
2004, when China negotiated a US $2 billion soft loans package with the Angolan 
government to be repaid with future oil windfalls. China extended another US $2 
billion loan to Angola in exchange for oil in 2005, and a US $2,5 billion line of 
credit in 2007.23  
For this reason, China’s engagements in Africa are often viewed as 
reproducing neo-colonial structures of trade dependence, especially in the 
Western media.24 In 2008, the Financial Times portrayed Chinese and American 
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initiatives in Africa in terms of a “new scramble for Africa”.25 Others speak of a 
“21st century scramble”, which similarly evokes recollections of 19th century 
European colonisation on the continent.26 African exports to China grew at an 
annual rate of 48% between 1999 and 2004, but a glance at the composition of 
Sino-African trade flows reveals a widening imbalance.27 In 2004, oil and gas 
accounted for 62% of Africa’s exports to China, ores and metals for 17%, and 
agricultural raw materials for 7%. In 2005, five oil and mineral exporting 
countries, including Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and Sudan 
accounted for 85% percent of African exports to China. 28 Chinese investment in 
Africa is also destined primarily for the extractive industries and has had a limited 
role (largely in apparel) in integrating African countries in the global value 
chain.29 Meanwhile, the majority of African imports from China consist of 
manufactured products ranging from basic consumer goods to machinery and 
electronics. Alden argues that local industries and merchants have been hit hard 
by the flood of cheap Chinese wholesale and retail shops used to establish 
networks to sell goods.30 Adopting a long-term view, Mohan and Power do not 
believe that China’s engagement in Africa will result in radically different results 
from those of other countries because it does not encourage diversification, value-
added industrialisation, or the redistribution of economic rents.31 China is thus 
sometimes viewed as a supplier of “rogue aid”, and its engagements in Africa as 
“…all trade, with no political baggage”.32 
 
An important component of this discourse centres on the issue of 
governance, and more specifically on China’s policy of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of African countries. In eschewing the language of donor-recipient 
that characterises the Western approach to Africa, China also dispenses with the 
issue of democratic governance, and emphasises economic progress over the 
process of development.33 China’s ideological framework is considered to be 
fundamentally at odds with African goals of democratisation as expressed in 
initiatives such as the African Union (AU) or the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD).34 China’s principle of non-interference is viewed as 
constituting an important reason why it has been able to maintain diplomatic 
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relations with countries such as Sudan, which have been marked by long periods 
of military rule.35 Tull argues: “If Sudan provides any clue to the future, it seems 
inconceivable that Beijing, unencumbered by the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur, 
will compromise its interests for the sake of ‘minor’ (domestic) issues such as 
transparency”. 36  Collier posits that the Chinese influence will worsen the 
authoritarian tendencies of African leaders, for “they are none too sensitive when 
it comes to matters of governance”.37 China’s US $2 billion soft loan package to 
Angola in 2008, and Angola’s subsequent termination of negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), is often utilised as an example of how 
“...African governments will see no incentive to move towards democracy or 
reduce corruption, if they see Chinese investment as an easier and more effective 
option than Western aid”.38  
Others place some of the blame for the detrimental political impacts of 
China’s approach on the nature of the post-colonial African state itself. As 
Clapham notes: “one very important reason China’s involvement in Africa has 
been so widely welcomed and readily accommodated has been that it fits so 
neatly into the familiar patterns of rentier statehood and politics with which 
African rulers have been accustomed to maintaining themselves”.39 According to 
Clapham, China’s engagement will not dramatically alter governance in Africa. 
Rather, China will adapt to the different forms of political organisation that occur 
in various African states. Taylor similarly argues: “problematically, it is because 
Beijing neither criticises the lack of democracy in Africa nor strives to advance 
intrusive projects associated with human rights that China is a collaborator 
favoured by many African leaders and their neo-patrimonial regimes. A key 
reason for this is that the type of governance strictures and values that underpin 
the liberal democratic project and are promoted by the West cannot be hurriedly 
implemented without undermining the basis upon which most African presidents 
and their followers base their rule”.40 Elsewhere, he maintains “obviously, there is 
justifiable disquiet that Beijing’s Africa policies may undermine political and 
economic reform on the continent. Before critiquing China’s role in Africa vis-à-
vis governance and human rights, analysts need to understand both China’s 
particular human rights discourse and the nature of most African states, for it is 
here that the real problem lies”.41  
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Yet concerns over China’s political nonchalance in Africa are 
exaggerated, for several reasons. As noted by Woods, “the support for rogue 
states argument quickly slides sideways into a broader critique about the 
economic model being exported by emerging donors” in Africa, such as China.42 
First, statements that China is a new actor in Africa are anachronistic considering 
the historical longevity of Sino-African relations. Many works, including both 
older and more recent publications, situate the new evolution in Sino-African 
affairs in a broad historical context. Snow traces the Sino-African relationship 
from the 4th century A.D., while Yuan as well as Shinn and Eisenmann 
demonstrate important areas of continuity within Sino-African links dating from 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.43  Strauss and 
Saavedra further argue that although China advocated revolution in Africa in the 
1960s, the essential ingredients of China’s political rhetoric in Africa - non-
interference and respect for state sovereignty and mutual cooperation - are the 
same today as they were when diplomatic relations were first established in the 
1960s and 1970s.44 While acknowledging important differences between China’s 
approaches in Africa before and after roughly the 1990s, China’s current 
engagements in African countries are best understood as the most recent 
manifestations of a Sino-African relationship that spans several decades, but 
which has hitherto gone largely unnoticed.45  
 Second, many aspects of China’s engagements are not fundamentally 
different from those of either the other new players on the continent, including 
Brazil, Russia, Iran, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and India, or those of its 
traditional economic partners in the West. As argued by Alden, the “first and most 
important point to make is that Chinese multinational corporations are, in many 
respects, like other state-owned multinational corporations operating in Africa”.46 
Chinese and other economic actors in Africa “simply employ different ideologies 
and practices of governance to conceal their own ambitions and political 
discourses on the African continent”.47 China’s engagements in Africa reveal a 
gap between the normative aspirations in Western development orthodoxy and the 
development impacts of private Western investments in Africa. Critiques of 
China’s engagements in Africa tend to embody a normative assumption of 
inferiority vis-à-vis Western actors in Africa. As argued by Sautman and Yan, 
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Chinese activities in Africa “do violate the human rights of Africans - not in ways 
that Western elites claim, but in much the same manner that Western policies do, 
through disadvantageous terms of trade, the exploitation of natural resources, 
oppressive labour regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers, all common 
features of the modern world system”.48  
 This is especially true in the extractive industries, where Western companies 
have a questionable record of environmental and development impacts. 
Researchers have documented the US and France’s close political ties with 
notoriously corrupt leaders in countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.49 
Ferguson shows that Western capital “hops” over “l’Afrique inutile” (useless 
Africa) from enclave to enclave via “transnational networks that link dispersed 
spaces in a selective, point-to-point fashion”, meaning that much of the 
investments pouring into African states from Western countries do not exert any 
tangible impact on the lives of the majority of the local populations.50 What 
Soares de Oliveira terms the “oil nexus”, which is a “mutually rewarding 
relationship between firms with the technical know-how, states with legal 
ownership of resources, and consumer states”, sustains the domestic political 
arrangements and international importance of the oil-exporting African state 
while neglecting the needs of the majority of its population. Since they are both a 
part of this nexus, in this respect Chinese corporations are not vastly different 
from Western companies. 51  Corrupt politicians have always found ways to 
maintain their bases of power in their dealings with foreign actors, and they will 
inevitably seek to profit from the influx of Chinese capital and investments.  
Third, China is sensitive to local politics when they affect its own 
investments or foreign policy goals. China does impose political conditionalities 
on African states when it comes to its Taiwan policy or the creation of voting 
blocs in multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN). When 
China’s emphasis on economic rights over civil liberties and political 
accountability threatens its own economic interests in African countries, it will 
interfere in local politics. China’s recent support for a peacekeeping force in 
Darfur, and its call on the government of Omar el Bashir to exercise flexibility in 
its dealings with the UN, demonstrate that it is clearly not immune to international 
opinion and pressure in relation to “rogue” African nations. China’s relationship 
with Zimbabwe also does not fully bear out the critique. China has responded 
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quietly to concerns voiced by other African states, taken a tougher line with 
President Mugabe, met with opposition politicians, and recently turned around a 
Chinese shipment of arms to Zimbabwe.52 Taylor notes that “if whilst adhering to 
the principle of non-interference, Chinese activities actually make things worse 
for some in Africa, then Beijing’s argument that basic socio-economic rights are 
more important for the poor than abstract political rights is potentially 
problematic. This is because there is a danger that Beijing’s engagement in Africa 
might be exploited by autocrats on the continent for their own, well-understood, 
reasons. Doing no harm, rather than a studied disinterest, needs to be part of 
China’s overall African policy, something that Beijing is bound to recognise”. 53  
Lastly, China does not reject the importance of effective governance for 
African development. It has assumed where necessary a more sequentialist 
position to democratisation and development in Africa. Sequentialists, who follow 
the basic arguments expounded by modernisation theorists in the 1960s, maintain 
that meaningful democratisation is only likely to occur in countries that have 
already attained an intermediate level of economic development.54 Economic 
development, producing increased income, greater economic security, and 
widespread higher education, “largely determines the form of the social struggles 
that lead to democratic political bargaining by permitting those in the lower strata 
to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of 
politics”. 55  From this perspective, premature, out-of-sequence attempts to 
democratise may make subsequent efforts to democratise more difficult and more 
violent than they would otherwise be.56 Importantly, China is careful to support 
African-led efforts to consolidate their democracies and strengthen their 
institutions for development through initiatives such as the NEPAD. However, 
while China supports NEPAD, it repeatedly stresses that it does so through the 
framework of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC), thereby avoiding 
the potentially awkward position of having to support the key structural elements 
that are ultimately necessary for NEPAD’s success: transparency, democracy, free 
press, civil society, independent judiciary, and rule of law.57 
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China has been characterised as a “new partner in development”, 
especially within Africa itself.58 China’s growing engagements in Africa are 
instigating a shift in the international system, where African governments are 
presented with novel choices for development partners.59 This enables African 
leaders to engage with “alternative investors, aid donors, and trade partners, 
increasing their leverage in negotiations and reducing pressures to conform to the 
liberal agenda”.60 Dietz, Havnevik, Kaag, and Oestigaard argue that since political 
or popular opposition to China in African countries is linked to a reinvigoration of 
economic nationalism and African challenges to neoliberal and Western 
development orthodoxy, the Chinese involvement on the African continent 
changes the context in which African states can exert their sovereignty.61 A 
defining feature of China’s approach is that it underlines the need to operate 
within existing political realities that condition local processes of development. 
China does not generalise about the “predatory” nature of African politics, nor 
does it attempt to impose its own model of political organisation. 
This has important implications for the role of the state in Sino-African 
development relations. Instead of reducing the power of the state to drive 
economic policies, China’s growing engagement in Africa may “re-configure, re-
spatialise, and potentially increase the economic and political power of certain 
states”.62 Naidu celebrates China as having a “fresh approach to development 
assistance, which eschews any interference in domestic affairs, emphasises 
partnership and solidarity among developing nations, and offers an alternative 
development model based on a more central role for the state”.63 By prioritising 
state effectiveness, infrastructure, and private sector growth instead of an abstract 
notion of governance as essential to development, China is considered to be 
offering African governments “much more practical advice” than the World Bank 
or other Western development agencies have in the past.64  
Sino-African development relations are characterised by a strong 
bilateralism, which further emphasises the important role of the African state 
within this relationship. Dramatic increases in visits by top Chinese leaders to 
African nations form part of China’s “charm offensive” to develop working 
relations with African leaders “where they explain and market China’s new 
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program of aid and economic cooperation”. 65  An emphasis on high-level 
diplomacy is also found within the FOCAC, which was launched in 2000 as a 
vehicle to project Chinese foreign policy objectives and development aid in 
Africa through commitments and pledges in consultation with African leaders. 
Chinese and African heads of state have met at FOCAC summits four times since 
the first such meeting was held in Beijing in 2000. Further summits were 
convened in Addis Ababa in 2003, in Beijing in 2006, in Sharm-el-Sheik in 2009, 
and again in Beijing in 2012. The summits focused on political affairs, regional 
peace and security, cooperation in international affairs, economic cooperation, 
development cooperation, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges and 
cooperation.66 At the FOCAC meeting in 2012, Chinese president Hu Jintao 
pledged a new US $20 billion in credit for African countries over the next three 
years, emphasising that the loans would support transport infrastructure, 
agriculture, and the development of private sector small business.67  
The development of public infrastructures has been a key feature of 
China’s engagement in Africa for over six decades. As explained by Brautigam, 
China has had a strong history of agriculture, health, and project-based 
development partnerships in Africa since the 1950s.68 Between 1956 and 2005, 
China provided US $44 billion in low- or no-interest loans to African states for 
900 infrastructure projects. 69  China is building roads, hospitals, schools, 
telecommunication grids, fibre-optic cable lines, and hydroelectric power 
facilities throughout Africa. Project-based infrastructure investments are generally 
viewed as constructive, especially where these serve to increase the well-being of 
the population or where they foster economic exchanges.70 It is “on a scale large 
enough to make an important material contribution to meeting Africa’s vast 
infrastructure needs” and “offers an important development opportunity for the 
region”.71  As Ikpe shows, the process of structural transformation from an 
agricultural-based economy to an industrial one in sub-Saharan Africa depends to 
                                                
65 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, and Brautigam, “Flying Geese or Hidden Dragon?”, 51-69, p. 83.  
66 While FOCAC is an interactive body that regularly meets to negotiate Chinese aid and 
development commitments to African countries, the African Policy Paper (Policy Paper), 
published in 2006, describes China’s Africa strategy in more definite terms and highlights the 
long-term approach of China’s engagement. The Policy Paper identifies four priority areas of 
Sino-Africa bilateral cooperation: diplomacy, economics, human resource development, and 
peace and security. See Government of China, African Policy Paper, 2006. 
67 “China Pledges $20 Bn in Credit”, BBC News, July 19, 2012.  
68 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift.  
69 “China Looks to Africa”, Associated Press, June 18, 2006.  
70 Moyo, Winner Take All, and Foster et al., China’s Growing Role. 
71 Foster et al., China’s Growing Role, p. iix. 
 28 
a large extent on its ability to create the necessary infrastructural foundations on 
which to implement industrial policies.72  
Although infrastructure development also features prominently among 
Western development institutions, the financing made available by China is 
unprecedented in size and in its commitment to large-scale projects. China is 
particularly successful at implementing these projects due to its cost 
competitiveness, access to cheap capital through Chinese state-owned banks, the 
availability of skilled low cost labour from China, cheap building materials 
through supply chains from China, and political support from the Chinese 
government channelled through the Chinese embassies in the respective African 
countries.73 The political support Chinese firms and investors receive from their 
government is crucial in determining the long-term viability of China’s 
engagement on processes of development in Africa. By virtue of being a one-
party state, China’s government is able to formulate and operationalise long-term 
economic strategies more effectively than Western companies or development 
institutions.74  
The most recent manifestation of China’s approach to infrastructure 
development has been the establishment of Chinese-built Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), including principally Export-Processing Zones (EPZs) in Africa, 
reflecting the “internationalisation of the developmental state” by China.75 At the 
FOCAC meeting in 2006, China approved the construction of eight official SEZs 
in Africa.76 SEZs and EPZs are not new in Africa, but with the exception of a few 
countries, including Madagascar, their levels of success have been relatively 
disappointing. Local government participation in these ventures has been low, and 
they have been unable to deliver the soft and hard infrastructure necessary to 
ensure that the advantages of the SEZs spill over to the local business sector and 
surrounding communities. 77  In theory, however, SEZs can benefit the local 
government through tax revenue, significant investment inflows, industrialisation 
and increased competitiveness, the business community through the creation of 
new business opportunities, economic spill-overs, improved infrastructure, and 
technology transfers, and the local communities through job creation and capacity 
building.78 They allow African states to improve their infrastructure, inadequate 
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services, and weak institutions by focusing efforts on a limited geographical area 
in order to promote labour-intensive manufacturing. The increased Chinese 
presence in Africa might thus play a positive role by providing a model for “low-
tech industrial development, stimulating the spin-off of manufacturing, or acting 
to jump start local investment”.79 China’s success with SEZs to promote growth at 
home, the high-profile nature of the initiatives (they were announced at the 
FOCAC forum in 2006) and corresponding economic and political imperatives of 
establishing successful African SEZs, and the profit-making incentives of Chinese 
firms have been cited as reasons why Chinese SEZ projects in Africa may 
succeed where others have failed.80  
The influx of temporary Chinese migrant traders, an often-overlooked 
component of China’s presence in Africa, is increasingly viewed as 
complementing infrastructure developments to promote economic exchanges in 
Africa. Mistry maintains that to connect Africa to the global economy in 
productive ways will require “the installation and embedding in Africa of human, 
social, and institutional capital from abroad…particularly from the developing 
world, especially China. In short, it will require large-scale immigration of a kind 
that diversifies, widens, deepens and augments Africa’s limited human resource 
base”.81 When local African entrepreneurs learn valuable skills from their Chinese 
counterparts and utilise newly formed Chinese business networks to harness their 
own entrepreneurialism, it can lead to the development of local private sector 
growth. As Friedman maintains, “contrary to conventional wisdom, China is 
already exporting entrepreneurial talent to Africa and dynamising the African 
economy through East Asian practices…with so many huge wealth opportunities 
suddenly available, and so much more in the offering, however much is wasted or 
is serving only elites, the extraordinary wealth and dynamism of the Chinese-
initiated entrepreneurial frenzy should most likely transform large sectors of 
Africa”.82 Yet, as described by Dobler, without the “implementation of a political 
framework that channels Chinese investment into sectors where it could really 
benefit the country’s economy, small-scale Chinese businesses in Africa are 
unlikely to have a positive impact on the country’s developmental prospects as a 
whole”.83 The host government thus also plays an important role in facilitating the 
ability of local entrepreneurs to meet the challenges and opportunities presented 
to them by the new presence of Chinese actors in their countries. Ultimately, the 
development impacts arising from the growth of Chinese companies and private 
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entrepreneurs in Africa will depend on both the formulation of African 
expectations in terms of what they hope to gain from the Chinese engagements, 
and on the implementation of appropriate methods to achieve them.84 
A number of policy recommendations for African government to manage 
China’s growing engagements have been suggested at both the local and regional 
levels. Locally, Morrissey and Zgovu argue that the ability of domestic producers 
to compete with Chinese aid, trade, and investment relationships in sub-Saharan 
Africa, especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors, should be the focus of 
concerted government policy.85 Alden insists that China’s emphasis on resource 
extraction and the accompanying needs of Chinese industry ought to be 
recognised as an opportunity for African governments to arrange for favourable 
terms on a range of issues. He further maintains that it should be standard practice 
for African states to demand that foreign investors, including China, link together 
a package of investment projects that meet local development goals.86 African 
leaders can also formulate a concerted response to Chinese activities in their 
countries at the regional or continental levels. Munyi proposes concrete 
supranational policy action plans embodied in standardised frameworks within the 
AU or the African Development Bank (ADB), rather than having China deal 
exclusively with African countries bilaterally or as just a conglomeration of 
countries with parallel visions. An African “China policy”, he maintains, would 
“give each African country a veritable platform to claim for nationally desired 
outcomes as well as to concede to the continental aggregated objectives”.87  
At the current stage of research, a coherent analysis of how Sino-African 
relations are changing the contexts of development in African countries depends 
on a disaggregation of both “China” and “Africa”. Moreover, acknowledging that 
China’s approach may offer useful lessons for other development partners allows 
for the adoption of new theoretical perspectives with which to analyse the 
engagement. Thinking “outside the box” furthers the process of determining 
which aspects of China’s engagement will prove beneficial to Africans and should 
be fostered, and which have the opposite effects and need to be better regulated. 
The most productive way of approaching this endeavour is through case studies. 
As argued by Large, it is necessary to “go beyond the framework of a monolithic 
Chinese dragon in an unvariegated African bush and consider the different levels 
and dynamics of the emerging Chinese relations with 48 sub-Saharan African 
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states”.88 Over the past few years, a growing number of detailed empirical case 
studies that offer new insights into the China-Africa relationship have emerged.89 
However, “few make a new conceptual or theoretical contribution to the 
subject”.90 By focusing on the role of the African state in managing China’s 
engagements, I seek to help minimise this gap in the literature. Furthermore, by 
utilising Madagascar as a case study, I am enlarging the empirical literature on 
China’s presence in Africa. 
 
The literature on China and Madagascar 
 
The Sino-Madagascar relationship has received little scholarly or public 
attention compared with China’s involvements in many other African countries, 
belying its scale, depth, and pertinence. Madagascar’s unique geographical 
location, the arguably related and relative lack of Western geopolitical or strategic 
interest (with the exception of France) in economic or political processes on the 
island, and the fact that Chinese trade with Africa is concentrated in eight of its 
most resource-rich states helps account for this.91 Those studies that do mention 
Madagascar tend to include the country in lists of Chinese migrant populations on 
the continent. Of these, many source their figures from a database of Chinese 
migration to African countries published by Ohio University in 2001, which 
estimated that 30,000 Chinese were living in Madagascar at that time. 92  Guerrero 
and Manji, as well as Park, refer to this database in their compilations of the 
number of Chinese in select African countries, including Madagascar.93 Park, 
however, does not reference Madagascar at all in the following statement: “By far 
the largest number of Chinese can be found in South Africa, followed by Nigeria. 
Sudan, Angola, Algeria, and Mauritius are the only other countries with well over 
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89 See Kohnert, “Chinese and Nigerian Cultures of Innovation”, 1-31, Dobler, “Oshikango”, 115-
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10,000 Chinese”.94 In their estimates of Chinese populations in several African 
countries, Sautman and Yan also omit the case of Madagascar.95  
The literature that does concentrate on the Chinese presence in 
Madagascar is generally based in the fields of anthropology, history, or 
geography, and the majority of it is out-dated. Relevant studies usually focus 
either on the old Chinese community on the island or on relations between the old 
and new Chinese. There are several French-language ethnographic and 
anthropological investigations of the old Chinese community in Madagascar, but 
they are difficult to locate, and the majority of them were published in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 96  English-language publications on the topic include a Ph.D. 
dissertation on Chinese migration to California and Madagascar from 1987 and a 
translated edition of Slawecki’s 1971 study of French policy towards the Chinese 
in Madagascar.97 More recent scholarship explores the links between the old and 
new Chinese in Madagascar. A Master’s thesis by a student from the University 
of Antananarivo provides a very interesting account of the old Chinese 
community in Toamasina, and Raveloarimanana analyses the old Sino-Malagasy 
community’s current levels of social integration with the Malagasy and the new 
Chinese.98 Finally, Fournet-Guérin traces the growing presence of new Chinese 
entrepreneurial migrants in Antananarivo in 2006 and 2007.99  
Veeck and Diop published an article in 2012 that situates the relationship 
between the old and new Chinese migrants in Madagascar within the broader 
backdrop of Sino-African relations. The paper provides an overview of local 
Malagasy perceptions concerning the new Chinese and vice versa. However, its 
choice of methodology and its small pool of interviewees limit its wider 
relevance. The article also does not go into detail on Chinese trade, FDI, or 
political relations with Madagascar, and in general the piece is more descriptive 
than analytical. The authors base their findings on informal interviews with six 
Chinese shopkeepers and a summary of blog comments and press articles in four 
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leading online Malagasy newspapers. The authors note that the new Chinese 
expressed very polite inclinations towards the Malagasy in interviews and that 
only the blogs reflected anger with them, which I did not find to be the case in my 
research.  Additionally, the study does not address the ways in which local 
perceptions influence Sino-Malagasy economic relations at the various levels of 
society. The article asserts that “the Malagasy government should appreciate the 
complexity of the current situation and work to diffuse anti-Chinese sentiments, 
rather than rely on anti-foreign sentiment to divert attention away from 
government failings”, but it does not further substantiate this finding or its 
important implications.100 
The second largest thematic category within Sino-Malagasy scholarship 
centres on the environment. The director of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Madagascar wrote an article on China’s interests 
in Madagascar’s extractive industries in 2010 that remains the most authoritative 
study on this particular aspect of China’s engagements in Madagascar, but it is 
constrained by Sino-pessimism and more generally by an unbalanced analysis.101  
Rio Tinto/QIT Madagascar Minerals (QMM) and Sherritt International 
Corporation (Sherritt), the two biggest Western mining investors in Madagascar, 
exhibit severe shortcomings in their environmental and social responsibilities, but 
the author does not mention these at all. He overwhelmingly concentrates on the 
detrimental social and environmental practices of Chinese firms and on their 
disregard for Malagasy mining regulations and contractual requirements. A 
briefing note by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) similarly argues that the lack of 
a clear environmental policy from both the Malagasy and Chinese authorities 
exacerbates the negative effects that Chinese investments are exerting on the 
environment. The briefing note provides an overview of several related issues, 
including Chinese investments in the extractive industries, the trafficking of wild 
animals, and the illegal logging and smuggling of precious woods.102  
Several reports point to the existence of dubious business links between 
Chinese traffickers and public officials from both the local and national Malagasy 
government in the exploitation of Madagascar’s natural resources. A study by the 
environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Global Witness and the 
Environmental Investigation Agency implicates elements of the Malagasy 
political establishment in the illegal rosewood trade.103 In what is quite an 
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exhaustive study, Randriamalala and Liu list the names of Chinese firms allegedly 
involved in the logging and trafficking of rosewood, and describe their business 
relations with specific local Malagasy authorities in detail.104 A brief article in the 
Africa Research Bulletin argues that Madagascar’s natural resources are 
exchanged for infrastructure deals with the HAT. A piece in Africa-Asia 
Confidential discusses the opaque relationship between the CIF and the HAT.105 
The Indian Ocean Newsletter also regularly comments on the extent of Chinese 
investments in Madagascar’s mining industry and the role of Chinese financial 
assistance in prolonging the power of the HAT and Madagascar’s economic 
stagnation. 106  
While China’s activities in the extractive industries and its environmental 
impacts have garnered the most criticism from foreign commentators, voices 
within Madagascar’s private sector and media outlets tend to highlight the 
detrimental economic impacts that an uneven trade relationship is exerting on the 
local industry. Existing overviews of the Sino-Malagasy economic relationship 
reveal that Sino-Malagasy trade and investments have been increasing 
significantly since 2006. 107  A Sino-Malagasy trade imbalance, where China 
imports raw materials from Madagascar and Madagascar imports manufactured 
items from China, has led to proliferation of negative reports in the local media. 
Chinese merchants and products have been characterised as “flooding” the 
Malagasy market and aggressively pushing away local competition, which is 
viewed as leaving Malagasy consumers little choice in their purchases.108 Yet, 
less sensationalist analysis concedes that there are also some positive aspects 
arising from the influx of Chinese consumer goods in Madagascar.  
It is increasingly accepted that Chinese traders are providing Malagasy 
consumers with a new range of affordable and useful products in both urban and 
rural areas. The introduction of Chinese electronics such as televisions and radios 
were touted as having democratised sound and the dissemination of information 
in Madagascar.109 Mobile phones and the introduction of affordable bicycles and 
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vehicles have facilitated access to these modes of communication and transport 
for the poor and middle-income Malagasy, which has the potential to increase 
local productivity.110 The influx of Chinese goods is also increasingly viewed as 
creating employment opportunities for the Malagasy. In 2010, the Malagasy press 
reported “if the Chinese were to move their business to another country or return 
home as a result of the economic and political insecurities in the country, 
unemployment numbers could swell”.111 Asking what Madagascar can gain from 
the Sino-Malagasy relationship, Ramiandrisoa, Razafindravonona, and 
Rafalimanana conclude that while the trade imbalance between China and 
Madagascar clearly favours China, Madagascar’s exports to China have increased 
nonetheless. Taking Chinese investments and employment creation in 
Madagascar into account, they perceive the Sino-Malagasy relationship as 
mutually beneficial.112  
The importance of the domestic political context in determining the 
development impacts of China’s engagements in Madagascar, which is a central 
theme of this dissertation, has only been vaguely alluded to in the literature on 
China in Madagascar. In his article on China’s responses to five political coups in 
Africa, Holslag approaches the Sino-Malagasy relationship from the perspective 
of China instead of from the Malagasy state and argues that China has not greatly 
altered its policies towards the island since the 2009 coup d’état. His analysis 
reduces the capacity of the Malagasy state to formulate a policy towards China by 
characterising it as inherently unstable. 113  Holslag points to the range of 
commercial agreements that have continued to be concluded between China and 
Madagascar, and China’s reluctance to formally condemn the 2009 coup, to 
support his claim that China’s policy of non-interference is helping the HAT stay 
in power. However, he overlooks the importance of China not having officially 
recognised the transitional government either and the fact that Chinese diplomats 
do not have overt relations with high-level Malagasy cabinet members and 
ministers. While Sino-Malagasy relations have continued relatively unfettered at 
the economic level, evidence suggests that China has adjusted its political 
engagement of Madagascar.  Holslag’s analysis would also have been enhanced 
by an evaluation of how the advent of the crisis has altered not just China’s policy 
towards Madagascar, but Madagascar’s approach towards China.   
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Two other works address the Sino-Malagasy politics of development. The 
first is a study by Pellerin published in early 2011.114 Pellerin demonstrates 
detailed knowledge of many of the main actors and key personal relationships in 
Malagasy society and politics, but his discussion lacks quantitative data and does 
not sufficiently contextualise the Sino-Malagasy relationship. Simply put, Pellerin 
attempts too much in too short an article. He traces the history of the Chinese 
community in Madagascar and analyses the links and relationships between the 
old and the new Chinese. He then discusses bilateral relations between the two 
countries and the nature of relations between China and the HAT since 2009. He 
rightly argues that the presence of Chinese economic actors in Madagascar also 
represents opportunities for Malagasy businessmen through the introduction of 
new business links and the launch of the Air Madagascar flight to Guangzhou. 
Unfortunately, he does not further discuss the implications of this key finding, but 
focuses on the fact that China in Madagascar is not a monolithic actor. This is 
correct and in constant need of reiteration, but merely stating it tells us little about 
what this means for Madagascar’s development prospects.    
The second is an unpublished report commissioned by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) in Madagascar in late 2011.115 This study provides a good overview of 
China’s economic presence in the country, but displays a limited understanding of 
the Malagasy political landscape and social setting of the Chinese engagement, 
and uncritically documents the Chinese presence in Madagascar. China’s 
engagement is viewed as contributing to the economic disempowerment of the 
poor in Madagascar, which according to the analysis causes the recurrent 
uprisings against successive regimes. This circumvents the related issue of 
political disempowerment and the fact that rival political factions within the 
Malagasy elite have largely created the social uprisings that ended successive 
regimes themselves. The report also states that the bulk of China’s investments in 
Madagascar are state directed in value terms, but it not does clarify which values 
it is addressing. The majority of Chinese investments in Madagascar have not 
been state-directed when one considers that the contribution of independent and 
small-scale entrepreneurs and network links may be equally as valuable (or 
perhaps even more valuable) as hard cash inflows. The study also highlights the 
                                                
114 Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor. UNDP and UNICEF hired Frontier Advisory, a South African 
advisory firm specialising in Asian-African business relationships, to conduct the study, who in 
turn then hired me to assist them with logistics, translations, interviews, contacts, and 
background research during their three weeks of fieldwork in Antananarivo in August 2011. I 
did not assist with the write-up of the report.  
115 United Nations, “Understanding the Magnitude”. 
 37 
illegal export of rosewood but does not reference the roles of non-Chinese actors 
in this process, nor does it mention the fact that Chinese merchants are also 
smuggling sea cucumbers, shark fins, or endangered turtles. The report further 
states that China is attempting to rectify the trade imbalance with Madagascar 
through a zero-tariff Preferential Trade Agreement (Trade Agreement) negotiated 
in 2005, which allows Madagascar to export around 5,000 duty-free goods to 
China. However, close to 90% of eligible Malagasy goods are primary, 
unmanufactured products, and the increased exportation of these items does not 
necessarily contribute to the growth of local value-added manufacturing. 
Nonetheless, the report is welcomed as it engages with a topic that has not 
adequately been addressed and because it lists hitherto undocumented information 
concerning Chinese development aid, bilateral trade, and investments in 
Madagascar. 
In sum, apart from some anthropological work on the relations between 
the old and new Chinese, in-depth research on the more recent Chinese 
engagements in Madagascar is scarce, especially within English-speaking 
academia. Most research on the subject is limited by a focus on one aspect of 
China’s engagement, or considering the contemporary and fluid nature of the 
subject, the passage of time. Research on Madagascar’s economic relationship 
with China has thus far been more investigatory than analytical.  Pellerin’s paper, 
the UN piece, and the article by Veeck and Diop are more encompassing, topical, 
and intrinsically valuable to the study of China in Madagascar, but their 
respective gaps in knowledge underscore the relevance of this study. None of the 
literature adequately discusses the role of the Malagasy state in influencing 
China’s development impacts in the country.  
 
Research methodology  
 
The empirical information presented in this dissertation is based on several 
periods of fieldwork conducted in Antananarivo between September 2010 and 
July 2012. The bulk of the information acquired during fieldwork is qualitative 
and was derived from formal and informal interviews with 153 individuals. All 
Chinese interviewees spoke French or English, apart from the small-scale private 
Chinese entrepreneurs, who were questioned with a Mandarin translator. The 
majority of interviewees, 40 in total, consisted of the new Chinese in Madagascar, 
comprising embassy officials, representatives from Chinese SOEs, and small-
scale traders. I also interviewed 32 members of the current Malagasy government, 
including key ministers, 18 operators and consumers from the Malagasy private 
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sector, and 31 individuals from the international diplomatic and development 
communities in the country. In addition, I questioned 10 Malagasy academics and 
journalists, eight foreign investors in Madagascar, seven Western academics and 
journalists, and seven prominent individuals from the old Sino-Malagasy 
community. Figure 1 provides an overview of the different categories of 
individuals interrogated for this research.  
Figure 1: Categories of individuals interviewed for this thesis. 
 
 
Other research methods included numerous informal discussions, 
participant observation of key events, and where available, the collection of 
statistics and data from the Malagasy government, NGOs, the UN, and 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) including the World Bank and the IMF. 
The majority of quantitative economic figures concerning the new Chinese 
engagement in the country were acquired from the Malagasy National Institute of 
Statistics (INSTAT). Data was also principally gathered from the Malagasy 
Ministry of Commerce, the Malagasy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Malagasy Permanent Technical Secretariat for Aid Coordination. Analysing the 
overwhelmingly qualitative information required the synthesis of a wide range of 
multiple sources and insights. I began with a large set of disparate information 
and progressively narrowed it down into smaller sets of thematic groups. After 
having organised the data, I identified patterns in the subject matter, from which I 
could then derive key findings and formulate conclusions. 
Having spent part of my childhood in Madagascar, I was quickly able to 
reconnect with old friends upon my arrival and lived with a Malagasy family in 
Antananarivo. I was already acquainted with some of the social and political 
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intricacies of the country and familiar with Malagasy customs, cultural habits and 
etiquettes, which facilitated interaction with Malagasy nationals. These factors 
afforded me access to a wide range of Malagasy society, including local 
consumers and private sector actors. It also facilitated contact with members of 
the current government and allowed me to interview key ministers and officials 
from the HAT. My background, the small size of the expatriate community, and 
the lull in diplomatic activity due to the current political crisis concurrently eased 
my entry into the diplomatic and development community. The knowledge 
gathered during fieldwork is thus based on a triangulation of information from 
different formal and informal sources, participant observation of important events, 
and insights acquired through personal experience as well as existing and newly 
formed relationships. Many of the findings in this study are supplemented by 
anecdotes from which I have documented and quoted interviewees to provide a 
sense of local experiences. 
 
Organisation of the dissertation  
 
This dissertation is organised into seven chapters. In chapter two I discuss 
Madagascar’s economic and development history, and analyse the structural and 
social characteristics of the Malagasy state since independence from France in 
1960 until today. Madagascar’s political past is characterised by the long reign of 
former President Didier Ratsiraka and a difficult and ongoing transition to 
democracy in the early-1990s. Madagascar’s first president, Philibert Tsiranana, 
maintained the basic structures that the state had inherited from its colonial rulers, 
which kept local Malagasy businesses out of industry and disenfranchised large 
sections of the population. Tsiranana was overthrown in 1972, after which the 
country was briefly ruled by the military. President Ratsiraka, a former general, 
assumed power in 1975 and presided over the country as a socialist and 
increasingly autocratic dictator until the advent of multiparty democracy in 1993. 
Madagascar’s first democratic president, Albert Zafy, was elected in 1993 and 
impeached in 1996, which led to Ratsiraka’s return to the presidency in 1996. 
Marc Ravalomanana then became president in 2002 after a disputed election 
resulted in a six-month long standoff with Ratsiraka that brought the country to 
the brink of civil war. In 2009, Ravalomanana was unconstitutionally ejected 
from power in what has been internationally condemned as a coup d’état by 
Rajoelina. Since then, Madagascar continues to be embroiled in a political crisis, 
with negative consequences for the population.  
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In this chapter, I show that strategies of development in Madagascar must 
account for a type of power that is based on impersonal formal institutions that are 
deeply embedded in ethnic and class-based political networks. Though not overtly 
ethnic, Malagasy politics is dominated by a small group of historically influential 
Malagasy families who retain close ties to the French and new business elites. 
With the exception of a few coastal leaders, these families hail from the central 
highlands around Antananarivo and are predominantly of Merina ethnicity. 
During his years in power, Ratsiraka had constructed a network of alliances that 
continues to shape elite bargaining among the Malagasy today. The persistence of 
the old Franco-Malagasy network helps explain why neither the state-led 
development projects of the post-colonial era, nor the attempts at neoliberal 
reform in the post-1993 transition to democracy have succeeded in engendering 
long-term growth or poverty reduction in Madagascar. All four of Madagascar’s 
democratic presidents have manipulated their position for personal gain through 
the legitimising tool of a national referendum, the punishment of their 
predecessors, and the domination of their political parties. Since the elite 
bargaining process continues to take precedence over wider social or economic 
considerations, none of the post-1993 leadership transitions have occurred 
through the peaceful election of a new president. Inevitably, civil society and the 
majority of the population are marginalised from processes of development in the 
country.  
In chapter three, I emphasise the importance of local politics for 
development by investigating Madagascar’s politics of development under 
Ravalomanana between 2002 and 2008 more closely. In particular, drawing on 
the notion of the developmental state, I explore to what extent the Malagasy 
government under the leadership of Ravalomanana could be considered 
developmental. I discuss the concept of the developmental state and its contested 
applicability to Africa. I argue that when adapted to the modern African context, a 
flexible interpretation of the developmental state concept is relevant to help 
explore the tensions between state, society, and development in Africa. I 
consequentially explore the two most successful instances of African 
developmental states – Botswana and Mauritius. I then explore the characteristics 
of Ravalomanana’s government and his governance style within this framework. 
 I maintain that Ravalomanana’s government broadly displayed 
characteristics commonly associated with a developmental state, such as a vision 
for long-term growth, the articulation of a development plan, an emphasis on 
infrastructural growth, education, and the attraction of foreign investment, a 
mechanisms to centralise rents, and the attainment of economic growth. After 
Ravalomanana became president, he embarked on an ambitious economic plan 
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informed by the experiences of the East Asian developmental states and an 
admiration for China’s rapid rates of industrialisation. By the time he was ousted 
from power, substantial inroads had been made towards fixing several of 
Madagascar’s most pressing economic problems. However, Ravalomanana’s 
overthrow in 2009 suggests that there was no unified and agreed development 
agenda amongst the Malagasy elite and that Ravalomanana prioritised his private 
interest over the national one, and as a result that during this time there was no 
developmental state in Madagascar per se.  
Ravalomanana’s network and leadership style was incongruous with that 
of the traditional Malagasy elite, which allowed him to break free of the 
previously unconstructive neopatrimonial networks that had constricted 
Madagascar’s development prospects, but which ultimately led to his downfall. 
Although he was an ethnic Merina from the highlands, Ravalomanana was born 
into a family of modest means and was not a member of one of the influential 
families. He embraced capitalism from an early age, studied abroad, and created 
his own wealth by becoming the largest producer and distributor of dairy products 
in Madagascar. His political power was based more on popular legitimacy than on 
an elite consensus, which meant that he was under significant pressure to build his 
own political support network. In the process, he conflated his personal business 
with that of the government to such an extent that the boundaries between state 
and society needed for a lasting developmental state became unclear.  
In chapter four, I turn to the Sino-Malagasy relationship at the state level 
and discuss China’s diplomatic and economic relations with Madagascar. I 
explore the relationship from a historical perspective, beginning with the 
establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, and discuss development cooperation 
under each of Madagascar’s presidents. In the 1970s, China began sending 
medical missions to Madagascar as part of an Africa-wide initiative. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, China constructed a highway connecting Antananarivo to Toamasina 
and built a sports stadium in Antananarivo. Since 2002, the Sino-Malagasy 
relationship has become closer and more multidimensional. China’s engagements 
in Madagascar influenced both Ravalomanana’s vision for development and its 
implementation, but China has had to adapt its approach in Madagascar to the 
political crisis on the island. I then debate the difficulty of determining Chinese 
development aid to Madagascar, provide an overview of Chinese aid projects 
since 1992, and discuss China’s hybrid rice initiative in Madagascar. Next, I 
review trade and investment figures and show that Malagasy exports to China 
consist overwhelmingly of raw materials and metals, while Madagascar imports 
manufactured products.  
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Addressing the negative images of Chinese construction projects in Africa, 
I also analyse the operations of Chinese SOEs in Madagascar and demonstrate 
that multilateral development organisations are increasingly accepting China’s 
role as a provider of vital infrastructures. I show that many Chinese SOEs in 
Madagascar are hired by development finance agencies such as the World Bank, 
the ADB, the European Investment Bank (EIB), or the Arab Development Bank 
(BADA) to construct their projects. This also points to two other, similarly 
important ideas. It suggests that there exist areas for enhanced collaboration 
between Western donors and Chinese multinationals and SOEs who are ready and 
able to venture into new markets such as Africa. Through these types of 
collaborations, Chinese and Western agencies can work together and learn from 
each other. Second, and in relation to the first point, engaging Chinese SOEs and 
treating them as equal development partners gives Western development 
practitioners potential leeway to ensure that construction projects built by Chinese 
firms conform to international environmental, safety, or other standards.  
Chapter five moves from state-to-state relations to those between the 
Chinese migrants and Madagascar’s private sector. Since the 1990s, Madagascar 
has accommodated an accelerating influx of migrants from China that will affect 
local Malagasy society and producers in important ways. I begin with a 
theoretical discussion of how Chinese business networks impact their host 
countries and then describe the growth of Madagascar’s resident Chinese 
community. A historical consideration of the Sino-Malagasy relationship enriches 
this thesis for three reasons. The existence of an old Chinese community in 
Madagascar differentiates this case study from other instances of Chinese 
activities in African countries, it clarifies the primary subject of this study (the 
more recent Chinese engagement), and the fact that historically high levels of 
social and economic integration between the old Chinese community and the 
Malagasy has facilitated the entry of the new Chinese.  
I then discuss the growth of the new Chinese migrants in Madagascar and 
the roles of Chinese business networks in furthering Malagasy entrepreneurialism. 
Most of the new Chinese migrants arrive in Madagascar through personal 
networks, which are then expanded once they set up their businesses in the 
country. Through these networks, the new Chinese migrants are creating novel 
economic opportunities for Malagasy entrepreneurs at all levels of society. Many 
Malagasy are employed in Chinese-owned shops, and increasing numbers of 
smaller Malagasy entrepreneurs are purchasing consumer goods from Chinese 
merchants and selling them to local consumers themselves. The more successful 
Chinese businessmen are beginning to organise themselves into professional 
associations and are seeking to foster contacts with the business elite in the 
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country. Through these means, they develop partnerships and introduce each other 
to important contacts. I demonstrate how this happened with the Malagasy Paper 
Company (PAPMAD), a local producer that was able to profit from the growing 
Chinese networks in the country to travel to China and purchase new industrial 
equipment from China. This effectively allowed the Malagasy company to 
compete with the influx of new Chinese paper goods on the Malagasy market. 
Lastly, I deliberate on how China’s engagement is also facilitating bi-directional 
migratory flows, and show that Malagasy entrepreneurs sometimes fly to 
Guangzhou themselves, to either purchase items directly, or in some cases to set 
up businesses in China.   
In chapter six, I explore the role of the Malagasy state in mitigating the 
negative local perceptions and impacts arising from the Chinese engagements. 
The growth of new Chinese traders in Antananarivo has driven the formation of 
varying perceptions concerning how the Chinese engagement is affecting 
development processes in Madagascar. Public opinion on the island generally 
vilifies what it considers the recent and rapid “Sinification” of Antananarivo.116 
The majority of perceptions are informed by Sino-Malagasy interactions in the 
market place, which are based on the relationships between Chinese vendors and 
Malagasy customers, or between Chinese employers and Malagasy employees. 
Low-cost Chinese imports are perceived as a sign of Chinese superiority towards 
the Malagasy, and as damaging to local producers. A Chinese tendency to ignore 
local regulations and customs and the growth of Chinese trafficking networks and 
crime syndicates aggravate these feelings. Negative perceptions fuel the suspicion 
that China’s engagements in Madagascar produce short-term benefits for the 
Malagasy business and political elite instead of generating the necessary 
foundations needed for long-term economic development among the wider 
population. Examining the accusations against China’s engagement in 
Madagascar, I discover that while some are exaggerated and perpetuated by 
negative stereotyping, others have some accuracy.  
I argue that while Chinese investors and traders in Madagascar do 
sometimes cheat and exert harmful impacts on local producers, the underlying 
issues are structural and political. I utilise the textile industry and China’s 
environmental impacts in the extractive industries to demonstrate that the role of 
the Malagasy government is paramount in regulating China’s activities in the 
country. I show how Chinese companies contributed to the growth of the textile 
sector when a Malagasy EPZ was successfully promoted in the 1990s.  However, 
the loss of important trade agreements in the wake of the current political 
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instability has led to a severe contraction of the industry, and the movement of 
Chinese firms to other countries. Likewise, the environmental records of Chinese 
firms in Madagascar are very poor to begin with, and this is exacerbated under 
conditions of a weak regulatory framework and state withdrawal. The collusion 
between local authorities and organised Chinese crime in the trafficking of 
precious woods and other endangered species is indicative of a dysfunctional 
development relationship between the HAT and elements of the Chinese 
presence. The differences between the impacts of China’s engagements under 
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina inform my conclusion that while the developmental 
effects of China can be positive, they are primarily contingent on the local politics 
of development. Finally, in chapter seven, I review the argument, expand my 
conclusions, discuss key findings and their implications, and highlight their 
relevance to wider debates. 
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Chapter 2: Contextualising Madagascar 
 
Introduction 
 
Formerly an independent kingdom with close ties to European monarchs, 
Madagascar became a French colony in 1896 before regaining its sovereignty on 
June 26th, 1960. Philibert Tsiranana, Madagascar’s president from 1960 until 
1972, largely maintained the economic and political structures he had inherited 
from colonialism. By 1975, Madagascar had begun a conversion towards 
socialism, which accelerated under the increasingly dictatorial regime of President 
Didier Ratsiraka as the state gradually assumed greater control over the economy. 
Mounting debt and other economic pressures resulted in the adoption of an IMF 
SAP in 1983. As public spending was reduced, the ensuing social upheavals 
translated into popular demands for political liberalisation by the late-1980s. 
Madagascar formally democratised in 1993 with the election of Albert Zafy, but 
the transition to democracy has been difficult. Zafy was impeached in 1996, 
allowing for the election and return of Ratsiraka to the presidency. In 2001, an 
election dispute between Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana resulted in a six-
month standoff that brought the country’s economy to a halt. Ravalomanana 
eventually persevered and embarked on an ambitious economic development plan 
that generated significant improvements in many sectors of the economy. In 2009, 
Ravalomanana was forced to resign the presidency amid corruption scandals and 
increasing pressure from Rajoelina, who, supported by influential factions of the 
Malagasy elite, orchestrated several months of social upheaval in the capital.  
The consolidation of democracy in Madagascar has been burdened by pre-
colonial patterns of ethnic and class-based politics that were reinforced by 
colonial policies. Although the exercise of political power in Madagascar is not 
exclusively based on personal relations, impersonal formal institutions are deeply 
embedded in local neopatrimonial networks. These networks are dominated by 
small groups of influential families (locally known as the grandes familles, or big 
families) from Antananarivo and the central highlands. Internal power struggles, 
which remain highly influenced by Ratsiraka’s long legacy of political power, 
largely determine political and economic processes on the island. Rather than 
liberalising political decision-making, the short-term nature of political power in 
an electoral democracy has intensified the necessity of elite bargaining. No 
democratic president has left office through a peaceful transfer of power after 
losing an election, and all of Madagascar’s leadership transitions have resulted in 
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severe economic crises. Since the 1990s, each of Madagascar’s presidents has 
subverted the democratic process to further their own interests and that of their 
support network.  
Economic development since independence has been slow. The country’s 
GDP grew at an annual average rate of 0,5% between 1960 and 1999, exceeding 
the growth rates of only Niger, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Kiribati.117 Low GDP 
growth and annual population increases of approximately 3% resulted in a 
continuous decline in living standards. Consumption per capita more than halved 
between 1970 and 1997.118 The institutional weakness of the Malagasy state and 
the dominance of the elite mean that large parts of society are marginalised from 
processes of economic development. Economic prospects had begun to improve 
by the late 1990s and especially under Ravalomanana, but since 2009 poverty 
rates have increased despite a still functioning economy that is largely dependent 
on growth in the mining sector. 119  The extractive industries, which were 
insignificant twenty years ago, have grown substantially over the past decade. 
Although the mining sector currently accounts for only 3% of GDP, the two large-
scale investments by QMM and Sherritt mean that this figure is expected to 
increase to 18% by 2018.120 Chrome, mica, and graphite account for the majority 
of Madagascar’s mineral exports, and the country has known oil deposits. 
Madagascar is thus faced with the challenge of preserving its unique environment 
and biodiversity, which is of global significance, while managing a rapidly 
enlarging extractive industry in a manner that will benefit the country as a whole.  
This chapter explores how neither the state-led development projects of 
the post-colonial era, nor the furtive attempts at neoliberal reform in the post-1993 
shift to democracy have succeeded in engendering long-term economic growth in 
Madagascar. Ravalomanana’s regime displayed elements of a developmental 
state, but as discussed in the following chapter, these could not be sustained 
because the pressures of consolidating power within the structures of 
Madagascar’s political networks proved too strong for him to maintain an 
adequate balance between state and society. In this chapter, I begin with an 
overview of Madagascar’s economy and mining and petroleum sectors to provide 
a context within which to discuss the country’s politics of development. I then 
analyse the important roles of underlying social dynamics and hierarchies, which 
originated in the pre-colonial era but were reinforced by French policies, in 
structuring the Malagasy political system. I consequentially examine the 
                                                
117 World Bank, Madagascar: An Agenda for Growth.  
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119 World Bank, Madagascar-Economic Update.  
120 Tahiny, Les Investissements de la Chine. 
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economic policies and the interplay between the state and social forces during the 
regimes of Tsiranana and Ratsiraka, which together constitute Madagascar’s First 
and Second Republics. I then discuss the transition to democracy, the Zafy, 
Ratsiraka, and Ravalomanana regimes, and expound on the events that led to the 
2009 political crisis. I show how each of these presidents have manipulated 
Madagascar’s constitution to suit their own needs, sentenced predecessors to 
crimes committed during their presidencies in absentia, dominated political 
parties, and have generally been unable to effect a peaceful leadership change 
without disrupting the economy. Finally, I demonstrate that civil society and large 
parts of the Malagasy population are marginalised from the processes of 
economic development in the country, leaving the Malagasy government and by 
extension ruling elite as the central actor in the politics of development.  
 
An economic profile of Madagascar 
  
Madagascar’s economy is largely informal and characterised by a dual 
structure, where one sector - agriculture - is geared to local needs, and others to 
the global export market. Including fishing and forestry, agriculture employs 78% 
of the population and accounts for 70% of export revenues, and 30% of GDP.121 
Rice is the primary crop produced and the most important source of income and 
employment. Approximately 60% of the population farms rice. Levels and 
stability of rice prices have major effects on the welfare of rice farmers and 
consumers, which is essentially the entire population. On average, 75% of a 
household’s budget is often spent on rice alone. 122 The contribution of agriculture 
to economic growth is however marginal due to low productivity, a prevalence of 
informal subsistence farming, and a rural infrastructure bias that is exacerbated by 
a general lack of infrastructure and the poor quality of existing infrastructure. 
Whereas Madagascar was one of the world’s top rice producers in the 1960s, it is 
now a net importer from Pakistan, India, and Thailand. Agricultural value added 
per capita dropped from US $71 in the 1980s, to US $66 in the 1990s, and to US 
$62 in 2005.123 Primary agricultural exports today include vanilla, cocoa, litchis, 
mangoes, coffee, and tea, but these are sometimes of poor quality and are often 
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marketed by foreign-controlled groups. Generally, they are directed toward 
traditional markets in France and have limited prospects for growth.124  
Madagascar’s principal exports are graphite, mica, and chrome. In the 
1950s, graphite and mica accounted for 92% of the country’s mineral exports. 
Graphite, an electrical conductor, was first exported in 1907, when Madagascar 
had a near global monopoly on the supply of graphite flakes, which were 
indispensible for the manufacture of metallurgical crucibles.125 In the late-1990s, 
four mining companies collectively produced more than 16,000 tonnes of graphite 
annually. In recent years, national graphite production has declined to about 5,000 
tonnes per year due to the increased costs of petroleum products used for drying 
the graphite and the gradual depletion of higher-grade graphite deposits. Mica, a 
relatively rare crystalline structure that forms chemically inert sheets with 
superior electrical properties, has been Madagascar’s most profitable export, 
despite more competition from other producers.126 Today, chrome is by far 
Madagascar’s most exported material in terms of quantity. The country began 
extracting and exporting chrome in 1969 through Kraomita Malagasy S.A. 
(Kraoma), a state-owned company that remains the country’s leading producer of 
the metal today.  
While Madagascar’s traditional metal and mineral exports continue to be 
produced, other substances and gemstones are also attracting substantial interest 
from local and foreign investors. Iron-ore, nickel, uranium, and coal deposits are 
increasingly being mined. Lesser-known minerals are also gaining attention, 
including bauxite, which is used in aluminium production, zirconium, a by-
product of titanium and principally utilised as a refractor in industrial and 
manufacturing processes due to its high resistance to heat, and ilmenite, mined for 
titanium oxide production and which is frequently used as a base pigment in paint, 
paper, and plastics. Gold deposits are plentiful, and fine, ornamental, semi-
precious, and precious gemstones (with the exception of diamonds), are also 
abundant. Deposits of gold and gems (amazonite, amethyst, beryl, citrine, 
cordierite, garnet, sapphire, and tourmaline) have been exploited, as have those of 
ornamental stones (agate, apatite, and aragonite, calcite, jasper, and labradorite) 
and stones for electrical geodes (quartz and celestine). Significant sapphire 
accumulations were discovered in 1998, triggering an export windfall in this 
precious gemstone. Table 1 and figure 2 show Madagascar’s principal mineral 
exports and the volume of its metal and mineral production, respectively.  
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Table 1: Madagascar’s principal metal and mineral exports, 2010. 
 Tonnes Net Value 
US$ 
Chrome 134,500 25,097,576.74 
Gemstones 10,786 14,986,041.11 
Graphite 3,783 2,735,136.94 
Mica 2,069 755,407.93 
Quartz 407 165,532.30 
Other Mineral Products 311,553 46,955,011.82 
Source: Madagascar, INSTAT, Imports et Exports Effectuées par Madagascar 
vers et Aupres les Dix Principaux Pays.  
 
Figure 2: Madagascar’s metal and mineral production by volume, % (2008). 
Source: Yager, 2010 Minerals Yearbook. 
 
Madagascar also has proven oil reserves, but it is not an oil-exporting 
country. It possesses five sedimentary basins covering 990,000 kilometres² (km²) 
of on- and offshore petroleum blocks and 480,000 km² of oceanic crust that hold 
petroleum, grouped into 20 onshore and 246 offshore blocks. In 2010, there were 
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17 oil companies in operation, including six offshore. Due to the difficulties 
associated with extraction and oil refining in Madagascar, exploration activities 
have been confined to the onshore blocks. The petroleum is mixed with sand and 
tar deposits, which necessitates substantial refinement and significantly raises the 
costs of production. Shell Corporation had been exploring for oil in the 1980s but 
terminated its operations in the country after deeming them commercially 
unviable. Total and ExxonMobil also purchased exploration contracts in the 
1990s. Madagascar Oil, a Malagasy-American company headquartered in 
Houston, recently succeeded in extracting petroleum from its Tsimiroro Oil field 
in northwestern Madagascar during a pilot test.  Oil is now being pumped at the 
Tsimiroro block on a very small scale. The company is aiming to produce a few 
dozen barrels daily, with the objective of reaching 1,000 barrels a day by the end 
of 2013. The Tsimiroro block holds a contingent reserve of 1,7 billion barrels 
over 20% of its area. This translates into 150,000 barrels a day at peak production 
once the well is commercial, which is forecast for 2019 at the earliest.127  
Despite the country’s wealth, Madagascar’s lack of infrastructure is a 
principal obstacle to economic diversification and growth. Existing infrastructures 
have generally been inherited from colonialism, when they were built to serve the 
ruling elite.  Hospitals, health centres, and doctors are still concentrated in urban 
areas and especially Antananarivo.128 Only 60 - 70% of Madagascar’s population 
- those who live in regions served by roads - has access to primary health care.129 
Madagascar has a prevalence of malnutrition and stunted growth, which is due to 
both a shortage of food and a lack of balanced nutrition.130 In 2010, the mortality 
rate for children under the age of five was 62 out of every 1,000 live births, which 
is below the regional average for Africa (119) but still far above that of the 
Americas and Europe (18 and 14, respectively). Preventable diseases including 
diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria are the three leading causes of child mortality. 
131 As a whole, Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (HIV/AIDs) infection rates in Madagascar are substantially lower than 
in many African societies. Between 2000 and 2009, only 123 out of 100,000 
Malagasy were reported to have the illness, compared with a regional average of 
2,740 and rates over 11,000 in Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, and 
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Lesotho.132 Polluted water is a primary reasons underlying poor public health in 
the country. According to WaterAid, an NGO focused on sanitation and water 
purification methods in Madagascar, close to 14 million Malagasy did not have 
access to clean water in 2008. When the 12 million people who practice open-air 
defecation are factored in, the impact of the lack of water and sanitation on the 
overall health of the population and economic development of the country is 
immense.133 Poor transport and power infrastructure compound these issues. The 
average Malagasy walks more than 10 km to reach the nearest health care centre, 
although mobile health centres have been recently established in remote and 
sparsely populated areas in an attempt to address these problems.134  
The country’s dearth of energy and transport infrastructure is also a major 
obstacle to wider economic growth. Charcoal is the principal source of energy in 
Madagascar, followed by wood, batteries, candles, and kerosene. Energy 
provision is extremely low throughout Madagascar. In 2009, 2% of the rural 
population and 19% of the total population had access to electricity. Electricity 
provision is strongest in the capital, where mechanical issues and weak energy 
grids nonetheless cause regular power outages. On average, a firm operating in or 
around the capital sustains 11 power outages per month.135 The Malagasy Gas and 
Water Company (JIRAMA), Madagascar’s principal power utility, generates 250 
megawatts of power, with the generation mix consisting of hydropower and oil, at 
55% and 45%, respectively. The country also has several small hydroelectric 
power plants.136 Madagascar has 37,476 km of roads, which translates into six km 
per 100 km². Out of these, 7,617 km, which represents approximately 16% of all 
roads, are paved.137 There is one principal commercial port in Toamasina, a 
smaller one in the southern town of Toliara, and two international airports, which 
are located in Antananarivo and on the tourist island of Nosy Be.  
Madagascar’s extreme poverty and growing mining sector threatens the 
nation’s fragile and unique ecosystem. Madagascar, the world’s fourth largest 
island, has one of the most diverse natural environments in the world. It possesses 
5% of global plant and animal species, approximately 80% of which (roughly 
150,000) are endemic.138 Around 90% of the country’s biodiversity is found in its 
dense rainforests, which are located mainly along the eastern and northeastern 
shoreline. Environmental pressures have accelerated as the population grows 
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more rapidly and rural Malagasy make more forested areas available for rice and 
other crops though “slash and burn” agriculture. Whereas Madagascar possessed 
11 million hectares of forest and 11 million people in the 1990s, it now has 
approximately nine million hectares of forest and over 20 million inhabitants.139 
While forests covered 27% of the island in the 1950s, this figure dropped to 16% 
by 2000.140 Extremely high rates of deforestation are contributing to widespread 
erosion, unearthing Madagascar’s red soil and colouring the country’s rivers and 
deltas to such an extent that the country has been nicknamed the “red island”.  
 
Society and politics in Madagascar 
 
The difficulties associated with finding political and economic stability in 
Madagascar are closely tied to the ethnic and class-based socio-political 
environment that underlies the elite bargaining process in the country. 141 The 
deepest cleavages within Malagasy society and political power structures are 
found within the country’s 18 different ethnic groups. The Tsimihety and 
Sakalava groups, who each number approximately 700,000, populate the 
country’s southern and western regions and constitute the biggest coastal groups. 
The Merina, Betsileo, and Betsimisaraka populations, who comprise roughly 3 
million, 2 million, and 1,5 million members respectively, live in the central 
highlands. 142  Before colonialism, Madagascar’s population was divided into 
different kingdoms vying for power over the island from the 1700s onwards. A 
key aspect of Madagascar’s immediate pre-independence history is the dominant 
role played by the populous Merina group from the highlands. A series of Merina 
monarchs ruled over the Kingdom of Imerina throughout the 19th century from a 
relatively isolated and centralised power structure in Antananarivo. The Merina 
leaders used their strength in numbers to exert control over the rest of the island 
but failed to achieve total unification. They sought to promote a process of 
economic modernisation through close diplomatic ties to the UK and France, 
leading to the establishment of European-style schools and government 
institutions. Merina state policies also stimulated agricultural production, which 
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helped to create a larger and healthier Madagascar and contributed to the early 
centralisation of the Malagasy state.143 French colonial policy initially aimed to 
co-opt the Merina leadership, but after recognising the extent of influence the 
Merina exerted over the population they adopted a tactic of indirect rule, which 
further strengthened the political dominance of the Merina group. A colonial 
policy of pacification towards the Merina thus retained the pre-colonial power 
structures of Malagasy society.144  
A complex feudal system emerged during the Merina rule, under which 
class and geographical location defined social status. Coastal populations were by 
definition in a lower class than the groups inhabiting the highlands. The 
dominance of the Merina led to the construction of a binary opposition between 
coastal and highlander populations in Malagasy politics that effectively serves to 
legitimise the authority of one group, the Merina, over the others. The term 
“côtier”, referring to the coastal populations, was conceived in the 1920s as a 
testimony to Merina exceptionalism.145 There is a discernable physical difference 
between populations from the central plateau and the coastal regions, with the 
former displaying distinctively Austronesian features and the latter more African 
traits. The Merina generally view themselves as more European and Asian, and 
therefore as more “civilised” and capable of exerting political power over the 
country than their counterparts from the coastal areas. However, simplifying 
Malagasy social dynamics into a coastal/highlander divide risks simplifying a 
complex issue. Merina politics is also characterised by a class division between 
the descendants of slaves and non-slaves, and between royals and non-royals. 
Caste distinctions are also important determinants of social status.  
The Merina have one of the countries most stratified caste systems, which 
is divided into small endogenous descent groups that are meticulously ranked. 
The Andriana (nobles), the Hova (commoners), and the Andevo (slaves) 
constitute the three main castes, which are then further divided into subclasses. 
While the Andriana and Hova castes could intermarry and originated from the 
Merina royalty and their fiefdom populations, the Andevo constituted a slave 
caste that descended from captives imported into the highlands by the Merinas.146 
Merina slaves could not marry an Andriana or a Hova, meaning that slavery was 
transmitted unaltered from generation to generation.147  Although slavery no 
longer exists, the dogma of having descended from Merina slaves continues to 
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inform the distribution of political power within the Malagasy elite today. The 
continued salience of these historically entrenched power structures has resulted 
in the political dominance of a network of about 30 big families hailing 
predominantly from the Merina and to a lesser extent the Betsileo and 
Betsimisaraka groups in Madagascar. Despite internal cleavages and increasing 
pressure from the coastal groups, who have gradually increased their political 
influence vis-à-vis the Merina over the past 30 years but are too fragmented to 
form lasting alliances, the Francophone Merina remain firmly in a position of 
authority.148 
 
The first and second Malagasy republics 
 
 The persistence of poverty in Madagascar has been perpetuated by a chronic 
lack of effective governance. Initially, Madagascar’s state-led development 
project under Tsiranana’s Social Democratic Party (PDS) resulted in a period of 
relative political stability and an average per capita GDP growth rate of 2,9%, but 
this growth benefited French interests and the Malagasy elite more than the 
Malagasy population.149 Tsiranana largely maintained French economic structures 
while implementing ISI strategies, which had positive impacts on macroeconomic 
growth, but did little to improve the participation of Malagasy in the formal 
economy. The economic foundations of Tsiranana’s regime were conditioned by 
the structures of the post-colonial “Communauté Française”. This framework 
“was characterised on the one hand by oligopolistic and monopolistic elements 
and on the other by the extension of civil liberties exclusively to a socially and 
economically assimilated French-speaking Malagasy elite”.150 At independence, 
foreign and predominantly French interests controlled Madagascar’s economy. 
French colonists owned the large estates producing export crops and foreign 
capital dominated the small industrial sector. By the end of the 1960s, firms under 
French control still accounted for 65% of sales, while Malagasy companies 
claimed 5%.151 ISI policies had limited the importation of consumer goods, 
meaning that the Malagasy market was saturated with French-made products and 
domestic industrial growth was limited by the small size of the internal market. 
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By 1970, Madagascar was totally dependent on foreign trade and capital. French 
companies controlled more than half of commercialised agricultural production 
and exports, debts were mounting, and the rural and lower class Malagasy 
struggled while the elites prospered. As Tsiranana sought to consolidate his 
economic control over the island, his government became increasingly 
authoritarian. He was re-elected as president in 1965 with 97,7% and in 1972 with 
over 99% of the vote.152  These wins are attributed to the intimidation of political 
rivals and control over the mass media, especially the radio.153  
The Tsiranana years culminated in significant social and political 
upheavals in the early 1970s. Rural farmers, urban youths, students from the 
capital, and religious organisations were at the heart of the revolts against the 
Tsiranana government between 1968 and 1975. In the countryside, farmers 
demonstrated their discontent with the ruling regime by burning far more land 
than they needed for cultivation in bush-fires, a practice discouraged by the 
government and often suppressed by violent means. In 1971, students from the 
University of Antananarivo launched a strike against the French system of 
education used in Madagascar. Concurrently, a political opposition party 
organised a rebellion in the southern and poorest region of the country where the 
“fiscal oppression and administrative arbitrariness became untenable”.154 The 
rebellion weakened coastal support for the PDS and consequentially its power 
over the country’s political institutions. Respected and known religious leaders 
publicly voiced their opposition to the government. In 1972, students again 
revolted against the continuing post-colonial character of the regime in the streets 
of the capital. Tsiranana declared a state of emergency, arrested around 400 
students, and banned all further public protests. The violent crackdown against the 
demonstrators persuaded the elder, white-collar workers of Antananarivo to join 
the demonstrations on the streets. As the youths turned to the army for support, 
Tsiranana had no choice but to liquidate his government and confer power onto 
the chief of the Malagasy army.  
This eventually led to the rise of Ratsiraka, who ruled the country on a 
socialist and nationalist platform from 1975 until 1993 (and again from 1997 until 
2002). After the revolts were quelled, the military initially assumed control under 
General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. The Ramanantsoa government held power from 
1972 to 1975 and initiated economic policies that moved Madagascar towards 
socialism. It expelled French military and naval forces from the country, 
nationalised French and other foreign companies, and formed state agencies to 
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implement marketing and trading policies.155 Madagascar exited the CFA franc 
zone, which had pegged the Malagasy franc to the French franc. Internal struggles 
within the army prevented Ramanantsoa from consolidating his own power, 
leading him to bestow it onto Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava in 1975. Six days 
later, Ratsimandrava was assassinated by a group of officers staging a military 
coup. These officers subsequently installed Lieutenant Commander Didier 
Ratsiraka, former minister of foreign affairs under Ramanantsoa, as the new 
leader of Madagascar’s Supreme Revolutionary Council. 
Ratsiraka continued with the socialist policies of his predecessor, further 
increasing the state’s role in the economy. He nationalised foreign import-export 
companies, banks, and insurance firms in the name of economic development, and 
American military forces were expelled from a National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) base that they had negotiated under Tsiranana. He 
established links with communist states in Asia, the Soviet Union, and several 
Eastern bloc countries, and Madagascar became a member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Ratsiraka’s political ideology was embodied in his idea of “scientific” 
Malagasy socialism modelled roughly on the Chinese collectivist vision, which he 
detailed in a publication called “The Red Book”. He sought to legitimise his 
regime through a referendum on the new “Democratic Republic of Madagascar”, 
which produced a result almost completely in favour of Ratsiraka and the socialist 
ideological principles guiding the new Republic. Education was expanded, 
military equipment was purchased, infrastructures were upgraded, an important 
hydroelectric dam was constructed, textile factories, fishing and agricultural 
processing plants were opened, and a host of lesser initiatives were announced 
during this time. 156   
Ratsiraka’s state-led interventions led to a 20% GDP growth rate by the 
late-1970s, but this growth was juxtaposed by increasing debt, an expanding 
budget deficit, and a marked decline in living standards. 157  Madagascar 
maintained an overvalued exchange rate through trade controls and foreign 
borrowing, established price controls that favoured public enterprises, financed 
government spending through money creation, and relied heavily on import and 
export tariffs to generate government revenues. By the mid-1980s, excessive 
foreign borrowing and domestic monetary expansion had swelled the nation's 
external debt from less than US $300 million in 1978 to in excess of US $1,370 
million, with debt-servicing payments accounting for more than one-third of 
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export earnings.158 Net foreign investment, which equalled US $14 million in 
1974, had disappeared by 1976, and was negative between 1977 and 1979. 
Concomitantly, the current account deficit ballooned from US $16 million in 1977 
to US $568 million in 1980.159 Consequentially, the IMF was approached for 
assistance to meet the balance of payments crisis.  
By the time Ratsiraka began implementing market reforms, slashing 
budget deficits, and reigning in a bloated civil service, it was “too little too 
late”. 160 As Gow asserts, under Ratsiraka’s model of state-led socialist 
development, the Malagasy found themselves faced by excessive personalised 
rule with too much power in the hands of one man. Growing corruption, 
continuing weak political and administrative institutions, an over-dependence on a 
few commodities, a shortage of investment capital, and failed policies of 
economic planning resulted in the excessive concentration of benefits for the 
regime's supporters.161 Since Ratsiraka's power was still rooted in his ability to 
please and gain the support of different factions, as the economic crisis deepened, 
it became more difficult to “get them to work together on policy matters or to 
remain satisfied with the few gifts he had left to distribute”.162 Although he was 
considered one of the IMF’s seven “good students” in Africa in the late-1980s, 
mounting inflation and economic pressures led to rising popular discontent by 
1990.163 International calls for democratisation supported local cries for political 
liberalisation. Violent clashes ensued on the streets of Antananarivo, during which 
military forces loyal to Ratsiraka fired on and killed opposition demonstrators. In 
1991, over 100,000 Malagasy filled the streets of Antananarivo to force Ratsiraka 
to accept a transitional government. By the end of 1992, Madagascar’s Second 
Republic, and with it Ratsiraka’s grip on power, had crumbled.  
 
The ongoing transition to democracy 
 
Increasing domestic and international pressures to liberalise culminated in 
a formal transition to democracy and the election of Zafy as president of 
Madagascar’s Third Republic in 1993. Democratisation was widely viewed by the 
Malagasy population as a chance to construct a more equitable national political 
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framework because it ostensibly disengaged the political processes from the 
“inclination of the ruling classes to lock things up”.164 However, a lack of respect 
for the electoral process and the repeated failures of democratic governments to 
produce tangible, positive, and lasting changes in the lives of the Malagasy have 
led to the limited political participation of the wider population. The Malagasy 
have little trust in the main political institutions of their country: “there is a degree 
of disenchantment with politics, causing some Madagascans to withdraw from 
political life altogether”. This disillusionment is clearly expressed by the 26% of 
Malagasy who hold the view that “for someone like me, it does not matter what 
kind of government we have”, indicating they have no expectations from the state. 
165 
 From its inception, Zafy’s regime was troubled by the failure of politicians 
to embrace the democratic process and the opposition’s inability to cohere into a 
stable governmental coalition. The success of democracy under Zafy had 
depended on the ability of political factions to form alliances in support of or 
against the executive. This was in turn contingent on an executive who 
demonstrated restraint, shared its power with the prime minister and cabinet, and 
encouraged political debate in the interest of economic development.166 Zafy 
placed excessive blame for governance failures and economic stagnation on his 
ministers, resulting in five cabinet reshuffles, and he espoused radical nationalist 
economic policies. 167  As Madagascar re-accumulated burgeoning debts, the 
World Bank, the IMF, and other donors began suspending their programs.168 In 
September 1996, within 36 months of assuming power, Zafy was impeached for 
the misappropriation of funds and for attempting to dismiss the prime minister in 
violation of the constitution. His impeachment demonstrated the continuing 
“fissiparous tendencies of Malagasy politics” and cleared the way for Ratsiraka, 
who was formerly ousted as an autocratic dictator, to return to power with a 
democratic mandate.169 
Ratsiraka continued with the implementation of liberalisation policies and 
embarked on a program of decentralisation meant to signal his new democratic 
credentials, but which in reality served to secure his hold on power. The fleeting 
nature of legitimate political power in an electoral democracy imposed new 
pressures on him to form alliances that would sustain his power when he left 
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office. Decentralisation, widely viewed as a democratic compromise, furthered 
both Ratsiraka’s personal interests and those of his old military regime.170 
Ratsiraka is from Toamasina, on the eastern coast of Madagascar. The distribution 
of power away from Antananarivo to the provinces bolstered the support of the 
president and disenfranchised political opponents in Antananarivo. 171 
Decentralisation “degenerated into the creation of fiefdoms of the old regime, 
which were used as strongholds of political destabilisation”.172 By the end of the 
1990s, Ratsiraka had formed a large network of nepotism similar to the former 
and more blatantly autocratic power structure that existed under his first 
presidency, and had appointed close friends and family members to various 
important posts in government and business,. During his election campaign of 
1996, Ratsiraka had claimed that he had lived in a modest flat in Paris during his 
years of political exile. In November 1997, shortly after winning the Malagasy 
elections, he bought himself a new apartment in Paris for an estimated US $1,4 
million.173 The flagrancy and corruption exhibited by the second Ratsiraka regime 
gave Marc Ravalomanana, the well-liked mayor of Antananarivo, the opportunity 
to challenge his power in the disputed 2001 presidential election.  
The political standoff between Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana in 2001 and 
2002 brought the country closer to civil war than at any other time in its modern 
history and clearly indicated that meaningful democratic consolidation had yet to 
occur in Madagascar. In December 2001, Ravalomanana’s I Love Madagascar 
(TIM) party and an independent church group proclaimed that he had won a 
majority of 50,5% of the vote in the first round of the election. Madagascar’s 
High Constitutional Court (HCC) and Ministry of the Interior disagreed, and 
proposed a second run-off to determine the winner of the race. Ravalomanana 
refused to participate in a second round until the first round had been 
satisfactorily counted. In February 2002, tensions increased considerably when 
Ravalomanana held an inauguration ceremony, had himself sworn in as president, 
and began forming his government in Antananarivo. Hundreds of thousands of 
peaceful civilian protesters massed in the streets and prevented Ratsiraka’s 
ministers from reaching their offices, which eventually forced them to resign. 
Unable to operate effectively in Antananarivo, Ratsiraka relocated to Toamasina, 
from where he orchestrated an economic, political, and military blockade of 
Antananarivo. Still proclaiming himself as president, and with the support of a 
large faction of the army, Ratsiraka declared martial law and destroyed the main 
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bridge connecting the coast to the capital, effectively starving its residents of food 
and fuel. In April 2002, the HCC released a recount of the election that awarded 
Ravalomanana the presidency and negated the need for a second run-off. Shortly 
thereafter, amongst rumours that Ratsiraka was amassing mercenaries from Africa 
to attack the capital, the international community began to support 
Ravalomanana’s claim to the presidency. 174 Under increasing pressure, Ratsiraka 
fled to Paris in June 2002, leaving Ravalomanana with a country severely 
damaged by months of economic paralysis and substantial capital flight.  
Ravalomanana replaced Ratsiraka’s economic policies with a state-driven, 
capitalist, and neo-liberal economic agenda. The US was one of the first countries 
to formally recognise his government in June 2002. France, China, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and five African governments quickly followed suit. 
Ravalomanana reached out to foreign donors and investors who welcomed 
Madagascar’s improved business climate. Economic growth gradually began to 
accelerate again, especially after Ravalomanana was given a second mandate. He 
was re-elected in December 2006 in a relatively fair election with almost 55% of 
the vote, and legislative, provincial, and regional elections were held in late-2007 
and early-2008, giving his regime substantial popular and democratic 
legitimacy. 175  Between 2002 and 2008, Madagascar’s economy grew at an 
average annual rate of 7%, and poverty declined from 80% to 69%. By the time 
he was ousted from the presidency in 2009, Ravalomanana had overseen a rise in 
GNI per capita from US $780 (in 2003) to US $1,030, a historic high.176 
 
The political crisis of 2009 
 
Despite Ravalomanana’s popular legitimacy, his policies economically 
disenfranchised influential members of the big families, which resulted in 
Rajoelina’s rise to power as the leader of the “Young Determined Malagasy” 
party (TGV) in February 2009. Ravalomanana had failed to help his party’s 
candidate win the 2007 mayoral election in Antananarivo, leading to increased 
tensions between the government and Rajoelina, the capital’s new mayor. The 
political crisis officially began on January 17th 2009, when residents of 
Antananarivo gathered to protest the presidency of Ravalomanana under 
Rajoelina’s leadership. The immediate impetus behind the crisis was the forced 
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closure of Rajoelina’s Viva television and radio stations in December 2008 by 
Ravalomanana’s regime after they aired an interview with Ratsiraka in which he 
lamented the state of governance in Madagascar and blamed Ravalomanana for 
the country’s economic woes. The protests turned violent as elements of the 
crowds rioted and looted. The state radio building was ransacked and set alight, 
and arsonists targeted a Ravalomanana-owned radio station and his personal 
businesses.177 On January 28th, a protest staged in the capital turned violent, 
leaving 48 people dead and hundreds more injured, marking the beginning of 
large-scale aggression towards Ravalomanana’s government.178  
In February and March 2009, the Malagasy capital was once again 
ensnared in a crisis of leadership. Rajoelina declared that he was taking control as 
the head of a two-year transitional government that would be legally established 
through a parliamentary request for Ravalomanana's resignation. His bid to 
impeach Ravalomanana was rejected by the HCC, and in retaliation President 
Ravalomanana removed Rajoelina from office. 179  Shortly thereafter, the 
presidential guard opened fire on a crowd that was protesting near one of the 
presidential palaces. Approximately 28 people died, and hundreds were injured.180 
This incident worsened the already volatile and tense situation, and strengthened 
Rajoelina’s movement. In an effort to save his presidency, Ravalomanana 
publicly acknowledged the mistakes made by his government during the crisis 
and suggested that a national referendum be held to determine whether he should 
stay in office. Rajoelina rejected his proposal. Compounding the issue was the 
mutiny of part of Madagascar’s armed forces in March 2009, who demanded that 
Ravalomanana step down from office. Under pressure from the army, and faced 
with a loss of political support in the capital, Ravalomanana fled to South Africa 
and conferred power onto a military directorate, who subsequently passed it on to 
Rajoelina.  
Rajoelina, born to a wealthy family in Antananarivo with ties to 
Ratsiraka’s extended clan, was a young entrepreneur who began his career as a 
disc jockey at local clubs and parties, and eventually became an event promoter in 
the capital. He then successfully launched a printing and advertising company in 
1999 and the Viva networks in 2007. Rajoelina had already campaigned as a 
candidate in the mayoral elections won by Ravalomanana in 1999, and he served 
as a campaign strategist for one of Ravalomanana’s presidential opponents during 
the election in 2006. In 2007, he campaigned for mayor once again, and 
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succeeded with a 62% majority against Ravalomanana’s TIM candidate. 181 
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were both economic competitors as well as political 
opponents. In 2001, Ravalomanana had already utilised his power as mayor to 
impede Rajoelina’s private business when he banned billboards advertising 
Rajoelina’s companies from being displayed in the capital. Personal conflict 
between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina reflected the wedge that Ravalomanana’s 
presidency had driven into the Malagasy political establishment. They “seem to 
dislike each other personally, and their very different policy approaches [to 
business and politics] have contributed to a malaise in the body politic. Polarised 
visions have created divergent views, dividing many families, communities and 
churches”.182 
Animosity between the two politicians was reflected in disagreements 
over the management of public and private affairs, and over the tensions between 
the exercise of power from the central government and that of the capital. After 
Rajoelina became mayor, Ravalomanana declassified the mayor’s budget and 
ordered him to repay the central government all of the arrears owed to it since the 
1980s. Additionally, Ravalomanana’s decision to suspend state subsidies to the 
newly elected mayor of Antananarivo was interpreted as an attempt to undermine 
Rajoelina’s ability to deliver on his electoral promises. 183  In 2008, the 
Ravalomanana government allegedly delayed the disbursal of funds for various 
local government infrastructure projects in the capital and diverted investment 
away from the city.184 Rajoelina also saw his income threatened with the closure 
of his media outlet, which explains the ferocity of his reaction.185 The fact that 
Ravalomanana’s earlier closures of other media outlets, and his censorship of 
private media across the country since the beginning of his presidency more 
generally, did not lead to the demise of his regime further points to the prevalence 
of a strong personal animosity between the president of the country and the mayor 
of Antananarivo. 186 In directly restricting the livelihood of a prominent member 
of an important Merina family, Ravalomanana had tipped the political balance in 
favour of his opponents. Riding on the wave of popular opposition to the Boeing 
and Daewoo affairs, and given the weakened state of the political opposition, 
Rajoelina was able to channel public anger, gain the support of the army, and 
position himself as the spokesperson for the opposition to Ravalomanana’s 
regime. 
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In 2009, Rajoelina had no clear political ideology or agenda beyond that 
of removing his predecessor. Under the HAT “economic decisions are taken with 
a view to buying off political opposition and ensuring temporary regime survival, 
instead of with a view to growing the economy over the long run”.187 Bachelard 
and Marcus argue that, “since seizing power in 2009, Rajoelina has done little 
more than attempt to secure his position in power and those of others in his 
political and business network. He has governed through significantly reduced 
international aid resources, amidst quickly eroding popular support. Madagascar 
is facing the threat of state unravel in which the ability to govern across sectors is 
diminishing”.188 Rajoelina largely maintained Ravalomanana’s macroeconomic 
policies in the hope of attracting FDI under conditions of limited donor support, 
which has nonetheless roughly halved since the crisis.189 Domestically, the HAT 
has implemented fiscal austerity and sharply limited public spending in an effort 
to curb inflation and keep the economy afloat. Real GDP growth has decreased 
from 7% in 2008 to -3,7% and -2% in 2009 and 2010, respectively.190 The cost of 
food, and critically rice, has risen significantly.191 Transparency International’s 
corruption perception index ratings for Madagascar – in which lower values 
indicate higher levels of corruption – fell from 3,4 in 2008 to 3,0 in 2009 and 2,6 
in 2010, placing Madagascar in 100th place in terms of levels of public corruption 
worldwide.192  
Rajoelina’s repeated impediments to negotiate a political settlement to the 
crisis resulted in a political and development impasse. He rejected a power-
sharing deal signed under the auspices of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in Maputo between the HAT and the main opposition 
leaders in August 2009. Talks resumed several months later, where the parties 
agreed that Rajoelina would remain leader of the HAT but not stand in 
presidential elections, and that consensus candidates from the various political 
stakeholders would staff important cabinet positions until elections could be held. 
Rajoelina then contravened the agreement by appointing a military officer and 
political ally, Brigadier General Albert Camille Vital, as prime minister. 
Democratic elections, initially scheduled for November 2010, have been 
postponed several times. In response to the lack of democratic accountability, and 
as a sign of their disapproval with the transition process, Madagascar’s traditional 
donors suspended all non-humanitarian programmes. Economic collapse has been 
                                                
187 Dawson and Kelsall, Anti-developmental Patrimonialism, 1-33, p. 26.  
188 Bachelard and Marcus, Country at the Crossroads, p. 3 
189 Burnod et al., “International Land Deals”.  
190 Economist Intelligence Unit, Madagascar Country Report. 
191 African Economic Outlook, Madagascar. 
192 See http://www.transparency.org/country#MDG. 
 64 
avoided due to fiscal austerity, limited public spending, and mining sector growth, 
but with no new donor support forthcoming, living standards for the vast majority 
of the population have deteriorated.193  
After two years of political deadlock, Rajoelina’s government and various 
opposition parties agreed to a SADC - brokered Roadmap in September 2011. 
This document stipulated, among other things, that the HAT would permit the 
appointment of an opposition leader as prime minister whilst the country prepared 
itself to host new elections and allow for the return of political exiles, including 
Ravalomanana. Although the Roadmap remains the first and most important step 
toward restoring democracy in Madagascar, under Rajoelina’s leadership the 
HAT continues to violate its conditions. The principal controversies surround the 
appointment of the prime minister and Ravalomanana’s return to Madagascar. 
Firstly, where the Roadmap called for the appointment of the interim prime 
minister to stem from an opposition party, the HAT subsequently bestowed this 
position on a well-known high-ranking member of the TGV, Omer Beriziky. 
Secondly, Rajoelina, supported by the army, warned that Ravalomanana would 
face imprisonment for the murder of protesters during the last days of his 
presidency.194 Rajoelina denied Ravalomanana’s right to return to Madagascar 
when the former president’s plane was ordered not to land in the capital city and 
forced to return to Johannesburg in January 2012.  
 
The difficulty of the democratic transition  
 
Two decades of flawed electoral democracy in Madagascar point to four 
recurring themes hindering progress towards the establishment of a stable political 
environment. These include the misuse of political power to eliminate or ostracise 
political opponents, the subversion of the democratic process by elected 
presidents through democratically sanctioned constitutional amendments, the use 
of political parties to consolidate neopatrimonial networks, and the difficulties 
associated with leadership successions. Since 1993, each of Madagascar’s 
presidents has abused its political power to eliminate political opponents, both 
retrospectively and pre-emptively. Zafy was impeached but not sentenced for 
crimes committed during his presidency, and both Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana 
were convicted in absentia. After assuming power, Ravalomanana tried and 
sentenced Ratsiraka to five years of hard labour for his attempt to convince five of 
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Madagascar’s six provinces to secede from the central government in 2002. His 
prime minister was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to twelve years of 
hard labour after it had been revealed that he had withdrawn almost US $8 million 
from state funds before being abrogated of his post.195 In contrast to Ratsiraka, 
who had already fled to France, his prime minister served part of his sentence in a 
Malagasy prison until his deteriorating health caused the Ravalomanana regime to 
allow his release, upon which he also fled to France. In June 2009, Ravalomanana 
was in turn fined US $70 million and sentenced to four years of hard labour by 
Rajoelina after he escaped to South Africa.196   
Almost all of Madagascar’s democratic presidents have altered the 
constitution to suit their needs through the legitimising instrument of a national 
referendum. Faced with declining popularity, Zafy enacted a popular referendum 
in 1995 to enhance his presidential privileges by shifting power away from the 
prime minister to the presidency. Among other rights, voters were asked to grant 
the president the ability to fire cabinet ministers and appoint replacements. 
Shortly after the referendum was approved by 65% of the vote, Zafy replaced his 
independent-minded prime minister with one of his political allies.197 Ratsiraka 
held a referendum in 1998 to amend the constitution that had formalised the end 
of his Democratic Republic of Madagascar in 1992. The amendments, which 
included proposals that protected the president from impeachment, created a 
Senate, and redefined territorial administration to ensure a decentralisation of 
power to the autonomous provinces, passed with 50,96% of the vote.198 In an 
April 2007 referendum, Ravalomanana received 70% approval for a series of 
constitutional changes, including a controversial proposal to give the president 
greater power during a state of emergency and a scheme to abolish the provinces 
and allow municipal and local governments more authority, which weakened 
Ratsiraka’s allies in the eastern provinces.199 Ravalomanana also included a 
clause that only allowed individuals whose parents both had Malagasy nationality 
from being president, effectively barring two of his political opponents from 
participating in upcoming elections.200   
 Most recently, Rajoelina held a referendum on the legitimacy of the HAT 
in November 2010, which heralded Madagascar’s Fourth Republic. The ways in 
which Rajoelina’s constitutional amendments were enacted exemplify how the 
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wider population is marginalised from the political machinations of the elite. The 
referendum was framed as a response to a call from the armed forces to resolve 
the political crisis amid the discovery of several reported coup plots. It comprised 
numerous clauses intended to legitimise Rajoelina’s government, for instance by 
allowing him to remain as interim president until conditions allowed for elections 
to take place. It also lowered the age of eligibility for the presidency from 40 to 
35, which theoretically permits Rajoelina, who is under the age of 40, to contest 
future presidential elections. Almost none of the voters knew specifically what 
types of changes to the constitution would be brought about by a positive outcome 
of the referendum. The referendum had been advertised as an opportunity for the 
people to help hasten the end of the crisis, and the majority of voters were 
effectively under the impression that voting “yes” would help resolve the political 
and economic situation.201 A public amenability to referendums reflects the 
generally high number of Malagasy who view their president as trustworthy. In a 
2009 survey, 68% of Malagasy stated they trusted him fully, and 72% of 
respondents claimed that they trusted him in part.202  
 Public reverence for the president is mirrored in the way personalities 
dominate Madagascar’s principal political parties. Little distinction is made 
between the political network of the president, the role of the presidency, or his 
political party. Instead of being associated with a political ideology or set of 
policies, political parties in Madagascar have served as instruments of 
neopatrimonial rule rather than democracy.203 Every political party in the history 
of independent Madagascar has been created by a leader at the top of a political 
network and has been followed by that party controlling the legislature.204 
Although there are over 16 political parties in Madagascar and presidential 
elections are generally contested by a very large number of candidates, Malagasy 
politics is currently dominated by four parties that are all lead by a former 
president. These include Zafy’s party, the Living Forces Coalition (Forces Vives), 
Ratsiraka’s party, the Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA), 
Ravalomanana’s TIM party, and Rajoelina’s TGV party.  
 Zafy’s party is a wide-ranging coalition hastily formed in the early-1990s 
with a vague political ideology based on opposition to AREMA in order to appeal 
to a wide range of voters and guarantee an electoral win.205 Ratsiraka formed 
                                                
201 Discussions with referendum voters in Antananarivo, November 17, 2010. 
202 Afrobarometer, Madagascans and Democracy, p. 7. 
203 Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, “Political Parties in Madagascar”.  
204 World Bank, Governance and Development Effectiveness.  
205 Gunther and Diamond, Political Parties and Democracy. 
 67 
AREMA in 1976 as a prelude to multiparty competition, but its creation also 
served to consolidate his own power within a political party. While some reforms 
within his ruling party were genuine in the sense that they increased the scope for 
political competition, they were partial and often appeared to be little more than 
attempts to pre-empt more serious change, and did not satisfy popular demands 
for political pluralism.206 In time, AREMA became an “elite-clientilist” party that 
constituted a confederation of traditional and newly created liberal-professional 
economic elites. Despite his being exiled in France and growing internal dissent 
within the party in the wake of the 2002 elections, Ratsiraka continues to be 
viewed by many Malagasy as the undisputed leader of the party and one of the 
most central figures in Malagasy politics. Ravalomanana’s party, TIM, is an 
“elite-paternalistic” party because its strength was almost entirely derived from 
Ravalomanana’s personality and his quest to advance his business interests in 
tandem with economic growth.207 Similar to Zafy, Rajoelina has assumed the 
presidency by virtue of his opposition to his predecessor, and his party lacks a 
coherent political platform. The confluence between his political party and his 
personality is so intimate that he himself is nicknamed TGV for the speed with 
which he rose to power.208  
The rise and fall of political parties tends to occur in tandem with the 
crises of leadership successions in the country, underscoring the incongruence 
between formal democratisation in Madagascar and the extent to which it has 
been truly institutionalised and accepted by Malagasy politicians. The process of 
leadership successions in transitional democracies varies according to the extent 
that it is governed by established procedures, which provides some indication of 
the extent to which a political system has been institutionalised. In the 
institutionalised version, political successions conform to a set of predetermined 
and widely accepted rules, and legitimacy is claimed by virtue of the process of 
selection to the extent that it honours those rules. When it is not institutionalised, 
successions are “self-justicatory and the leader is virtually self-selected”. 209 All of 
Madagascar’s democratic presidents have claimed legitimacy through opposition 
to their predecessor and a set of policies popularised as an intention to “save the 
nation”, instead of through a consolidated process of democracy, which usually 
includes compromise, bargaining, or accommodation with opposition groups.210 
On two occasions, a crisis of succession has erupted into a full blown political 
impasse and economic paralysis. Both the events of 2002 and 2009 reversed 
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economic growth trends in Madagascar, implying that high growth rates in 
Madagascar are not sustainable through a democratic transition of leadership. The 
two principal characteristics needed for a successful transfer of presidential 
power, including a dominant political party with a consensual decision-making 
tradition and an organic bureaucracy insulated from the political process, are 
noticeably absent in Madagascar’s current system of electoral democracy.211  
The convergence between the rise and fall of leading political parties and 
that of their leaders, and the repetitive crisis of leadership in Madagascar are 
indicative of how the country’s political elite undermines progress towards both 
democratic consolidation and economic growth. The 2002 election recount clearly 
showed that the population across all of Madagascar, except for in Ratsiraka’s 
hometown of Toamasina, had voted for Ravalomanana to be their president. They 
fought for their democratic right and ultimately received it, exposing the gap 
between Madagascar’s liberal democratic populace and its minimally democratic 
political elite. Although from a strictly legal perspective, Ravalomanana assumed 
the presidency in an unconstitutional manner, the public support given to him in 
2001 and 2002 suggests that he has been Madagascar’s most freely elected and 
democratic president. The crisis of 2009, which occurred just after Ravalomanana 
had been given a second and very strong mandate by the populace in the 2006 
elections, was a clear reminder of the political power wielded by Madagascar’s 
elites. Thus, in Madagascar, “reconstituted patterns of authoritarian rule are 
anchored in formal, and often internationally sanctioned, multiparty elections”. 212  
New political allegiances are regularly formed within the same political 
network to topple successive governments and allot economic rents. As noted by 
Galibert, the persistence of poverty and the multiplicity of political crises in 
Madagascar does indicate the fading of the state, but rather the extent to which it 
has become polarized into different factions vying for control over rents, 
especially in the extractive industries.213 Those who initially supported Ratsiraka, 
an ethnic Betsimisaraka, in 1975 helped create the social turmoil that led to the 
political liberalisation and rise of Zafy, an ethnic Tsimihety, in 1993.214 In turn, 
Zafy’s impeachment was principally a result of the same forces that helped him 
acquire power in the first place: “ineffectual leadership squandered the democratic 
dividend he had been handed, although his time was made difficult by factional 
jealousies rather than policies”. 215  Ratsiraka lost his hold on power when 
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important coastal and Merina leaders felt marginalised and the elite unity became 
fractured, partly because Ratsiraka’s expanding state strangulation role across 
sectors threatened their rents.216 Likewise, Ravalomanana’s decline ultimately 
sprang from the fact that he was a self-made Merina from a lower caste, and that 
his economic success came at too high a cost for the influential Merina families 
and their partners.  
 
Malagasy civil society 
  
 After more then two decades of quasi-military rule under Ratsiraka, in the 
1990s Malagasy civil society initially flourished as citizens found novel ways to 
express their opinions. Madagascar’s media sector, for instance, is quite vibrant. 
Since 1993, successive waves of investment in private media have endowed 
Madagascar with roughly 200 print media, 100 radio stations, nearly 20 television 
stations, and eight Internet suppliers. 217 Various members of the elite families 
own the country’s four daily newspapers with the highest distribution rates, but 
Madagascar’s media sector is relatively liberal. 218  The media outlets first 
published Ravalomanana’s initial win after the church group, which helped 
galvanise the population of Antananarivo to protest against Ratsiraka, proclaimed 
it. It has also generally played an important role during the current political crisis. 
Without the support of the media, the speed and assuredness with which 
Ravalomanana was able to consolidate his win is questionable.  
 Marcus argues that in contrast to many African states that have been shaped 
by a history of domination by “big men”, Madagascar’s civil society and social 
movements define its political space.219 However, his assessment that “no leader 
has had as much influence on the nature of the political system, or its dynamics, 
as the anti-colonial uprising of 1947, the military’s dissolution of the First 
Republic in 1972, the popular strikes of 1991, or the populist support for 
“democracy” that balkanised the country in 2002”, is not entirely accurate.220 It 
overlooks the fact that most of the Malagasy presidents created the uprisings that 
led to their eventual downfall themselves and rarely rewarded their popular 
supporters for their assistance. The arrival in Antananarivo of large numbers of 
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young people every year looking for employment creates a volatile atmosphere 
that is easily exploited by politicians. Ellis argues that in Madagascar, the ability 
to control the “urban mob” is significant in national politics. Furthermore, 
“behind this social phenomenon lies a factor rarely spoken of in public: that many 
of Antananarivo's urban poor are the descendants of slaves”.221 For example, 
Ravalomanana began limiting press freedoms and closing private media outlets 
after they had played such an important role in his struggle for power. Although 
the urban uprising in 2002 resembled an organised civil society movement, it 
ultimately proved to be unsustainable. In the end, the “aborted Malagasy culture 
of political change, which in the beginning looked quite promising to national and 
international observers, proved to be weakly anchored within the civil society. It 
was relegated by its own proponents to a shadowy existence beside the reinforced 
new power brokers”. 222 The strength of social movements in Madagascar is not 
derived from civil society per se, but paradoxically from the power of the 
presidency and the ability of Madagascar’s “big men” to influence social 
movements.  
 Poverty, low levels of education, and a high rate of urban youth mean that 
where Malagasy civil society is organised, it is very piecemeal and easily 
influenced. The various groups of significant actors within Malagasy civil society 
suffer from major structural deficiencies. Key challenges faced by civil society 
organisations include a weak enabling environment, a limited presence throughout 
the country beyond the capital, governance constraints, and a dearth of sustained 
financing. The deeply rooted centrality of the state has also ensured that most 
associations, where they exist, do not have the capacity to intervene in the 
political sphere.223 Political action organisations are being consulted in the current 
political negotiations, but they lack real influence in the national political arena.224 
The better-funded civil society organisations are the environmental groups and the 
bigger organisations such as the Red Cross. However, the environmental groups 
only survive on substantial support from international initiatives and benefactors, 
and politician’s wives generally run the humanitarian organisations.225 Consumer 
federations and trade unions are also small and relatively immobilised. There are 
a total of six consumer associations in Madagascar, which are grouped together 
under the Malagasy Federation of Consumer Associations. These associations 
enjoy a point of contact with the government through the consumer services 
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section of the Interior Commerce Department at the Ministry of Commerce, but 
their initiatives rarely lead to substantive policy changes. Several trade unions 
also exist, but they have very little political influence, and consultation processes 
between the unions and government Ministries are not institutionalised. In 1997, 
13 of the country’s most important trade unions unified into the Malagasy 
Workers Conference to strengthen their bargaining power, but the syndicate 
remains politically weak and hampered by Madagascar’s informal economy.226  
The politically most powerful entity in Malagasy civil society is the 
church. The important roles of religious institutions in Madagascar, which stem 
from a deep social reverence for ancestral histories embodied in the relationship 
between the living and the dead, are well documented.227 The veneration of 
ancestors is common to all ethnicities in Madagascar and represents a 
fundamental aspect of the Malagasy national psyche that helps explain the 
entrenched structures of social and political power. Razafindralambo argues that 
social relations among the Merina on the highlands of Madagascar can be 
understood only in relation to the division of the population into two major social 
categories based on the assumed status of ancestors. 228 The resulting conceptions 
and behaviours mark a separation between members of these two categories in 
everyday life, and thus help maintain the relatively rigid social and political 
hierarchy. Ancestors play a critical role in the construction of authority by linking 
those in power to a timeless, transcendent order.  
Due to their extensive networks, a long record of development work with 
donor funding, and credibility in the public arena, the Christian churches play an 
important role in the politics of development in Madagascar. The highly 
developed structures and networks of religious institutions afford them a social 
coverage that is unparalleled in civil society. They have acted as service providers 
as well as civic educators (on issues such as anti-corruption) and democracy 
watchdogs (human rights and election monitoring).229 The Malagasy Council of 
Christian Churches (FFKM) is the umbrella organisation for the country’s four 
principal Christian denominations. Although the FFKM has sometimes taken an 
overt position on political issues, in the political arena it has often served as a 
mediator, bringing together antagonistic factions. The FFKM encompasses the 
Catholic Church (EKAR), the Church of Jesus Christ of Madagascar (FJKM), the 
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Lutheran Church, and the Anglican Church. The FFKM has come to be seen as a 
moral force in Madagascar. It has been one of the few effective components of 
civil society, intervening between the state and the citizen. It legitimates itself by 
pointing not towards its voluntary and humanitarian activities but towards the 
60% to 70% of Malagasy who claim to be Christian.230 As a result, the big 
families have been influential members of the church and have used this 
institution to further their political interests. Today, serving the church can be 
considered less as building of civil society credentials and more as the 
construction of alliances with certain longstanding political networks.231The 
instrumentalisation of religious rivalry for political purposes reached a zenith 
when the rivalry between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina in 2009 pitted the New 
Protestant Church in Madagascar against the FJKM, where Ravalomanana was a 
pastor.232 
Despite the prevalence of clan-based politics, Malagasy society as a whole 
is not fundamentally ethnic or particularly violent, and the army has often played 
the role of peacemaker. In general, ethnic strife has been uncommon, and overt 
and large-scale conflict between political opponents or deaths among political 
demonstrators has been relatively limited. Fears of ethnic conflict were raised in 
2002, but the issue largely remained one between Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana 
supporters. Domestic capabilities for peaceful conflict management, evidenced by 
the strength of social movements and the often-restrained actions of the Malagasy 
military in political conflicts, are relatively high. This suggests that problems of 
national identity and national cohesiveness in Madagascar are low. This 
characteristic can be traced back to strong traditional and cultural values in 
Malagasy society that are mirrored by the concepts called Fihavanana and 
Raiamandreny, which, broadly understood, denote the idea of solidarity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Madagascar contains many of the elements needed for economic growth 
and development, including extensive mineral wealth, a low population to land 
ratio, national cohesiveness, a low penchant for civil violence, and due to its 
tactical location in the Indian Ocean, is of strategic interest to foreign donors and 
investors. Additionally, Madagascar has a continuous history as a state and its 
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people have a unified sense of Malagasy nationhood. Despite being conscious of 
their different ethnicities, Malagasy society as a whole is decidedly Malagasy, and 
the country’s history of political domination by the Merina signifies a societal 
acquiescence of a centralised power structure. Nonetheless, in 2011, Madagascar 
ranked as the 9th poorest country in the world in terms of GDP per capita.233 This 
chapter has attempted to shed light on how the socio-economic dynamics that 
originated in the pre-colonial era and were reinforced through colonial policies 
have manifested themselves in a contemporary politics of development that is 
determined by the intricacies of elite bargaining. 
Neither Ratsiraka’s state-led development project, nor the perfunctory 
attempts by the political elite to consolidate democracy and development in 
tandem with significant donor support have resulted in tangible benefits for the 
majority of Malagasy. Rather than being developmental, the power of 
Madagascar’s elites to subvert the political decision-making process for personal 
enrichment suggests that Malagasy politics, economics, societal traditions, and 
economic development are inextricably intertwined in an anti-developmental 
manner. Patterns of patron-client networks, ethnic, and class-based politics 
continue to exert a vigorous hold on political and economic processes in 
Madagascar, but these must be understood as rooted in historical and socially 
institutionalised patterns of thought and internal social and political organisation. 
Kinship, ancestral ties, and heterodox interpretations of time, for instance, 
influence development processes in Madagascar in important ways.  
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Chapter 3: Madagascar’s politics of development from 2002 - 2008 
 
Introduction 
  
In this chapter, I explore Madagascar’s politics of development from 2002 
to 2008 and investigate to what extent the Malagasy government under the regime 
of Marc Ravalomanana was developmental. This discussion is framed by the 
concept of the developmental state, which grew out of the experiences of Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s. These 
countries experienced unprecedented rates of economic growth and 
industrialisation through state-led development policies that differed significantly 
from the neo-liberal development orthodoxy of the time. Developmental state 
proponents questioned the value of unfettered markets, leading a concern with 
“bringing the state back in” to development and finding the right balance between 
state and market forces to pursue economic growth. 234  Leftwich defines a 
developmental state as “ones whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, 
autonomy, and capacity at its centre to shape, pursue, and encourage the 
achievement of explicit developmental objectives”.235 The applicability of the 
developmental state concept to Africa remains contested, but the most clearly 
accepted cases of African developmental states, including principally Mauritius 
and Botswana, demonstrate that when adapted to local contexts, developmental 
leadership can facilitate long-term and widespread economic growth in Africa. 236 
The discussion is thus progressively shifting towards an acceptance that the 
concept of a developmental state offers a useful analytical framework with which 
to analyse the tensions between the state, society, and economic growth in 
contemporary African contexts.  
Between 2002 and 2008, the Malagasy government broadly displayed 
certain elements of a developmental state. These include a clearly defined vision 
for economic growth, the centralisation of rents, an emphasis on infrastructure 
and education as pre-requisites of growth, the attraction of foreign donor support 
and investments, and an overall positive growth trajectory. The strength of the 
presidency in Madagascar and Ravalomanana’s popularity more generally 
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allowed him to amass the support of civil society and the wider population and 
push through economic reforms. As the political turmoil abated after the standoff 
with Ratsiraka in mid-2002, Madagascar embarked on an ambitious 
transformation towards a hybrid mix of state-led capitalist development that 
brought gradual but important improvements in both economic and human 
development indicators. By 2008, Ravalomanana’s policies had exerted visibly 
positive impacts throughout the country, especially in the capital where he had 
upgraded transport infrastructure, repaired potholes, constructed a multilane 
highway to the airport, and regulated street vendors, taxi licensing, and market 
places. 
However, Ravalomanana’s Madagascar was not a developmental state per 
se. Rather, a non-developmental Malagasy state was under the rule of a 
development-oriented government. In a developmental state, the government and 
business society are conceptualised as two distinct yet related institutions that 
must cooperate with each other to achieve economic growth. A state is considered 
developmental when the government demonstrates a definitive commitment to 
deploy its administrative and political resources in the pursuit of growth and 
cooperates with the private sector to achieve this goal. Under Ravalomanana, 
government-business relations were characterised more by neopatrimonialism and 
crony capitalism than by national cohesion. Ravalomanana’s economic policies 
were pro-growth, but by prioritising his private interest over the national one they 
were also dysfunctional because they excluded influential members of the local 
elite from his developmental agenda. This process so upset the existing balance of 
local politics that it led to the coup of 2009.  
Ravalomanana’s regime eventually succumbed to internal pressures from 
a coalition composed of Madagascar’s big families, French interests, and elements 
of the Indian-Pakistani (locally known as the Karana) business elite, which was 
able to mobilise the masses against him and erode his initially strong support 
among the public. Ravalomanana was not born into one of Madagascar’s big 
families, but part of the country’s new and small economic elite that has existed in 
an uneasy alliance with the traditional elite since the advent of economic 
liberalisation in the 1990s. He was a self-made millionaire who rose to political 
prominence through his corporate identity and exploited his position of authority 
to facilitate the expansion of his business empire. Although he was extremely 
successful in all of his business ventures and seemed to be placing Madagascar on 
a path towards prosperity, he became excessively corrupt and alienated too many 
members of Madagascar’s elite. The underlying social and political dynamics that 
have repeatedly undermined development processes in Madagascar thus also 
thwarted the progress made by Ravalomanana’s regime.  
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This chapter commences with a discussion of the developmental state 
concept and an exploration of African developmental states, with a closer look at 
the examples of Mauritius and Botswana. I then explore Ravalomanana’s agenda 
for development within this framework. I explain his vision for development and 
show that his policies resulted in both macroeconomic growth and the enhanced 
wellbeing of the population. I then discuss the economic basis of Ravalomanana’s 
rise to power and describe how he utilised his corporate identity and the power of 
the church to gain political support. I analyse why Ravalomanana ultimately 
failed to unite Madagascar’s political and economic elite to support his agenda by 
interrogating the complex relations between state and society in Madagascar that 
transpired during his regime. Finally, I highlight the differences between 
Ravalomanana’s government and those of the neopatrimonial developmentalist 
government in Rwanda.  
 
The developmental state 
 
Chalmers Johnson first introduced the concept of the developmental state 
in 1982 when he argued that Japan’s post-war recovery, marked by heavy 
investment in infrastructure projects and fast rates of economic growth, was 
chiefly accredited to the far-sighted economic intervention policies by elements of 
the Japanese state. Johnson included the presence of a small, professional and 
efficient state bureaucracy, a socio-political environment in which the political 
elite can operate and define policy independently of interventions by vested 
interests, a combination of planned political economy and free market principles, 
and a pilot organisation ultimately guiding this process as the defining features of 
a developmental state. 237  The state is the primary actor in development processes 
because it guides economic policy. As argued by Fine, the “gathering experience 
and study of the East Asian newly industrialised countries, and their success in 
comparison with failures elsewhere, have increasingly revealed that the 
multiplicity and complexity of conditions required for industrialisation…depend 
on appropriate political capabilities being present and deployed in ways that vary 
from sector to sector and country to country”.238 From a political perspective, the 
characteristics of the state, state-society relations, the existence of a 
developmental elite capable of implementing a developmental vision, and an 
external geopolitical environment conducive to state-led development are 
paramount. 
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The state is the central agent in society and an arbitrator and regulator in 
times of economic change. It acts as a facilitator of private capital accumulation 
and sometimes assumes the role of entrepreneur itself. The success of the 
developmental state depends to a large degree on its internal organisation and the 
ways in which it has divided responsibilities for managing economic policies 
among different agencies and institutions. Johnson made an important distinction 
between a state that regulates the market and one that develops and manages 
relations between the private sector and the market. According to Johnson, a 
regulatory state governs the economy mainly through regulatory agencies that are 
empowered to enforce a variety of standards of behaviour to protect the public 
against market failures of various sorts, including monopolistic pricing, predation, 
and other abuses of market power, and by providing collective goods that 
otherwise would be undersupplied by the market.239 In contrast, a developmental 
state intervenes more directly in the economy by picking winners among local 
industries and businesses through a variety of means to promote the growth of 
new industries.240  
A developmental state is further characterised by a very particular 
relationship between the state and society. Industry is crucial to the growth of the 
economy, but the state is responsible for engineering a regulatory environment 
that facilitates the success of industrial conglomerates. Conversely, the state needs 
private social capital for its economic growth, but it is dependent on economic 
actors believing in its developmental vision, following its regulations, and 
directing capital along what the state deems to be profitable avenues. To maintain 
this delicate balance, the state must be “embedded” in a concrete but complex set 
of social ties that bind it to local actors and provide institutional channels for the 
constant negotiation of goals and policies between state and society.241 Yet the 
preservation of clearly delineated boundaries between opposing forces, such as 
local and central power, private and public realms, and political stability and 
economic necessities, is equally vital, and must underpin the social embeddedness 
of the state.242 These margins protect the political elite from being captured by 
particular societal interests that may obstruct developmental goals. Due to its 
strategic position within the state apparatus and society, a political elite can also 
provide a vision of the future development of the economy around which other 
agents in society can coordinate their actions. 243  Although the policies, 
bureaucracies, and levels of capacities and competences differed among the 
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developmental states in East Asia, all displayed a deep commitment to economic 
growth through the institutionalisation of development policies grounded in 
nationalism and a sense of developmental urgency that transcended national 
ethnic, religious, political, and social cleavages.244  
The legitimacy of the traditional developmental state was based on 
significant improvements in standards of living for a broad cross section of 
society rather than on popular electoral support. Autocratic governments oversaw 
economic growth in Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Taiwan, and even Japan remained a one party state during its phase of rapid 
industrialisation.245 A focus on democratic practices is thought to divert attention 
away from the immediate developmental needs of a country, and “leads to 
indiscipline and disorderly conduct that are inimical to long-term 
development”.246 The mobilisation of the population to make sacrifices to achieve 
developmental ends has further been identified as the key advantage an 
authoritarian regime has over a democratic one in terms of its developmental 
potential.247 Paradoxically, the institutional mixes and various economic, civil, 
and political liberties often found in the Asian developmental states provided the 
virtues that have been held to be peculiar to democracy, such as conditions of 
stability, security, and openness and information, but not in virtue of providing 
democracy itself.248  
The Asian developmental states also benefitted from specific modes of 
interaction between international conditions, domestic politics, and industrial 
policies that enabled them to formulate and implement economic goals. Whilst the 
global context in which developmental states arose has sometimes been 
overlooked in preference for examining the domestic structures of the state, it 
occupied a significant role. The emergence of the Asian developmental states 
cannot be understood outside of the Cold War context and particularly their 
relationship with the US. 249 Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan were all strategically 
important for the US during the Cold War period and received significant 
diplomatic, financial, and in some cases military aid from it. They also profited 
from a booming US economy through trade agreements.250 Cold War geopolitics 
further allowed developmental states to implement industrial policies that 
sometimes jarred with the neo-liberal economic development orthodoxy of the 
                                                
244 Chang and Rowthorne, The Role of the State.  
245 Edigheji, Constructing a Democratic Developmental State. 
246 Bhagwati, “Democracy and Development”, 151-162, p. 151.  
247 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.  
248 Chang, Rethinking Development Economics.  
249 Routley, Developmental States.  
250 Pempel, “The Developmental Regime”, 137-181.  
 79 
Western powers in the 1980s. Related to the US support, the urgency of economic 
development that propelled the developmental state forward against the existing 
economic orthodoxy has been attributed to a “systemic vulnerability” and a 
perception of extremely intensive and long-term external existential threats. This 
was especially the case in South Korea and Taiwan, and played a key role in 
creating cohesive states with a consistent commitment of otherwise self-interested 
politicians and bureaucrats to put group interests ahead of their own.251  
 
The African developmental state 
 
There is a widespread view that the type of state-led economic growth 
witnessed in Asia is not replicable in Africa. On a practical level, this is attributed 
to the absence of state capacity, the inability of the state to resist capture by 
special interest groups, and the associated lack of a developmental elite. The 
assertion that a developmental state can provide a vision of the future 
development of the economy around which other agents can coordinate their 
actions implies a normative role for the state, which is credited with knowing how 
to employ the right mix of interventionist and neoliberal policies while respecting 
the rights of its citizens. The elusive nature of this type of state-society relations 
in Africa is widely attributed to the “weakness” of African states, which lack the 
capacity to implement economic reform and resist capture by self-interested 
elements in society.252 The inability of the state to resist capture is in turn 
characterised by the permeability of the political leadership in relation to the local 
industrial and business elites around it. 253  A “patrimonial logic”, where 
officeholders almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own 
uses and political authority is largely based on patron-client practices, including 
patronage, various forms of rent seeking and prebendalism, has been identified a 
primary factor impeding equitable and sustainable economic development in 
African countries. 254  Within these social structures, heavy state intervention 
aggravates existing predatory rent-seeking activities. 255  Under conditions of 
clientelism commonly found in African countries, greater accountability can mean 
greater demands on patrons, more competition for resources, and increasing 
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political instability as patronage networks break down.256 This manifests itself in 
the mismanagement of state resources, inefficiency, corruption, and a frail judicial 
system.257 Instead of strengthening private accumulation, the African political 
elite diverts resources away from productive investment, appropriates them for 
themselves, and imports foreign goods to fill the vacuum. Economic stagnation in 
Africa has been directly attributed to the rational choices made by African 
elites.258  
Post-independence experiences with state-led development helped erode 
the extent to which African states are perceived as capable of formulating and 
implementing successful economic development policies. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
the sudden onset of independence left many states with a fragmented private 
sector that necessitated a statist approach to economic growth. Leaders in 
countries such as Côte d’Ivoire (1960-75), Kenya (1965-75), and Malawi (1961-
78) attempted to industrialise their economies by implementing state-led 
development strategies. The state became the main economic actor involved in a 
wide range of activities that included not only social and economic infrastructure, 
but also the ownership and management of productive industry. This far-reaching 
state involvement also reflected the nationalist ideology of overcoming colonial 
and capitalist control of the economy and the concomitant neglect of human 
development.259 However, post-colonial regimes in Africa sought to consolidate 
their own power and implemented interventionist policies in order to facilitate the 
appropriation of wealth by means of state power.260  While some improvements 
were made in social sectors, overall economic development remained elusive. 
Post-independence state-led interventions in Africa ultimately led to the “lost 
decade” of the 1980s, when debts spiralled out of control and poverty rates across 
the continent increased.261  
The transferability of a development model to Africa is further contested 
because the Asian developmental states were conceived at a specific point in time 
and under a particular set of circumstances. The East Asian financial crisis of the 
late-1990s has in particular cemented the viewpoint that the developmental state 
concept is anchored to the experience of Asian economies in the 1980s. The crisis 
suggested that even the developmental successes of the Asian industrialisers were 
no longer tenable within the changing global economic environment. Since the 
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strategies of developmental states are aimed at enhancing the global 
competitiveness of their economies, their fortunes are closely interwoven with 
international market forces. The tolerant geopolitical environment, which saw the 
US privilege systemic strategic issues over narrower national economic interests, 
has been overturned. Instead, Western conceptions of economic development and 
good governance are being promoted through an international regulatory 
framework that governs to what extent developing economies can determine their 
political and economic policies within an array of multilateral economic 
organisations, international treaties, and bilateral agreements. This altered 
geopolitical context ostensibly allows African states considerably less leeway to 
actively participate in the governing of their economies. A rhetorical commitment 
to liberalisation “shrinks” the development space for diversification and 
upgrading policies in developing countries.262 The African developmental state is 
consequentially viewed as limited by its own internal dynamics and by increasing 
international pressure to liberalise economically and politically. As Hillbom 
maintains “the East Asian developmental model is very specific and applicable 
only to a minority of developed and developing countries. Instead of watering it 
down to fit a broad range of development processes the concept should keep its 
distinctive features or risk losing its explanatory value”. 
The arguments against an African developmental state are summarised by 
what Mkandawire terms an “impossibility thesis”.263 According to Mkandawire, 
the state in Africa is vilified to the extent that the most accepted case against 
developmental states “is not faith in flawless markets but rather that whatever the 
degree of market failure African states cannot correct them in ways that do not 
make them worse”.264 The impossibility thesis is characterised more by an 
ideological preference for the market approach to development rather than on a 
careful analysis of the role of the state in development. Critiques against the 
African developmental state simultaneously call for the existence of a 
developmental state, but doubt the ability of the African state to implement the 
correct policies. Utilising the low levels of economic growth in Africa to explain 
their lack of developmentalism is also somewhat tautological “…since evidence 
that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance 
of the economy”.265 Lastly, the arguments against an African developmental state 
describe in a rather sweeping and general sense (and without a critical analysis of 
their differential performances), the African state at a particular historic juncture 
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in the continent’s development trajectory - mainly from about the mid-to-late-
1970s - to explain why African societies never were and never will be 
developmental. 266 
 Critical appraisals of the African developmental state overlook the 
differences between a model and a paradigm of a developmental state. As noted 
by Woo-Cumings, “the act of rethinking [the developmental state] should give us 
pause: there was never a consensus about the nature and causes of development in 
East Asia”.267 African states should not aim for a replication of an Asian model of 
the developmental state. 268  A flexible and broad conceptualisation of a 
developmental state “underscores the ways in which political power, if wielded 
astutely, can contribute positively to a nation’s economic well-being”.269 It also 
underlines the transferability of one key lesson: that the ability of a society to 
adapt and reinvent itself to match its development needs to its national and 
international contexts is paramount to the success of a developmental state. In a 
contemporary, “21st century developmental state”, the state remains the central 
motivator in the development process, but since new dynamics and actors are 
influencing the process itself, the path towards economic growth must be adapted 
to incorporate more intangible but still growth-enhancing goals related to health, 
education, and skills transfers.270 A paradigm of a flexible development state, 
which “nurtures networks of production and innovation to attract foreign 
investments and links local and global technology and business networks together 
in ways that promote domestic development within the contexts of globalisation,” 
is conducive to the analysis.271 In sum, the concept of a developmental state is in a 
process of transformation because it must adapt and reinvent itself to fit in the 
new global economic order, but it is not redundant.272 
 
Examples of African developmental states  
 
Since most African states are today nominally democratic and because 
most of the clear examples of authoritarian developmental states in Africa from 
the immediate post-independence era failed to engender sustainable or widespread 
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economic growth, the African developmental state is generally conceptualised as 
a democratic developmental state. Robinson and White argue that in situations 
where democracy is already in place and unlikely to be reversed due to 
international pressures, one should not question which form of government is 
more conducive to development. Instead, one ought to inquire, “to what extent 
and in what ways the parallel priorities of a democratic political system and an 
effective developmental state can be achieved concurrently”. 273  The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) similarly maintains 
that the necessary ingredients are in place for African countries to tackle their 
developmental challenges by employing a pragmatic mix of state-led and market 
policies and taking into consideration country-specific developmental challenges 
within the framework of a democratic developmental state.274 In a democratic 
developmental state, the political leadership and its institutional groups enjoy a 
reasonable measure of autonomy from society, but they simultaneously align with 
groups, classes, and institutions to facilitate the delivery of its set developmental 
objectives. The defining features of such a state are accountability, 
responsiveness, transparency, democratic governance, autonomy, and a people-
centred development strategy that can promote delivery of the public good.275 The 
process of changing from a weak democracy to one with developmental 
capabilities is one of institutional accumulation that must occur gradually and, 
crucially, it must happen organically.276  
Mauritius and Botswana are most often highlighted as contemporary 
examples of established African developmental states. Successful records of 
peaceful economic development in Botswana and Mauritius are attributed to their 
democratic systems of government, which, due to the need for accountability and 
responsiveness to electorates, are compelled to select appropriate economic 
policies for the efficient allocation and utilisation of resources and to provide 
sufficient incentives to foreign investors to propel development. 277 Mkandawire 
argues: “the first few examples of developmental states were authoritarian. The 
new ones will have to be democratic, and it is encouraging that the two most cited 
examples of such 'democratic developmental states' are both African - Botswana 
and Mauritius”.278 However, rather than underlining the constructive role of 
democracy in the African developmental state, the examples of Botswana and 
Mauritius buttress the counter-argument that the establishment of effective 
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institutions ought to take prominence over whether or not they should be 
democratic.  
Although Mauritius has a functioning multiparty democracy and has 
implemented industrial policies to spur export-led growth, it differs from many 
mainland African cases because it is a small, resource-poor island populated 
principally by migrant settlers whose state-society relations were influenced by 
various different forms of colonial rule, including Dutch, French, and English.279 
The emergence of a society with dense associational ties with the state through 
land-holding reforms in the 19th century meant that Mauritius largely lacks the 
traditional and entrenched forms of neopatrimonial social and political 
organisation often evidenced throughout the African continent. Tight 
associational ties between the state and industrial society helped create a 
constructive state-society synergy, which promoted broad-based development by 
engaging and strengthening both state institutions and societal associations. This 
endowed Mauritius with the institutions necessary to initiate inclusive 
development strategies after independence.280 It also lead to the consolidation of a 
functioning multi-party democracy on the island, with three parties, the Labour 
Party, the Movement Militant Mauricien, and the Movement Socialist Militant 
alternating power in Mauritius since 1970.  
Mauritius was a heavily interventionist state that first determined 
industrial policy by negotiating market access for its sugar industry and other 
commodities, and later by creating an EPZ. The Mauritian EPZ was modelled on 
the experiences of the East Asian industrialisers, especially Taiwan. The 
government created the Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority 
in 1983 as a centralised institution to support the development of the EPZ. The 
EPZ formed part of a Mauritian strategy to implement the “flying geese” 
paradigm, which denotes the use of a state’s latecomer advantage to emulate 
faster developing economies and build up local industries that grow dynamically 
in the more developed countries.281 The EPZ was designed to attract investors 
through incentives that included duty-free exports, a free tax zone, cheap but 
skilled labour, and profit mobility. Export manufacturing became the primary 
means to achieve developmental ends. Crucially, government policy in Mauritius 
had targeted the education and social services, which resulted in a relatively 
cheap, skilled, and stable labour force crucial for the successful export of locally 
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manufactured goods.282 The state was able to use its popular legitimacy to 
promote export-led industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s, with rates of success 
that rivalled the East Asian economies.283 Whereas in the 1970s, Mauritians flew 
to Antananarivo to buy French products and conduct business, today it is the other 
way around.284 These factors render Mauritius a democratic developmental state, 
but arguably not an African one.  
Botswana, on the other hand, is an African developmental state, but not 
necessarily a multi-party democracy. Hillbom disputes the definition of Botswana 
as a developmental state due to its dependency on natural resources, dearth of 
economic diversification, the lack of thorough industrialisation strategies, and the 
ongoing close connection between the government bureaucracy and the cattle-
keeping elite.  However, as pointed out by Taylor, who approaches the debate 
from a more political and state-oriented than economic perspective, Botswana has 
“broadly pursued certain policies” that are considered developmental.285  Since 
independence in 1966, Botswana has been a de facto one party state with “an 
electoral process that is symbolic of a style of political rule rather than a source of 
alternative political leadership”.286 The legitimacy of the state was principally 
based on the elite’s commitment to development and on its ability to implement 
industrial policies. During colonialism, colonial elites and prosperous cattle 
farmers had dominated Botswana’s economy, and beef exports had accounted for 
the majority of export earnings. By independence, beef accounted for 85% of 
Botswana’s export earnings. 287  Shortly after independence, Botswana’s 
government nationalised the mining industry and formed a joint venture with De 
Beers, a South African diamond company. Revenues from the diamond industry 
continue to drive economic growth rates, which have been among the fastest in 
the world. The implementation of development policy was institutionalised 
through the creation of a centralised economic agency, the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning. Using the windfalls from the diamond industry, 
Botswana’s government has heavily invested in public infrastructures and social 
services, which have brought significant benefits to the wider population.288    
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A primary reason for the success of Botswana’s elite to guide economic 
growth is attributed to its widespread legitimacy, which is partly based on the 
country’s pre-colonial and indigenous institutions. Unlike many post-colonial 
African nations who sought to make a break from their past by modernising, 
Botswana’s post-independence leadership embraced some of the more important 
indigenous institutions, which effectively legitimised the state despite it being 
dominated by a single party.289 The construction of a post-colonial historic bloc 
and a broad hegemonic project underpinning the chosen developmental path 
granted the dominant party an enduring form of legitimacy almost unprecedented 
in the rest of Africa.290 The country’s ethnic homogeneity, evidenced by its 
linguistic cohesiveness, facilitated the construction of a cohesive, national 
development project undeterred by ethnic political rivalries. Surrounded by white 
settler-dominated southern Africa, the country also faced an immediate 
developmental threat at independence. The socio-economic elite, which hailed 
from the same ethnic group as the majority of the population, transcended 
colonial and post-colonial histories to establish a developmental state apparatus 
with strong institutions.291 The fact that they did not have to maintain an excessive 
network of clients to keep their dominant group in power meant that the state 
elites were able to retain an important element of autonomy from society. 
 
A development-oriented government in Madagascar? 
 
In contrast to the cases discussed above, under Ravalomanana the 
Malagasy government was not able to adequately balance levels of autonomy and 
cooperation with society and was thus development-oriented rather than the 
leading institution of a developmental state. Crucially, Ravalomanana had a clear, 
long-term vision of an industrially and socially accelerated development for 
Madagascar. With the launching of “Madagascar Naturally”, Ravalomanana’s 
slogan for development, he sought to promote the environmentally sustainable 
value-added processing of Madagascar’s natural wealth through private sector 
growth based on the attraction of foreign investment and the promotion of 
incentives for local investment. 292  After Ravalomanana had secured the 
presidency “perhaps one of the most important shifts [in society] was that the 
pervasive feeling of anomie that had gripped the country since the impeachment 
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of Albert Zafy in 1996 gave way to a tangible hope that leadership had something 
to offer Madagascar”.293 Ravalomanana planned on building a “culture of results” 
within his administration and the Malagasy government, which was conceived as 
a “breath of fresh air” signalling an end to the inertia the country had endured 
under Ratsiraka’s regime for over three decades.294 Ravalomanana hoped to 
replicate the economic growth trajectories of the Asian developmental states and 
viewed China’s rapid industrialisation over the past two decades as containing 
important lessons for Madagascar. Akin to the examples of Malaysia and 
Singapore, Ravalomanana believed that Madagascar possessed the potential for 
fast economic success through a mix of state-led and capitalist development in a 
southern African axis of growth that would include Madagascar, South Africa, 
and Mauritius.295  
Ravalomanana’s plan was institutionalised through a World Bank-
approved national development strategy paper in 2002, which was revised and 
renamed the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) in 2006. This comprehensive 
agenda was to guide development policy from 2007 until 2012 and addressed a 
large number of issues. Its eight principal commitments were, in order of 
importance: (1) responsible governance, (2) connected infrastructure, (3) 
educational transformation, (4) rural development and green revolution, (5) 
health, family planning, and the fight against HIV/AIDS, (6) high growth 
economy, (7) cherish the environment, and (8) national solidarity. These 
commitments were to be pursued through the MAP’s six “breakthrough reform 
initiatives”. They included: (1) reforming public finances in order to increase the 
tax quota to 15% in 2012 by enlarging the taxable base, improving the 
effectiveness of tax levies, simplifying tax laws, and improving expenditure 
management, (2) significantly boosting investment levels, (3) preparing a “green 
revolution” by improving agricultural productivity, making agro-industrial 
management and production more efficient, expanding farm credit, providing 
machines and other inputs to farmers, securing land tenure, and enlarging the 
sequence of the agricultural value-added chain, (4) improving public security by 
augmenting personnel and resources in the gendarmerie and police, combating 
cattle theft and the smuggling of precious stones and tropical woods, (5) 
bolstering health and family planning through sex education, distribution of 
contraceptives and media campaigns to reduce the average number of children per 
family from five children to three by 2012, encouragement of the use of mosquito 
nets and malaria prophylaxis countrywide, and (6) transforming the judicial 
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system through the introduction of an economic tribunal, a reform of the 
penitentiary system to meet international Red Cross standards, a reduction of 
corruption among judges, and an acceleration in the speed of judicial procedures. 
The development objectives of these reforms were ambitious. Between 2005 and 
2012, the MAP proposed to raise Madagascar’s GDP growth rate from 4,6% to 
10%, improve its HDI rank from 146 to 100, and decrease the percentage of the 
population living on less than US $2 per day from 85% to 50%.296 
 The commitment relating to infrastructural growth was a fundamental 
component of Ravalomanana’s overall development plan because it provided the 
logistical support to the other commitments. The building of quality roads, 
railways, ports, airports, schools, and hospitals, and energy grids throughout the 
country, “all supported the economic development process”.297 The most visible 
sign of economic growth under Ravalomanana’s regime was the enhanced 
conditions of Madagascar’s road network. Ravalomanana created the Road 
Authority of Madagascar in 2007, an agency in charge of road construction and 
rehabilitation. Between 2004 and 2006, the total amount of paved roads in 
Madagascar almost doubled from 9,034 km to 16,755 km, and a further 8,251 km 
of national roads benefited from maintenance work. These improvements exerted 
a positive impact on private sector growth, resulting in an expansion of the 
transport sector in 2007, and an increase of 17,3% for the transport of goods and 
13,3% for the transport of passengers. These developments were boosted and 
mutually reinforced by a positive trend in imports and a growth in the tourist 
industry.298  
  The commitment concerning educational transformation was a crucial 
foundation of human capital development in the country. The quality of education 
in Madagascar still exhibits a heavy urban-rural bias, but important efforts were 
made to improve schooling services in the countryside. New schools and libraries 
were built, and government officials distributed backpacks, notepads, and other 
essential equipment in remote towns and villages as a way to publicise the 
government’s commitment to education as a national priority.299 Primary schools, 
elementary schools, high schools, and higher learning facilities were upgraded, 
and virtual libraries were established in all of the country’s six universities. 
Ravalomanana also reformed the educational system to comply with global 
effectiveness standards and enacted institutional changes that reorganised pre-
school and primary education. Attendance was made free and mandatory between 
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the ages of 6 - 13, and English was (controversially) included alongside French as 
the second language of instruction in schools. The net rate of children attending 
primary school increased from 93,3% to 97% between 2004 and 2007, bringing 
Madagascar closer to the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reaching 
100% primary school enrolment by 2015.300 From 2001 to 2005, enrolment rates 
increased by 53,5% in elementary schools, 69,1% in high school, 50,3% in lycées 
(French private schools), 55,7% in higher education, and 42,9% in technical and 
professional education.301 High incompletion rates and concerns over the quality 
of education led to a shift in focus towards the promotion of teaching careers and 
the training of instructors during Ravalomanana’s second term.   
Many of these infrastructure and education projects were financed with 
support from international donors. Since it signalled that the new Malagasy 
government had a clear plan for development and was dedicated to achieving this 
in an environmentally sustainable manner, the formulation of the MAP increased 
international and especially Western donor support for Madagascar. 
Ravalomanana publicly stated that fostering economic growth without destroying 
the country’s natural heritage is “a difficult challenge for which we [Madagascar] 
need the support of the international community”.302 Many significant donors had 
already recognised the Ravalomanana government in 2002 after relatively little 
hesitation because they strongly supported his pro-Western neoliberal agenda for 
growth. In 2002 the World Bank organised a conference in Paris named “Friends 
of Madagascar”, during which international donors pledged US $1 billion in 
assistance over five years. In October 2004, Madagascar qualified for the 
cancellation of half the national debt, which amounted to approximately US $2 
billion, under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. In the 
summer of 2005, the Group of 8 countries approved the cancellation of 
Madagascar’s entire external debt.303 China also annulled all of the dues owed to 
it by Madagascar in 2005. Later that year, Madagascar became the first recipient 
of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a initiative by the US government 
which rewards developing countries that display sound economic and governance 
performance by enrolling them in a credit program. Under the MCA, Madagascar 
received an account in the form of a four-year grant worth US $110 million.304 
Ravalomanana also reached out to emerging economic partners, such as China, 
and less traditional donors, such as Germany. Table 2 shows that while 
                                                
300 International Monetary Fund, Republic of Madagascar, 1-44. 
301 Epstein et al., Employment, Poverty and Economic Development, iv-140, p. 72.  
302 Rabesahala-Horning, “Strong Support for Weak Performance”, 405-431, p. 420.  
303 The Group of 8 is a forum for the world’s eight wealthiest countries, which includes the US, 
the UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and Russia.  
304 Rabesahala-Horning, “Strong Support for Weak Performance”, 405-431. 
 90 
multilateral agencies accounted for the majority of donor funding for the MAP, 
bilateral funding also contributed significantly to Madagascar’s budget between 
2006 and 2008. Most of the subsidies were destined for the infrastructure sector, 
followed by social services, including health and education, the productive sector, 
and the administrative sector.305 
       Table 2: External donor funding for the MAP, 2006 – 2008, US $ million. 
 2006 2007 2008 
Multilateral agencies combined 380 300 388 
China - - 4 
France 1 2 3 
US 4 4 2 
Japan 2 1 2 
Germany 1 1 1 
Others 1.5 2 3 
Other Aid 0.3 0.5 2.3 
Total 389.8 310.5 405.3 
 Source: International Monetary Fund, Republic of Madagascar. 
A key component of Ravalomanana’s plan was for Madagascar to lessen 
its economic dependency on France by integrating more energetically with the 
global economy. After 2002, Madagascar increasingly liberalised foreign trade 
through regional integration and the strengthening of bilateral trade and 
investments agreements. It joined SADC, a predominantly English-speaking 
socioeconomic and political cooperation organisation, in 2005. This 
complemented both Ravalomanana’s economic diversification strategy and his 
efforts to foster relations with Madagascar's Anglophone neighbours on the 
African mainland.306 He also strengthened existing trade agreements through 
increased economic partnership negotiations with the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA), and within the framework of the European Union – Africa, 
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Caribbean and Pacific Cotonou Treaty. Increased regional integration and an 
expanded global market for existing exports more generally resulted in an upsurge 
of Malagasy exports from 9% in 2005 to 13,7% by 2007. Madagascar also 
profited from its comparative advantages related to its geographical proximity to 
certain member countries of SADC and COMESA. During Ravalomanana’s 
regime, Madagascar’s exports towards nearby countries such as South Africa and 
Mauritius averaged 34% of the total foreign trade.307  
To promote private sector investments, Ravalomanana established the 
Economic Development Board of Madagascar (EDBM) in 2006. The EDBM is 
tasked with the management and dissemination of investment policies in 
Madagascar, and centralises all issues pertaining to private sector investments 
outside of the extractive industries into one institution. By working to attract 
foreign investment, the EDBM sought to help Malagasy exporters acquire foreign 
investment in order to promote domestic export capabilities. As a one-stop-shop 
for investors, the creation of the EDBM reduced the time it takes to register a 
business in Madagascar from a few weeks to four days, which helped improve 
Madagascar’s score on the World Bank’s “Doing Business” ranking from 151 to 
144 between 2008 and 2009.308 Between 2005 and 2008, total FDI to Madagascar 
rose from US $86 million to US $1,47 billion, with significant investments made 
in the financial sector, oil distribution, telecommunications, and the extractive 
industries.309  
The MAP targeted the mining industry as a key sector for reform. Mining 
is the object of multiple commitments in the MAP, and its goals are interwoven 
with the country’s plans for infrastructure development, rural development, 
environmental protection, and a high growth economy. Noting that previous 
governments had neglected Madagascar’s mining potential for almost two 
decades, the MAP aimed to help current mining projects enter the production 
phase and quickly expand. Ravalomanana also recognised that previous efforts to 
reform the mining sector had failed to generate tangible benefits in terms of job 
creation, tax revenues, infrastructure, or social services, and he sought to 
encourage the growth of the extractive industries while respecting surrounding 
communities and the environment. The aims of the reform were to increase the 
contribution of mining to GDP from 3% to 30%, and to raise mineral royalties 
from US $0,168 million to US $45 million between 2002 and 2011. Revenues 
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from mineral exports were expected to rise from US $50 million to US $300 
million over the same period.310  
Although serious reforms had already begun with the creation of a Project 
for the Reform of the Mining Sector (PRSM) in 1998 and the establishment of a 
new mining code in 1999 in the wake of Madagascar’s mining sector boom, these 
were both strengthened under Ravalomanana. A number of new laws and 
initiatives came into force during Ravalomanana’s first term, and a new Mineral 
Resources Governance Project (PGRM), which provided more legal stability and 
investment incentives than the previous reforms, replaced the PRSM in 2003.311 
The Mining Policy Declaration of March 14th, 2003 focused on the need to better 
regulate the sector and produce an updated inventory of Madagascar’s natural 
resources in order to attract investors. A large mapping project to document 
Madagascar’s natural resources was launched within the framework of the PGRM 
in 2005. The project initially produced high-resolution magnetic and radiometric 
data showing the extent of mineral endowments for six selected regions in 
Madagascar in 2006, and further geological surveys are ongoing.  
The reform of the mining sector resulted in a significant influx of mining 
sector investments and the launching of two large-scale mining projects. The first 
multinational mining company to heavily invest in Madagascar was QMM, which 
is 20% owned by the government of Madagascar and 80% owned by Rio Tinto. 
Exploratory work for the QMM mine had already begun in 1989, but construction 
on the mine commenced in 2005 after the Malagasy Mining Registry (BCMM) 
issued the company its relevant mining permits. After 19 years of preparation in 
Fort Dauphin, on the southeastern coast of Madagascar, QMM’s ilmenite mine 
became operational in 2008 and is expecting total revenues of US $3,2 billion 
over the 40 - year life of the mine. Sherritt, the other major mining conglomerate 
in Madagascar, acquired the rights to the Ambatovy nickel-cobalt mine close to 
Toamasina in 2007. In partnership with Dynatec, Sunimoto Corporation (a 
consortium of Korean companies), and SNC Lavalin, Sherritt constructed the 
project with an initial investment of US $2,5 billion.312 Many other companies, 
including notably from Australia, Canada, the UK, and China, began purchasing 
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exploration and exploitation permits in Madagascar after the mineral resource 
inventory was concluded in 2006. The WISCO deal, although formalised in 2010 
under the HAT, was also negotiated during Ravalomanana’s presidency in 2008.  
 
Economic growth between 2002 and 2008  
 
 Ravalomanana’s critics contend that his economic initiatives did not 
significantly enhance the wellbeing of the wider population. Food prices 
increased due to the global economic downturn in late 2007 while purchasing 
powers remained low, leading Ploch to conclude that the majority of Malagasy 
have remained poor.313 Ralambomahay ventures that purchasing powers were the 
same under Ravalomanana as they had been under Ratsiraka, and that increases in 
investments were relatively minor outside of the extractive industries. On balance, 
he contends, the majority of Malagasy did not greatly benefit from 
Ravalomanana’s policies, and the country “is still waiting for economic take-
off”. 314  Macroeconomic indicators however demonstrate that Madagascar’s 
economy was experiencing significant growth under Ravalomanana’s presidency. 
Existing data show a positive overall trajectory between 2003 and 2008. After the 
Malagasy economy recovered from the political crisis of 2002, both GDP growth 
and current rates had begun to grow steadily. Increases in life expectancy also 
signify that the Malagasy people were benefiting from this growth, for instance 
through increased access to potable water or medical facilities, despite stagnating 
purchasing powers. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 show increases in GDP growth, current 
GDP, GNI per capita growth, and life expectancy in Madagascar from 2003 to 
2008.  
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Figure 3: Annual GDP growth in Madagascar, 2003 – 2008, %. 
Source: World Bank Databank. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Current GDP in Madagascar, 2003 - 2008, US $ billion. 
Source: World Bank, DataBank. 
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Figure 5: Madagascar GNI per capita, 2003 - 2008, US $.  
Source: World Bank, DataBank. 
 
 
Figure 6: Life expectancy at birth, 2003 - 2008, years. 
Source: World Bank, DataBank.  
 
Conflating the government and the private sector  
 
The economic roots of Ravalomanana’s popular support are central to an 
understanding of the manner in which he exercised power, and why he lost it. 
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Ravalomanana based his development experiment for Madagascar on his own 
experiences in the private sector. As a self-made businessman whose only 
political experience had been as mayor of Antananarivo two years prior to 
winning the presidency, Ravalomanana utilised his corporate identity as the basis 
of his political power.315 Ravalomanana was born into a Merina household of 
modest means in the village of Imerinkasinina, 20 km east of Antananarivo. As 
one of eight children, he began working in his family’s homemade yogurt 
business at an early age. As a young adult, he studied in Germany and Sweden 
and undertook internships in Norway and Denmark. In 1982, he expanded the 
family business and founded his firm, Tiko Group (Tiko), with a US $2 million 
loan from the World Bank.316  
He quickly became known throughout the country for his line of dairy 
products sold by Tiko, which grew to be the largest locally owned company in 
Madagascar. By the end of the 1990s, Tiko employed 3,000 direct hire employees 
and indirectly provided another 100,000 individuals who supplied Tiko with dairy 
products with a source of livelihood. 317  Ravalomanana’s mounting wealth 
inevitably catapulted him onto the political scene, especially once politicians 
began asking him to financially support their campaigns. Ravalomanana had early 
connections to Zafy’s prime minister, for whom he had provided financial 
backing during his bid for the presidency in 1996 (this already pitted him against 
Ratsiraka’s supporters, which would have important consequences). 318  The “self-
made man” story of a successful Malagasy entrepreneur that he came to be 
associated with eventually enabled him to gather his own political following, 
which he harnessed to become mayor of Antananarivo in 1999.319 During his 
various political campaigns, Ravalomanana used the name recognition associated 
with Tiko to appeal to the Malagasy electorate, particularly in the more isolated 
regions of the country. Rural Malagasy, who had been purchasing Tiko yogurts 
for years, easily recognised his party’s name, Tiako I Madagasikara. Tiako I 
Madagasikara means “I love Madagascar”, and “Tiako” is phonetically very 
similar to “Tiko”. With the help of US election strategists, TIM campaigners 
exploited the name recognition of Ravalomanana’s firm by distributing free Tiko 
T-shirts, baseball caps, and stickers around the country.320  
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Ravalomanana also used the important role of churches and religious 
institutions to support both his growing political power and his business interests. 
Ravalomanana was himself very religious, and he was a prominent member of the 
protestant FJKM. The thousands of employees in his private companies and his 
political collaborators were expected to attend regular services and hold prayer 
meetings before they began their workday.321 After he was elected vice-president 
of the FJKM in 2001, he used the platform presented by the churches to further 
spread his political message, and announced his candidature for the presidency 
from the steps of the church in his hometown. Together with his corporate 
identity, his election to one of Madagascar’s most important religious associations 
gave him a public visibility unprecedented by previous Malagasy political figures.  
Ravalomanana enjoyed widespread popular support, especially among the 
rural populations. Although he was a Merina, Ravalomanana had successfully 
highlighted his roots as one of the Hova “commoners” to appeal to the rural 
populations often alienated by the political elite. After he assumed power in 2002, 
he sought to reach beyond the capital to ensure an ethnically diverse political 
sphere.322 He also demonstrated restraint in dealing with his former political foes, 
appointing members of Ratsiraka’s party to cabinet positions and not demanding 
the extradition of Ratsiraka from France after he was sentenced in absentia. These 
actions further broadened his popular support and alleviated concerns that he 
would promote ethnic divisions among the population. 323  Ravalomanana’s 
popularity among rural and non-elite Malagasy was evidenced in 2005 when an 
Afrobarometer survey showed that the public expressed confidence in their 
government to improve their future economic prospects. The Malagasy were 
especially fond of Ravalomanana’s publicly stated efforts to fight government 
corruption, reduce economic insecurities, improve health and education facilities, 
and enhance their access to potable water. 324 In spite of his current exile and the 
consolidation of power under Rajoelina, many poorer Malagasy continue to praise 
Ravalomanana’s accomplishments in bringing tangible improvements to their 
lives, even in relation to something as simple as providing new backpacks to 
students in rural areas or fixing the potholes on the streets of Antananarivo.325 
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The “unembeddedness” of Ravalomanana’s regime 
 
Although he enjoyed popular legitimacy, Ravalomanana was a relative 
anomaly in Malagasy politics, which contributed to the “unembeddedness” of his 
government from local society. His presidency marked the first time that the 
exclusiveness of political power, which had been defended by Madagascar’s big 
families for decades, was lost to someone from outside the families. 326 
Ravalomanana broke an unspoken social contract preserving the balance of power 
among Madagascar’s elite families, which is that the president of Madagascar is 
always a non-Merina and that the president and prime minister are always from 
two different ethnic groups. Before the 2001 election, it was “unimaginable that 
someone of Merina ethnicity…could compete successfully in national presidential 
and legislative elections by winning substantial support in nearly all the 
provinces”.327 Ravalomanana’s nomination of a Merina prime minister in 2006 
then broke the second component of the rule.  
As an outsider to the network of big families in Madagascar, 
Ravalomanana was able to break the traditional pattern of neo-patrimonial rule, 
but instead of identifying a different range of local industrialists to champion, he 
created a new, arguably more personalised system of patronage that pushed vital 
domestic and foreign economic actors outside of the market. Instead of being 
“embedded” in industrial society, the state under Ravalomanana became the 
industrial society. A patrimonial developmental state needs a mechanism to 
centralise rents with a view to long-term growth in order to be successful.328 
While Ravalomanana did consolidate rents, these were centralised under Tiko, 
which was owned solely by Ravalomanana and used to pursue both the 
government’s industrial policy and his personal business aspirations in tandem.  
Ravalomanana exploited his political position to ensure his own 
corporations and business ventures were strategically positioned to win new 
contracts. After consolidating his presidency, Ravalomanana privatised several 
previously state-owned industries, including the state agricultural corporation and 
the Malagasy trading corporation, and incorporated them under the Tiko Group. 
He formed a road works and construction company, the Asa Lalana Malagasy, 
which was regularly awarded important government contracts or allowed to sub-
contract in larger projects. His other business ventures included the Magro 
beverage and wholesale group, a wheat mill, an oil refinery, one television and 
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two radio stations, two daily newspapers, a printing company, and two 
construction firms. He additionally had several investments in international 
hotels, owned a private airplane company, and founded other firms in South 
Africa and Switzerland.329 Ravalomanana essentially created a personal national 
business empire and slowly began to monopolise Madagascar’s key industries 
with his companies. While Tiko was able to implement the objectives of the MAP 
and thereby help accelerate Madagascar’s economic growth, because it was 
attached to Ravalomanana personally, there was insufficient administrative or 
public oversight to curb excessive corruption.  
Although he had made the fight against corruption a centrepiece of the 
MAP, Ravalomanana tripled his personal wealth during his time in office.330 
Mining sector activity under Ravalomanana remained susceptible to corruption, 
despite the improvements made to the regulatory framework governing the 
extractive industries. The informal networks that flourished under Ratsiraka’s 
regime before 2002 continued to deter the positive impacts that mining sector 
growth could potentially exert on local poverty reduction. Increasing 
globalisation, the proliferation of global trafficking networks, and the continued 
politicisation of the mining sector by Madagascar’s political and economic elite, 
including Ravalomanana himself, sustained these networks.331 Citing his support 
for local efforts at stone cutting and manufacturing, Ravalomanana banned the 
export of raw gemstones from Madagascar in 2008, but it was alleged that he 
intended to monopolise the sector for himself. 332  The convergence of 
Ravalomanana’s political and business personalities is also reflected in his choice 
of the Magro business complex in Antananarivo to serve as TIM headquarters. 
Rather than just exercising the public good as a private one, he inverted the 
process: the “confluence of economic liberalisation and his own well-placed 
business interests afforded him the opportunity to not only benefit from growing 
his corporate position but to exercise his private goods to build private networks 
for the purpose of gaining public authority”.333 The space between the public and 
the private became increasingly blurred between the two sectors in service to 
“President Marc Ravalomanana or CEO Marc Ravalomanana”.334 In December 
2008, international donors suspended over US $20 million in aid disbursements, 
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citing concerns over budget transparency and possible conflicts of interest 
between the state’s budget and the president’s business investments.335 
A coalition of anti-Ravalomanana elements from within the Malagasy 
Merina and pro-Ratsiraka elite, and the Karana and French communities is widely 
considered to have chosen Rajoelina as their figurehead to eject Ravalomanana 
from power.336 Ravalomanana himself has accused members of the Karana elite 
of orchestrating his removal from the presidency because they felt that their 
economic interests were being threatened by his policies. 337  The Karana 
community numbers between 15,000 - 30,000, and accounts for only 1,2% of the 
population, but it is economically and politically quite powerful.338 Although the 
dominance of French commercial interests in Madagascar suggests that the figure 
is exaggerated, India’s Ministry of External Affairs claimed in 2000 that the 
Indian community in Madagascar owned 50% - 60% of the economy.339 Many of 
the influential Indo-Pakistani families have lived in Madagascar for generations, 
but have not acquired Malagasy citizenship and are thus considered foreigners. 
Around 80% of the Indo-Pakistani community in Madagascar holds French 
passports, indicating the potentially close alignment between French and Karana 
interests on the island.  
Ravalomanana committed the crucial mistake of disenfranchising 
economically and politically influential elements within the Karana community. 
In 2004, he intervened in the rice industry, marginalising a large Indo-Pakistani 
conglomerate that had traditionally handled the distribution of government rice 
imports. At the time, Madagascar was experiencing a rice shortage that led to a 
significant increase in the price of rice. Ravalomanana confiscated the 
government contract from the Karana distribution agency and awarded it to 
Magro, with no invitation for other firms to tender. Magro received a tax holiday 
on rice imports, while other private importers did not, effectively ostracising not 
only the Karana-owned companies, but also all remaining competitors.340 In a 
similar situation, the Karana family that owns the Industrial Company of 
Malagasy Products (Sipromad), one of Madagascar’s largest holding groups with 
over 20 companies in industry, agriculture, real estate, aviation, tourism, agri-
business, securities, and banking, also saw its revenues decline after 2002 as 
Ravalomanana’s firms increasingly acquired larger shares in a wide range of 
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markets.341 Ravalomanana had met with leaders from the Karana community on 
several occasions to discuss economic and citizenship issues, and retained close 
links to some of its influential members, but this did little to ameliorate overall 
relations with the group in the face of economic rivalry. 
Ravalomanana also had a troubled relationship with the “Francophone 
Malagasy political old guard” and the French community on the island. In 
advocating his pro-Western policies and inviting new foreign investors into 
Madagascar, Ravalomanana alienated the French-Merina elite and was generally 
perceived to retain an anti-French agenda.342 This was implicit in the fact that not 
all members of the political and commercial elite supported SADC membership 
because they did not wish to align themselves with Anglophone Africa.343 This 
was particularly the case among some of the Merina elites, who view their 
Polynesian ancestry as distinguishing them culturally from mainland Africans, 
and who increasingly considered Ravalomanana out of touch with the island’s 
European and French connections. At the state level, France had supported 
Ratsiraka throughout his two presidencies, and had given him asylum in France 
after he fled Madagascar in 2002. Ravalomanana’s efforts to cultivate new 
economic partnerships with countries other than France meant that Franco-
Malagasy relations under Ravalomanana’s regime were initially cold, and they 
remained ambivalent throughout his presidency. A series of disputes led to the 
removal of the French ambassador in July 2008, and Rajoelina was given asylum 
at the French embassy in early March 2009 during the height of the crisis.344 
France’s summation of Franco-Malagasy relations during Ravalomanana’s tenure 
is clearly underlined by a frustration with his aversion towards French influence 
in Madagascar and disapproval of how he has concentrated power in his regime.  
The French government states that Ravalomanana maintained “a strong tropism 
for the United States, Germany, and China within his “authoritarian democracy” 
model”.345  
 
Amid increasing concerns about corruption and international 
condemnation of his monopolisation of key industries, several scandals in 2007 
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and 2008 enabled Ravalomanana’s political opponents to mobilise the masses 
against him. Ravalomanana’s image had already become tainted when he 
purchased a new presidential Boeing jet for US $30 million and registered it to 
Tiko in 2007, but his attempt to lease 1,3 million hectares of land to Daewoo 
Logistics, a multinational South Korean conglomerate, in the autumn of 2008 had 
cataclysmic results. Daewoo planned to utilise the land to grow palm oil and the 
equivalent of half of South Korean corn requirements for export to the Korean 
market. In the deal, the company agreed to spend US $6 billion over 25 years to 
build roads, railways, a port, and schools in Madagascar.346 The project was 
problematic for two main reasons. It was incompatible with a recent effort by 
Ravalomanana to reform access to land at the local level, and it would mean that 
large swaths of land containing ancestral graves would now legally belong to the 
South Korean firm. The Daewoo case was utilised as an example of how 
Ravalomanana was stripping the country of its national resources, and how 
foreign investors like Daewoo could “jeopardise local land-based livelihoods by 
usurping Malagasy ancestral lands”. 347  Thus, when Ravalomanana’s support 
among the wider population began to dissipate in the wake of the Boeing and 
Daewoo incidents, Ravalomanana’s opponents saw an opportunity to re-instate 
someone who aligned more closely with their interests, such as Andry Rajoelina. 
 
A development-oriented neo-patrimonial government? 
 
Ravalomanana’s demise suggests that the sometimes neopatrimonial 
tendencies of African elites and the related issue of corruption can be inimical to 
the creation of a successful developmental state. Much of the literature on 
corruption and development in Africa draws a negative causal link between the 
two. Among Western scholars and the IFIs, corruption is generally thought of in 
terms of perversion and decay. The IMF argues that the economic costs of bribery 
and systematic corruption are high, raising transaction costs, uncertainty, and 
inefficiency in an economy, while simultaneously eroding the legitimacy of the 
state. 348  Rose-Ackermann concurs that corruption limits growth and creates 
inefficient government. 349  Neoliberal globalisation is also thought to have 
unintentionally facilitated the growth of new forms of corruption in Africa, 
thereby further eroding the capability of African states to pursue developmental 
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objectives.350 However, while the appropriation or embezzlement of public funds 
and assets for private use is clearly not in the primary interests of a country’s 
development, the developmental impacts of bribery, cronyism, and relatively hazy 
instances of corruption are unclear. In some instances, corruption may further the 
faster functioning of an economy by facilitating trade and business deals which 
would otherwise not have occurred or been slowed down by ineffective legal 
systems and bureaucratic red tape.351 A consequentialist approach to corruption 
judges the moral value of corrupt interventions in the economy in terms of its 
outcomes, costs, and benefits.352 This implies that corruption is not necessarily 
immoral and deconstructive. The extremely close links between state and the 
business society exhibited by many neopatrimonial African political systems may 
actually contribute to the smooth functioning of the African developmental state.  
This has given rise to the idea of developmental patrimonialism, where 
ruling elites acquire an interest in and a capability for managing rents in a 
centralised way with a view to enhancing their incomes in the long run, is based 
on the legalisation of rent-seeking. Neopatrimonial states can be developmental so 
long as rents are channelled into productive areas of the economy and the net 
benefits of corruption for the population as a whole outweigh the private gains of 
politicians. In other words, there is a need to distinguish between the intended 
outcome of state intervention in the economy and the cost of rent-seeking it 
induces.353 Legalising government interventions would regulate and minimise the 
type of corruption that negatively influences the economy and foster a 
constructive role for rent seeking. Much of the rent seeking in developed 
countries is legalised because the underlying interventions themselves are legal, 
which permits rent seeking to be regulated by allowing interest groups to lobby 
for particular policies within prescribed limits. 354  In most African states, this type 
of social organisation is considered corrupt because it is less transparent.  
Rwanda provides an example of a neo-patrimonial developmental 
government. Since 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front has ruled Rwanda, a small, 
land-locked central African nation with no oil and few minerals, as a de facto one 
party state. Since 2000, this has occurred under the leadership of Paul Kagame. 
Rwanda is considered a hybrid regime, which combines authoritarian and 
democratic elements. Although the country is nominally democratic, the ruling 
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party dominates the political scene and political competition is minimal. 
Independent media and social organisations also exist but are restricted. A stable 
government that promotes economic security is viewed as a means to overcome 
the country’s ethnic divide and volatile political history. 355 Since 2000, Rwanda 
has deliberately pursued an economic vision of a developmental state. Vision 
2020, the country’s development plan, identifies six pillars for development, 
including good governance (conceived as effective governance), agricultural and 
private sector growth, human capital building, infrastructure, information and 
communications technology networks, and regional and global economic 
integration. Significant donor support and increasing foreign investments 
facilitate state spending and the implementation of the development plan.356  
The success of Rwanda’s developmental patrimonialism is due to the 
regime’s ability to establish a constructive balance between the state and 
industrial society. Yet rather than championing local industrial elites and 
becoming embedded in society from the outset, the Rwandan government created 
a number of state-owned companies incorporated under Tri-Star Investments 
S.A.R.L. (Tri-Star), which institutionalised a system of rigorously centralised 
rents. Tri-Star initially used its funds to initiate projects that met elementary 
socio-economic needs considered crucial to political stabilisation in the country. 
Subsequently, it made investments that were informed by a long-term vision for 
the development of the economy. Where these investments depended on an 
element of protection or subsidy and were in a position to generate additional 
rents, there was generally a rationale in terms of funding the learning costs 
associated with new activities or a new scale of activity.357 In this manner, Tri-
Star serves to invigorate nascent sectors of the economy to promote the growth of 
private sector enterprises in those sectors. The state in Rwanda played the role 
associated elsewhere with an active industrial policy. It absorbed the learning 
costs of pioneer firms, thereby creating opportunities for unsubsidised private 
investors in a second stage, which allowed the state to then become embedded in 
industrial society according to the more conventional understanding of 
embeddedness. Crucially, the creation of Tri-Star Investments essentially 
“legalised” corruption and obviated the need for party officials to engage in 
corruption on their own account.358 Kagame’s developmental state thus observes a 
separation of state and private accumulation of wealth, a fact that is demonstrated 
by Rwanda’s comparatively good performance on corruption indices. 
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The principal difference between Ravalomanana’s Madagascar and 
Kagame’s Rwanda is that whereas in the latter case rent extraction was centralised 
under a public institution, in Madagascar, economic rents were centralised under 
Tiko, which was owned solely by Ravalomanana as a private enterprise. A 
patrimonial developmental state needs a mechanism to centralise rents with a 
view to long-term growth in order to be successful.359 In the Rwandan case, 
investments by companies linked to Tri-Star implemented the state’s industrial 
policy. While Ravalomanana did consolidate rents, he exploited his presidency to 
position Tiko to pursue both the government’s industrial policy and his personal 
business aspirations in tandem. Patrimonial developmentalism also functions best 
in societies with a relatively homogenous or evenly distributed ethnic 
composition, which is evident in Rwanda but less so in Madagascar.  Moreover, in 
Madagascar, where technocratic integrity is exceptionally poor, it is perhaps 
“incongruous that political leaders will manage rents in a developmental manner” 
with the broad-based support of all sectors of society.360  
 
Conclusion 
 
Ravalomanana ultimately failed in his endeavour to create a Malagasy 
developmental state because he did not have the support of a unified national elite 
and because he centralised economic rents in his private company instead of in 
one that was legally attached to the state. Yet a lack of a Malagasy developmental 
state does not preclude the argument that a development-oriented government was 
beginning to take shape during the six years of Ravalomanana’s presidency. 
Ravalomanana invested heavily in infrastructures, which may have significantly 
facilitated future private sector growth, and in education, through which he sought 
to nurture human capital. He created an investment agency in the EDBM, and he 
was able to exploit Madagascar’s mineral wealth to help spur economic growth. 
Crucially, he sought to attract and diversify foreign donors and economic 
partners, and to integrate Madagascar more energetically into the global economy. 
Although he was venal and amassed significant wealth during his presidency, 
similar to developmental leaders in other countries, Ravalomanana realised that 
he stood to maximise his own welfare over the long run by encouraging the 
economy and associated rents to grow. Unfortunately, he did not possess the 
political astuteness to rally all of Madagascar’s elites behind him. 
                                                
359 Kelsall, “Developmental Patrimonialism?”, 1-4.  
360 Kelsall, “Developmental Patrimonialism?”, 1-4, p. 3.  
 106 
Ravalomanana’s journey from a small-time yogurt producer to millionaire, 
then mayor of the capital, and finally to being a central figure in the country’s 
religious institutions allowed him to amass a wide network of supporters from 
many different parts of Malagasy society. As president, he was able to place those 
loyal to him at the head of his private companies and in leadership positions in the 
government and public enterprises, which effectively guaranteed him control over 
both the private and public sectors. Yet he was unable to find a balance between 
the needs of the country as a whole, his personal aspirations, and those of 
Madagascar’s elite. By alienating too many of the traditional Malagasy political 
and economic elites from his vision for development, he unleashed the political 
instability that underlies the elite bargaining process in the country.  
Ravalomanana’s excesses presented his opponents with an opportunity to 
rally the masses in Antananarivo against him and erode the popular support that 
had been critical to his hold on power. Most likely, a coalition of predominantly 
Merina, French, and Karana business interests felt threatened enough by 
Ravalomanana’s policies that they conspired to re-align the power structures in 
their favour and revert to the ones that had been entrenched and then further 
sustained throughout the Ratsiraka regimes. Ravalomanana’s excesses also 
alienated many important provincial political bosses who had emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s under Ratsiraka only to be ostracised during Ravalomanana's 
nearly seven years in power.361 From this perspective, it was not the structural 
foundations of Ravalomanana’s regime that caused it to crumble, but rather his 
inability to adequately embed the state within the local elite. Additionally, it 
suggests that the influence of the big families in Madagascar is being challenged 
by some of the new economic elites, whose members are politically less powerful, 
but who, along with the military, constitute critical alliances for the big families. 
The rise of a new business elite that emerged as novel opportunities became 
available beyond a small segment of predominantly urban society has created a 
politically destabilising conflict as private entrepreneurs, such as Ravalomanana, 
sought new opportunities at the expense of existing family enterprises. In this 
sense, Malagasy politics is being reshaped by a growing struggle between the 
interests of the private sector and entrenched structures of historically conditioned 
neopatrimonial modes of political organisation.  
 
 
                                                
361 Ellis, “Roots of Turmoil”. 
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Chapter 4: China’s diplomatic and economic engagements 
 
Introduction  
 
Moving from the discussion of Madagascar’s politics of development to 
China’s engagements in the country, this chapter examines Sino-Malagasy official 
development cooperation and provides an overview of Chinese aid, trade, and 
investments in Madagascar. China and Madagascar established diplomatic ties in 
1972, when China was keen to solidify its links with the country (and other 
developing countries) in order to alienate Taiwan. Today, China is less concerned 
about the Taiwan issue (although it is still an issue) and more interested in 
presenting itself as a favourable development partner in order to secure vital raw 
materials. The first Sino-Malagasy technical cooperation agreement was signed in 
1974, and China began sending medical missions to the island in 1975. 
Infrastructure cooperation commenced under the first presidency of Ratsiraka in 
the 1980s, when a Chinese SOE constructed a highway connecting Antananarivo 
with Toamasina. Sino-Malagasy relations deepened significantly in the 1990s, 
with increasing numbers of private Chinese entrepreneurs and SOEs investing in 
Madagascar. Relations at the state level were marked by several bilateral visits, 
the signing of an immigration agreement, and the construction of the sports 
stadium in downtown Antananarivo in 1996. Since 2002, the relationship has 
become more multifaceted, and it has intensified across all sectors.  
Twelve low-to-high level bilateral visits to Beijing by Malagasy officials 
occurred during Ravalomanana’s presidency. Ravalomanana negotiated new 
investment and trade agreements, which resulted in a multitude of Chinese private 
companies and SOEs making significant investments in a variety of economic 
sectors, notably in transport, energy, and communications infrastructures. Large-
scale infrastructure projects completed between 2002 and 2009 comprise the 
construction of a cement factory, the ICC, a five-star hotel, a housing complex, 
and a new turbine on the country’s biggest hydroelectric dam. The Sino-Malagasy 
trade relationship grew concurrently.  Raw materials and especially chrome, mica, 
quartz and gemstones account for the majority of Malagasy exports to China. 
Since 2009, the Sino-Malagasy diplomatic relationship has become more 
restrained as China has sought to balance its interests in Madagascar while not 
overtly appearing to placate an internationally-unrecognised government, but 
economic relations have continued relatively unencumbered. While Chinese 
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development aid for Madagascar has decreased, in 2012, it was Madagascar’s 
primary source of imports and its fifth-largest destination of exports.362 The 
contemporary Sino-Malagasy development relationship exhibits a confluence 
between aid, trade, and investments, and it reflects the economic complementarity 
between Madagascar’s infrastructure needs and China’s demand for natural 
resources.  
Criticisms of Sino-Malagasy relations at the state level target the role of 
China in perpetuating an uneven trade balance, and accuse it of exploiting 
Madagascar’s resource richness in exchange for low quality and “useless” 
infrastructure projects.363 Since China’s ability to dispense funds through its state-
owned financing agencies exceeds that of the Western IFIs and donors, Chinese 
SOEs are thought to win construction projects that otherwise might have better 
been better built by Western companies. Moreover, the “Chinese money” invested 
in Madagascar is not viewed as benefitting the Malagasy people because it is 
ultimately returned to the Chinese companies who are contracted to construct the 
projects, and by extension to the Chinese state who owns the companies.364 
However, Chinese SOEs in Madagascar employ between 30,000 - 50,000 
Malagasy, and often operate with financing from Western and other development 
agencies. 365 The fact that Chinese SOEs are often financed by some of the same 
Western agencies, such as the World Bank, whose employees in Madagascar 
voiced considerable criticism of Chinese-built infrastructure projects in the 
country, suggests that reproaches about a lack of quality or sustainability mask a 
wider unease that the new emergence of China as an important development 
partner in Madagascar may marginalise the ability of the traditional donors to 
influence economic and political processes on the island.366  
In this chapter, I place the Sino-Malagasy diplomatic relationship in 
historical focus and provide an overview of the relationship under each of 
Madagascar’s presidents. I begin with an exploration of the Taiwan issue after 
1960 during Tsiranana’s presidency, move on to Ratsiraka’s first regime, and then 
examine significant developments in the relationship under Zafy. I explore Sino-
Malagasy links during Ravalomanana’s regime before discussing how the 
relationship has changed since the advent of the current political crisis. I then 
examine the available data on Chinese development aid to Madagascar. Based on 
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363 Interview with the IMF representative to Madagascar from 2008-2010, October 27, 2010.  
364 Interview with the World Bank country director for Madagascar, September 16, 2009.  
365 Interview with the commercial and economic counsellor at the Chinese embassy, September 
21, 2010. 
366 Interview with the World Bank country director for Madagascar, September 16, 2009. 
 109 
information gathered during fieldwork, I provide an overview of loans and 
projects financed by the Chinese state in Madagascar between 1992 and 2010. I 
scrutinise China’s hybrid rice project in Madagascar to demonstrate the potentials 
and pitfalls associated with China’s development projects. I also consider trade 
and investment figures and show that both of these have grown substantially over 
the past few years. Finally, I examine the activities of Chinese SOEs in 
Madagascar and demonstrate that many of the infrastructure projects being 
constructed by them are financed by multilateral and Western development 
agencies. 
 
Sino-Malagasy relations in historical focus 
 
 Official relations between China and Madagascar were established on 
November 6th, 1972 when Ratsiraka’s regime recognised the sovereignty of the 
PRC over the nationalist Chinese government in the Republic of China (ROC). 
The ROC had opened its first consulate in Toamasina in 1946. In 1949, the 
consulate was closed following the communist victory in China, but it was 
allowed to re-open as a Taiwanese consulate in 1958. The Taiwanese consulate 
was elevated to embassy status upon Madagascar’s independence in 1960. 
President Tsiranana, who was wary of communism as a threat to the new 
Malagasy Republic, preferred to maintain links with the ROC instead of with the 
PRC. The ROC, on the other hand, was eager to maintain contact with foreign 
countries and overseas Chinese populations. It was not until Ratsiraka visited 
China in 1972 in his capacity as foreign minister that Madagascar recognised the 
PRC as exerting sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. However, the latter was 
allowed to maintain an official presence in Antananarivo through a small 
delegation, which enabled the Malagasy government to receive development aid 
from both China and the ROC. China ended this ambiguity in 2000 by using its 
growing economic importance to put pressure on Antananarivo to close down the 
Taiwanese representation.367  
A significant shift in Madagascar’s foreign policy occurred after the fall of 
Tsiranana when Ratsiraka’s political philosophy of Malagasy socialism and his 
emphasis on non-alignment during the Cold War resulted in growing ties with 
non-Western countries, and especially with the Soviet Union and China. 
Madagascar established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 1972 one month 
before establishing ties with China. As the Sino-Soviet split intensified in the 
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1970s, Ratsiraka sought to balance Madagascar’s relations with the two 
communist powers. However, Madagascar’s relations with China were secondary 
to its relations with the Soviet Union.  
Sino-Malagasy cooperation during this time focused primarily on 
infrastructure. A Sino-Malagasy economic and technical cooperation accord was 
signed in 1974 when China extended a credit line to Madagascar worth 
approximately US $8 million and a cultural agreement followed in 1980.368 In 
1975, China dispatched its first medical team consisting of 30 doctors to 
Madagascar.369 The mission to Madagascar originated from Gansu province, and 
has been renewed every two years since its inception.370 In 2012, the program was 
in its 18th rotation and had sent 530 doctors to Madagascar.371 Chinese doctors, 
who specialise in general surgery, orthopaedic surgery, and gynaecology, work 
alongside their local colleagues. During the most recently completed rotation, 
Chinese doctors undertook 8,000 surgeries and 100,000 external consultations 
with Malagasy patients.372 Today, the Chinese mission runs one of four Chinese-
built hospitals in Mahitsy, Ambovombe, Vatomandry, and Sambava.  
Infrastructure cooperation also commenced under Ratsiraka. A Chinese 
state-owned construction company, the National Chinese Bridge and Road 
Company (SNCTP), built the highway connecting Toamasina with Antananarivo, 
located roughly 375 km inland through mountainous terrain. The highway was 
constructed between 1980 and 1985 and financed with a Chinese credit line worth 
US $24 million.373 The road, called the RN2 (an abbreviation of route nationale, 
which translates as National Road), is still one of the country’s most important 
transportation links today. There is a large Chinese pagoda in the town of 
Moramanga, about a quarter of the way to Toamasina, commemorating this 
achievement.374 The SNCTP, which was established in Madagascar in 1970, 
became a joint venture between the Malagasy and Chinese states and renamed the 
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369 China has a long history of conducting active “heath diplomacy” programmes with African 
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Sino-Malagasy Public Works Company (SMATP) in 1984. Photograph 2 depicts 
the sign outside of the SMATP headquarters in Antananarivo in 2011. 
Photograph 2: The sign outside of the SMATP headquarters in Antananarivo. 
 
After Madagascar liberalised its economy in the 1990s, a growing number 
of Chinese SOEs, and to a lesser extent private Chinese enterprises, began 
investing in Madagascar. This dovetailed with China’s own economic 
liberalisation that had begun in the 1970s and culminated with the formulation of 
the “Go Out” policy, which encouraged Chinese companies to develop a global 
strategy and exploit opportunities in the expanding local and international 
markets, in 1999. China and Madagascar signed an immigration agreement in 
1996, which facilitated Chinese immigration to the island. That same year, Zafy 
negotiated a deal for the Chinese to construct a sports stadium in the district of 
Mahamasina, in central Antananarivo. The stadium was built by Sogecoa 
Madagascar Limited (SOGECOA), which was founded in Madagascar in 1994 as 
a subsidiary of the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group (AFECC).375  
SOGECOA is well known in Madagascar today and has expanded away from 
construction to various other sectors of Madagascar’s economy, including retail, 
infrastructure, and mining. It is headquartered in Ivato, where it owns two 
restaurants and business centres, a hotel, and a large supermarket called 
“Horizon”, which sells manufactured products and foodstuff imported from 
                                                
375 AFECC is a Chinese state-owned construction and mining company that has an explicitly 
international focus. It has 14 overseas subsidiaries in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, and 
the Pacific Islands. 
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China. To service its operations in Ivato, the company recently rehabilitated the 
three-km road between Ivato and the international airport.376 Photograph 3 shows 
the commemorative plaque at the entrance to the sports stadium declaring that the 
project was inaugurated as a sign of Sino-Malagasy cooperation under Ratsiraka 
in 1997. 
Photograph 3: The plaque in front of the sports stadium in Mahamasina. 
 
 
Sino-Malagasy relations since 2002 
 
Sino-Malagasy relations have increased considerably since 2002. China’s 
growing engagements in Madagascar over the past decade are partly rooted in 
Ravalomanana’s determination to cultivate Sino-Malagasy trade, aid, investments, 
and cultural ties. The Sino-Malagasy relationship was a crucial component of 
Ravalomanana’s plan to attract foreign investment and diversify Madagascar’s 
economic partners.  He visited China four times during his six years as president, 
which helped inform his vision for development. He first flew to China in 2004 to 
discuss economic cooperation and negotiate plans for China to construct the ICC, 
the cement factory, and to exploit mineral resources. In 2006, he met with 
President Hu Jintao, toured the Shenzhen SEZ, and attended the FOCAC forum in 
Beijing. At the invitation of the Hong Kong General Association of International 
Investment, he also journeyed to Hong Kong for a three-day visit with a business 
                                                
376 Interview with a representative of SOGECOA, August 19, 2011. 
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promotion delegation consisting of several Chinese ministerial officials.377 In May 
2007, he returned to China to attend the annual meeting of ADB, and in August 
2008 he attended the Olympic games opening ceremony in Beijing. During the 
last visit, he was awarded an honorary title from Peking University, China’s most 
prestigious academic institution. 
While Ravalomanana encouraged and harnessed the Sino-Malagasy 
relationship, a “big push also came on behalf of the Chinese themselves to secure 
resources and move their big public works companies into new markets”.378 China 
was among the first countries to recognise Ravalomanana’s presidency in 2002, 
with a delegation led by the Chinese assistant foreign minister arriving in 
Madagascar in the wake of the victory. The group arrived in Madagascar on July 
19th, 2002 to congratulate the new president, seek affirmation of the One China 
policy, and discuss bilateral cooperation. In 2005, Chinese Foreign Minister Li 
Zhaoxing flew to Madagascar to meet with Ravalomanana and his prime minister 
to further discuss the implementation of cooperation agreements.379 Chinese Vice-
Premier Huang Ju also visited Madagascar in 2005, and Wu Guanzheng, member 
of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China, came in 2006. In 2007, Chinese Assistant Foreign 
Minister Zhai Jun attended Ravalomanana’s second inauguration ceremony. Zhai 
reviewed bilateral ties and stated that China was ready to implement the 
consensus reached at the Beijing FOCAC summit in 2006 to strengthen 
cooperation with Madagascar in the areas of infrastructure, minerals, agriculture, 
and human resources development.380 Tables 3 and 4 show the official state visits 
effectuated by high-ranking officials from China to Madagascar and vice versa 
between 1990 and 2012.  
Table 3: Chinese state visits to Madagascar, 1990 - 2012. 
 Chinese official 
1990 Chen Muhua, vice president of China’s national popular assembly 
1994 Qjan Quchen, vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs 
1997 Jiang Chunyun, vice prime minster 
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378 Interview with the IMF representative to Madagascar from 2008-2010, October 27, 2010.  
379 Government of China, “Chinese, Madagascar FMs Meet”.  
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1999 Hu Jintao, vice president  
2000 Wu Yi, foreign affairs counsellor 
2001 Wang Zhongyu, general secretary of the foreign affairs counsel 
2001 Xu Jialu, vice president of China’s National Popular Assembly 
2005 Li Zhaoxing, foreign minister 
2005 Huang Ju, vice premier 
2006 Wu Guanzheng, member of the standing committee  
2007 Zhai Jun, assistant foreign minister 
Sources: Pellerin, 2011 and Madagascar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fiche Technique Chine-
Madagascar, 1972-2010, and author compilations from Chinese and Malagasy media.  
 
Table 4: Malagasy state visits to China, 1990 - 2012  
 Malagasy official 
1992 Francisque Ravony, vice prime minister 
1993 Richard Andriamanjato, president of the national assembly 
1994 Albert Zafy, president 
1996 Richard Andriamanjato, president of the national assembly 
1997 Erizo Razafimahaleo, vice prime minister and minister of foreign 
affairs 
2000 Pierrot Rajaonarivelo, vice prime minister 
2005 Marc Ravalomanana, president 
2005 Jean Lahinitiko, president of the national assembly 
2006 Marc Ravalomanana, president 
2007 Marc Ravalomanana, president 
2008 Marc Ravalomanana, president 
2012 Pierrot Rajaonarivelo, minister of foreign affairs 
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2012 Olga Ramalason, minister of trade 
Sources: Pellerin, 2011 and Madagascar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fiche Technique Chine 
Madagascar, 1972-2010, and author compilations from Chinese and Malagasy media. 
 
Increases in accords and agreements signed during Ravalomanana’s 
regime also point to an intensification of Sino-Malagasy relations during this 
time. Whereas 15 accords were signed between 1990 and 1999, 52 bilateral 
agreements were approved between 2002 and 2009.381 Important treaties include 
the Accord on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(Investment Accord) and the Trade Agreement, which were both concluded in 
2005. The Investment Accord streamlined investment regulations and procedures 
for Chinese entrepreneurs in Madagascar and remains the formal legal framework 
governing the security of transactions and Chinese FDI to Madagascar. The Trade 
Agreement allowed for tariff-free trade for select Malagasy goods exported to 
China and has been amended several times. The number of eligible goods was 
raised from 462 to almost 5,000 in 2010, and is supposed to reach 8,000 by the 
end of 2013.382  
Chinese companies also fuelled Ravalomanana’s plan to improve the 
country’s infrastructures. The most visible and large-scale of these include the 
five-star hotel, the ICC, and the high-end gated housing complex. Ravalomanana 
contracted SOGECOA to build these projects in 2007 and 2008 as the locales for 
an AU summit that Madagascar had been scheduled to host in 2009. Since 
Madagascar was suspended from the AU following the political crisis, the summit 
was cancelled, and two of the three structures have become relatively redundant. 
The ICC is utilised for conferences, trade fairs, and cultural performances, but the 
five-star hotel was empty in 2012, and the housing complex is also not 
commercially viable. The housing complex, which is known as the “presidential 
villas”, and which is composed of close to 50 mansions located near the airport in 
Ivato, was meant to accommodate the African heads of state travelling to 
Madagascar for the AU meeting. When the presidential villas lost their original 
purpose, they were transformed into a luxury resort with a conference centre, a 
business centre, and a large Chinese restaurant. 383  These types of projects 
vindicate arguments made by critics of China in Madagscar that the Chinese 
construct useless infrastructures in Madagascar, but insisting on their redundancy 
obscures an appreciation of the other, less ostentatious and more obviously 
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valuable infrastructure projects that the Chinese initiated under Ravalomanana, 
which have been far more numerous.384  
The China Complete Plant Import and Export Corporation (COMPLANT) 
and the Madagascar Long Cement Factory (MALOCI) have invigorated 
Madagascar’s sugar and cement industries. 385  COMPLANT, which has had 
operations in Madagascar since 1997, is the largest Chinese investor in 
Madagascar’s agricultural and agro-processing sectors. COMPLANT 
concentrates on sugar production and processing in Madagascar through its 
wholly owned Malagasy subsidiary, Sucrerie de Complant de Madagascar, which 
manages three factories. Under Chinese management, yearly sugar output at the 
factory in Morondava, the first to be privately leased to COMPLANT, increased 
from 4,000 tonnes in 1997 to 16,536 tonnes by 2005 (with a total production 
capacity of 20,000 tonnes). Due to this success, COMPLANT won an additional 
contract worth US $3,5 million to operate two more sugar factories in Ambilobe 
and Namakia, which used to be run as Chinese development projects, in 2006.386 
Work on the MALOCI cement factory began at an initial cost of US $10 million 
in March 2005 on the outskirts of Antananarivo. Production started in 2008, and 
the company has a weekly output of around 20,000 sacs of 50-kg cement bags. 
MALOCI invested US $20 million during the construction phase, and is 
estimating a total investment of US $87 million over the next decade. 387 
Chinese companies have also constructed a myriad of large and small-
scale transport and energy infrastructures around the country. China Railway 18th 
Bureau, a subsidiary of China Railway Construction Corporation Limited 
(CRCC), Guangdong Xinguang International Group (Guangdong Group), China 
Geo-Engineering Construction Company Group (China Geo-Engineering), and 
Sinohydro Corporation (Sinohydro) are recent newcomers to Madagascar’s 
construction sector. CRCC has been present in Madagascar since 2004 and is 
primarily engaged in the rehabilitation and construction of roads. 388  The 
Guangdong Group has been involved in public utility construction projects in the 
Toalanaro region in the southeast of the country and in Nosy Be, since 2008 and 
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2006, respectively. China Geo-Engineering won tenders for a road reconstruction 
project, a sanitation project, and a potable water and plumbing project in Nosy Be 
in 2008. Sinohydro, the world's largest hydroelectric company, has maintained 
operations in Madagascar since 2006, and was contracted to construct the turbine 
on the country’s largest hydroelectric dam, located on the Betsiboka river, in 
2008.389  
Huawei Technologies Company, Ltd. (Huawei) and Zhong Xing 
Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited (ZTE) have also energised 
Madagascar’s small but growing mobile phone market. Huawei was established in 
Madagascar in 2001 and set up a Malagasy subsidiary in 2005. Huawei provides 
mobile phone and data networks for Madamobil and offers Internet services under 
the “Life” brand, and plans to unveil Madagascar’s first mobile broadband 
network. In 2011, it won projects to construct an underwater fibre-optic network 
linking Madagascar with Reunion and Mauritius and to expand the network of 
Airtel, an Indian-owned mobile phone provider in Madagascar.390 ZTE, its rival, 
acquired a contract in 2007 to sell mobile phones to Telma, a different Indian 
mobile-phone operator which dominates the local market. ZTE quickly became 
one of Telma’s best sellers in Madagascar’s fast growing mobile phone market.391 
Low-cost portable phones introduced by Huawei and ZTE have revolutionised 
mobile communication in Madagascar, which can significantly enhance the 
conduct of business. In 2006, Telma had introduced Motorola phones in 
Madagascar, but by 2008, Motorola and Nokia (who had already entered the 
market prior to Motorola) had been pushed out of the market by Huawei and ZTE, 
who sold phones for 10,000 Ariary (approximately US $5), which is within the 
purchasing power of many Malagasy.392  
Since 2009, China has balanced its competing agendas of maintaining a 
strong economic presence in Madagascar while not appearing to support the 
internationally sanctioned government in the country. Beijing is careful not to be 
viewed as providing political support to the Malagasy government, but it has 
neither condemned nor expressed support for the HAT. China follows the 
international standard by not officially recognising the HAT as the legitimate 
government of Madagascar. Chinese diplomats do not attend Malagasy state 
events and do not invite members of the HAT to theirs, and the Chinese 
government even requested that Madagascar not send a representative to the 
FOCAC meeting in Sharm-el-Sheik in late December 2009. However, China has 
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maintained diplomatic relations inside Madagascar. Upon arriving in 
Antananarivo in March 2012, the new Chinese Ambassador Shen Yongxiang 
presented his credentials to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subsequently met 
with Prime Minister Beriziky to discuss the socio-economic and political 
situation. An article in the Express de Madagascar covered the story under the 
title “the Chinese are coming back”, but this is a rather inaccurate reflection of 
China’s relations with the HAT, since the Chinese never really “left”.393 Trade 
and investment relations have also continued relatively unfettered, and as 
evidenced by the HAT’s negotiations with WISCO and the CIF, in some cases 
they have grown. Likewise, while Chinese aid initially decreased after the crisis in 
2009, it has begun to recover as well. China reported its aid contribution in 2008 
as US $34 million. This fell to US $14 million in 2009, US $2 million in 2010, 
and has recovered marginally to US $4 million by the end of 2011. China’s share 
of total aid contributions to Madagascar has decreased from a somewhat larger 
share of 11% in 2008 (behind the EU and the US, and just ahead of France and 
Norway), to 6% in 2009 and 1% in 2010, rising back up to 5% in the first quarter 
of 2011.394 
 
Chinese development aid to Madagascar 
 
Determining Chinese development aid to Madagascar is no simple task. 
Relatively little can be said in precise figures about Chinese aid, since China 
views trade and investments as forms of aid and includes these in its aid 
figures.395 China also considers the amount or type of foreign aid it disburses a 
state secret, and official figures on aid allocations to specific countries or specific 
sectors and on overseas development projects simply do not exist publicly. The 
Chinese government releases very little information about the quantities of aid it 
gives. The dearth of information given on aid is compounded by the relatively 
opaque management structure of China’s foreign aid apparatus. A number of 
Ministries and organisations within the Chinese government are responsible for 
different aspects of its foreign aid activities. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
is the administrative department authorised by the State Council to oversee 
foreign aid and is responsible for the formulation of foreign aid policies, 
regulations, annual plans, and for the examination, approval, and management of 
foreign aid projects. The Executive Bureau of International Economic 
                                                
393 “Les Chinois Reviennent”, L’Express de Madagascar, March 15, 2012. 
394 www.amp-madagascar.gov. mg. 
395 Grimm, Transparency of Chinese Aid. 
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Cooperation, China International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges, 
and the Academy of International Business Officials affiliated with the Ministry 
of Commerce are in turn entrusted with the implementation of technical 
cooperation projects and material aid projects, and with the management of 
training programs connected to China’s foreign aid. The Ministry of Finance 
prepares the overall budget for foreign aid, while the China Exim Bank and the 
China Development Bank are tasked with the assessment of projects with 
concessional loans, and for the allocation and recovery of these loans.396  
 The Malagasy government also does not keep a reliable record of 
development aid coming into the country. Before 2008, there was no national aid 
tracking or management system. In 2008, the Aid Management Platform (AMP) 
was launched under the supervision of the Permanent Technical Secretariat for 
Aid Coordination at the prime minister’s office in order to promote transparency 
and encourage collaboration among donors. Supported by the UNDP, the OECD, 
the World Bank, and the Government of Ethiopia, the AMP sources information 
from donor countries and organisations on a quarterly and voluntary basis and 
publishes it on a freely accessible website.397 The project came online in 2009, 
and Madagascar requested that China begin supplying information on its 
development aid funding in 2010. China joined the initiative in 2010 and began 
contributing information to the database in May 2011. Since China gives 
information to the AMP voluntarily, this database most likely does not accurately 
reflect Chinese aid inflows to Madagascar.398 Moreover, although the AMP is 
online, various Malagasy institutions still retain their own aid figures. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance 
and Economics, and the Malagasy Central Bank each maintain their own records. 
INSTAT has some data available, but it relies on the Malagasy Ministries for 
information. The World Bank and the IMF also compile statistics, but often these 
are just as skewed because they continue to receive their data from the Central 
Bank and the Malagasy Ministries. The IMF in Madagascar usually has three sets 
of data. It derives its own figures from research undertaken by IMF employees, it 
as those given to it by the Malagasy government, and it produces a third set that 
combines the two.399  
Based on available information, I compiled a list of Chinese development 
projects to Madagascar since 1992. This data is derived from INSTAT, the AMP, 
                                                
396 Grimm, Transparency of Chinese Aid. 
397 See www.amp-madagascar.gov. mg.  
398  Interview with the director of the Malagasy Permanent Technical Secretariat for Aid 
Coordination, August 29, 2011. 
399 Interview the resident representative of the IMF to Madagascar from 2008-2010, September 27, 
2010. 
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various Malagasy Ministries, the Chinese embassy in Antananarivo, and reports 
of Chinese aid flows in the Malagasy media. Since each of these sources offered 
an incomplete account of Chinese development statistics due to the reasons 
described above, I compared statistics from INSTAT and the AMP with 
information obtained in interviews and Malagasy newspaper articles. These aid 
flows encompass funding given by China to promote economic and social 
development in Madagascar. The figure excludes military grants given by China 
to Madagascar, as these are not deemed development aid. The four primary areas 
targeted by Chinese development aid in Madagascar over roughly the past two 
decades are infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture. Table 5 shows 
Chinese development aid projects to Madagascar between 1992 and 2010. 
Table 5: Chinese Development Aid Projects in Madagascar, 1992 - 2010. 
 Type of aid Sector Type of funding 
1992 US $16 million  Economic Interest-free loan 
1993 US $8 million Economic Grant 
1996 Construction of the 
sports stadium 
Infrastructure Loan 
1996 US $8 million 
(destined for the 
Complant upgrade) 
Infrastructure Interest-free loan 
1999 US $19 million Infrastructure Grant 
2000 US $480 thousand Economic Grant 
2001 US $4,8 million for 
the rehabilitation of 
the road connecting 
Ampitabe to 
Vatomandry 
Infrastructure Grant 
2001 US $160 thousand  Infrastructure Grant 
2001 4 Chinese 
technicians sent to 
help with the 
planning of a new 
Infrastructure Technical 
Assistance 
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sports stadium 
2001 Partial debt 
cancellation 
Finance  
2002 US $4,8 million Economic Grant 
2004 US $9,6 Economic Grant 
2005 Complete debt relief Finance  
2005 US $4,8 million Economic Interest-free loan 
2006 Anti-malaria 
medicine 
Health Donation 
2006 3,416,149 school 
uniforms 
Education Donation 
2007 Hybrid rice centre Agriculture Technical 
Assistance 
2007 Construction of the 
five-Star hotel 
Infrastructure Loan 
2008 Construction of the 
presidential villas 
Infrastructure Loan 
2008 Plumbing facilities 
for hospitals 
Health Loan 
2008 Anti-malaria 
medicine 
Health Donation 
2008 US $481 thousand 
for the hybrid rice 
project 
Agriculture Grant 
2008 US $24,5 million  Education Donation 
2008 Construction of a 
hospital with 150 
beds 
Health Loan 
2009 Anti-malaria centre Health Technical 
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Assistance 
2009 Technical 
cooperation  
on the ICC 
Infrastructure Technical 
Assistance 
2009 Natural disaster 
relief 
Humanitarian Donation 
2009 Construction of the 
road to the ICC 
Infrastructure Loan 
2010 Hybrid rice project Agriculture Technical 
Assistance 
2010 56 tonnes of rice Agriculture Donation 
2010 Hybrid rice seeds Agriculture Donation 
Sources:  Madagascar (INSTAT), Etudes sur les Investissements Direct Etrangers à Madagascar, 
Madagascar (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Fiche Technique Chine-Madagascar, 1972-
2010, Interview with the Malagasy Minister of Water, November 12, 2010, Interview 
with the Malagasy Minister of Commerce, November 29, 2010, Interview with the 
economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, August 17, 2011, and the 
AMP database.  
 
China’s hybrid rice project  
 
In 2007, Madagascar was chosen as the location of one of 20 Chinese 
agricultural technology demonstration projects built throughout Africa. Chinese 
development aid in agriculture has the potential to ameliorate living conditions for 
many Malagasy. Since the 1970s, China has reached and exceeded the food 
security standard set by the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation, feeding 
more than 20% of the global population with about 9% of the world’s arable land. 
China achieved this through state-directed agricultural initiatives, which provided 
the foundation for urbanisation and export- and industrialisation-oriented growth 
in the country. 400 Today, rice production in China averages eight tonnes per 
hectare, while the average output for all of Africa is one tonne per hectare.401 
China’s success at domestic rice cultivation should help to dispel rumours that 
                                                
400 See Xiaoyun, Gubo, Lixia, Lixia, Leshan, Zhangfen, and Jin, Agricultural Development.   
401 Interview with the economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, August 31, 
2011. See also Xiaoyun, et al., Agricultural Development, for a comparison between Chinese 
and African agricultural development programmes. 
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China is purchasing African land to enhance its agribusiness and grow food for its 
population at home, which are contrary to the reality of very sparse Chinese 
investment in land.402 In Madagascar, it is commonly believed that Chinese 
investors were negotiating with President Ravalomanana during the Daewoo 
affair in 2008. In effect, China’s engagements in the agricultural sector are 
enhancing rice productivity in Madagascar.  
The Chinese-funded Project for Sino-Malagasy Agricultural Cooperation 
was launched inside the National Centre for Applied Rural Development in 
Mahitsy, 30 km to the west of Antananarivo, in November 2007.403 A rice 
cultivation centre was subsequently built in Mahitsy with the technical assistance 
of the Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences in China. Since then, China has 
donated US $481,000, several tonnes of hybrid rice seeds, and sent a technical 
assistance team to help with the project. Between 2007 and 2010, average rice 
output at the centre rose from two to seven tonnes per hectare.404 The scheme was 
renewed in November 2010 and is currently in its second phase. To date, 56 
tonnes of donated seeds have been sowed and over 680 hectares have been 
harvested, which has resulted in a maximum yield of 10,2 tonnes per hectare. 
Chinese technicians work with Malagasy counterparts, transferring their 
knowledge and skills. In 2011, the centre had trained 100 Malagasy in agricultural 
technology for senior managerial positions.405 This implies that the project can be 
continued without Chinese assistance and emulated in other parts of the country. 
Increased rice yields also translate into more rice on the domestic market, which 
would increase the supply and lower the price of rice. The Malagasy government 
has celebrated the centre as an example of how Chinese aid in Madagascar targets 
those sectors of the economy that are vital to its long-term development 
prospects.406 
Empirical evidence strongly favours support for improved agricultural 
production as an important part of any strategy to reduce the high poverty and 
food insecurity rates currently prevalent in rural Madagascar. The country’s 
downward trend in agricultural output has been due to a combination of out dated 
farming techniques not being able to cope with population growth, a dearth of 
fertiliser, and poor infrastructure. A study comparing the growth-generating 
power of alternative agricultural development strategies in Madagascar found that 
                                                
402 Brautigam and Xiaoyang, “Economic Statecraft”, 799-816. 
403 Interview with the Malagasy minister of agriculture, November 5, 2010. 
404 Madagascar (Ministry of Agriculture) “Cooperation Sino-Malagasy”. 
405 Interview with the economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, August 31, 
2011. 
406 Interview with the Malagasy minister of agriculture, November 5, 2010. 
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investment in rehabilitating small irrigated rice perimeters generates 40% to 100% 
more GDP than a comparable investment in for example coffee production. The 
growth in rice paddy productivity was also identified as generating greater 
employment and a more equitable income distribution. 407  Controlling for 
geographical and physical characteristics, communes in Madagascar that have 
higher rates of adoption of improved agricultural technologies and, consequently, 
higher crop yields enjoy lower food prices, higher real wages for unskilled 
workers, and better welfare indicators.408 
However, there is reason for caution, which is related to China’s 
commercial rationale in the promotion of hybrid rice technology. The cultivation 
of hybrid rice has the potential to increase rice yields in Madagascar and combat 
hunger in acute times of need, but it should not be seen as a panacea for 
Madagascar’s shortage of rice production. According to the Chinese government, 
the goal of the hybrid rice project is to encourage food security in Madagascar and 
to promote the idea that rice exportation should be a primary goal of the Malagasy 
government.409 While hybrid rice technology increases choice for farmers and 
increases productivity, its cultivation requires new seeds for every growing 
season. This means that Malagasy farmers cannot reuse the grain harvest, which 
they traditionally do. It also implies that Madagascar would either have to build 
several more centres where hybrid seeds can be multiplied, or continuously 
purchase seeds directly from China. China leads the world in hybrid rice 
technology and is the world’s principal producer of hybrid rice seeds. Currently, 
the demand for new seeds is outstripping supply. If Madagascar were to become 
dependent on this technology, it would have to source almost all of its seeds from 
China under unfavourable market conditions. In addition, hybrid rice cultivation 
not only requires the constant purchase of new seeds to keep yields high, it also 
requires significant amounts of fertiliser and pesticides, which are rarely used in 
Madagascar, to be most effective. Moreover, the discovery in 2010 that 120 
tonnes of hybrid rice seeds from China were infected with a virus has dampened 
local enthusiasm for the technology.410  
The success of China’s agricultural investments will depend on the actions 
of the Malagasy government, those of the farming communities, and ultimately on 
their local sustainability. The impacts of China’s agricultural projects are 
                                                
407 Dorrosh and Haggblade, “Agriculture-led Growth”, 165-180.  
408 Minten and Barret, “Agricultural Technology, Productivity and Poverty”, 797-822. 
409 Interview with the economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, August 31, 
2011. 
410 “Riz Hybride Chinois: Vers une Colonisation Commercial”, La Gazette de la Grande Île, 
March 22, 2012.  
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contingent on the ability of local governments to deliver changes at grass-roots 
level and to co-ordinate economic activities between small-scale farmers and 
supply chains, especially in conditions of poor market access prevalent in 
Madagascar’s economy.411 Instead of focusing solely on hybrid rice technology, 
Malagasy farmers should also be encouraged to promote domestic rice varieties 
and apply the system of intensive rice cultivation (SRI), which was developed in 
Madagascar in the 1980s.412 SRI is a cheaper, more organic, and environmentally 
friendly approach to increase rice productivity. It has been adopted in over 30 
countries, can be practiced with any seed, and if implemented correctly, it 
produces a higher yield than hybrid rice.413 The Malagasy National Research 
Centre for Rural Development has also developed several other varieties of rice 
seeds adapted to different agro-ecological systems in the country that have shown 
good returns. Nonetheless, China’s emphasis on rice cultivation is positive, and 
the introduction of new methods to enhance rice productivity in the country 
increases choice for farmers and addresses one of Madagascar’s fundamental 
infrastructure deficits.   
 
Sino-Malagasy trade and investments 
 
Increases in official Sino-Malagasy development relations over the past 
two decades have paralleled with growing trade and investments links. Chinese 
imports accounted for 15% of all of Madagascar’s exports in 2000, for 26% in 
2008, and for 39% in 2011.414 The majority of Chinese exports to Madagascar are 
consumer goods, including electronics, paper and plastic products, chemical 
products, and textiles, while China primarily imports raw materials. Between 
1997 and 2009, Madagascar’s principal ten exports to China were, in order of 
importance, wood, chrome, mica, raffia, plant fibres, hides and skins, precious 
gemstones, woodworks, essential oils, and quartz. 415  The Trade Agreement 
negotiated in 2005 was intended to help rectify this imbalance by encouraging the 
                                                
411 Sun, China’s Agricultural Investments. 
412 “Riz Hybride Chinois: Vers une Colonisation Commercial”, La Gazette de la Grande Île, 
March 22, 2012. 
413 SRI methodology is based on four main principles that interact with each other, including early, 
quick and healthy plant establishment, reduced plant density, improved soil conditions through 
enrichment with organic matter, and reduced and controlled water application. See the project 
launched by Cornell University at: www.sri.ciifad.cornell.edu.  
414  Madagascar (Ministry of Commerce and Industry) “Chine-Premier Pays Importateur a 
Madagascar”, press statement, February 12, 20112. 
415 Madagascar (INSTAT), Imports et Exports Effectuées par Madagascar Vers et Aupres les Dix 
Principaux Pays. 
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diversification of Malagasy exports to China, which has occurred to a certain 
extent. In 1997, Madagascar sold 17 types of products to China. By 2007, 111 
different items were exported to China.416 However, the items eligible for zero-
tariff entry to China are overwhelmingly primary commodities and 
unmanufactured products. Most of the products benefiting from the provisions in 
the Trade Agreement are essentially materials and inputs, such as spare parts or 
components, which are then utilised to manufacture products in China, and 
outputs from farming, mining, breeding, forestry, and fisheries. Table 6 shows the 
volume of Sino-Malagasy trade between 2005 and 2010, table 7 displays China’s 
position among Madagascar’s ten primary sources of imports over the same 
period, and tables 8 and 9 show Madagascar’s mineral exports to China.  
Table 6: Sino-Malagasy bilateral trade, 2005 - 2010, US $ million. 
 Madagascar to China China to Madagascar 
2005 31 231 
2006 20 320 
2007 22 419 
2008 40 666 
2009 45,5 337 
2010 57 313 
         Source:  Madagascar (INSTAT), Imports et Exports Effectuées par Madagascar vers et 
Aupres les Dix Principaux Pays.  
 
Table 7: Madagascar’s sources of imports, 2005 - 2010, US $ million. 
  
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
France 235,7 235,6 230,3 279,6 290,4 344,2 
China 231,3 320,8 419,2 666,3 337 313,3 
                                                
416 Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana, and Rajaobelina, Impact of Investment Relations, p. 12. 
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South Africa 97,2 104,8 118 192,4 134,5 199,1 
USA 39,2 65 77,6 158,2 102,4 148,4 
Bahrain 216,6 298,6 334,1 251,7 104,2 141,2 
Mauritius 122,8 55,6 65,5 70,3 139,4 134,6 
Belgium 45,6 31,2 30,5 49,4 188,8 97,6 
India 98,1 53 63 149,8 118,1 60,7 
Germany 42 44,5 53,1 132,9 66,1 57,9 
Thailand 32,3 27,2 34,6 59,2 548,6 46,3 
Source:  Madagascar (INSTAT), Imports et Exports Effectuées par Madagascar vers et Aupres les 
Dix Principaux Pays. 
 
Table 8: Madagascar’s mineral exports to China, US $ million. 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (1st 
quarter) 
Mica 3,802,000  No data 4,487.53 174,946.96 81,259 
Chrome 9,120,774 25,636,953 12,156,913 24,536,299 8,799,643 
Quartz 663,751 365,065 30,126 119,370 44,087 
Gems 1,069,888 1,109,140 1,922,720 4,451,417 4,915,01855 
Other 20,708 459,539 1,118,162 7,670,853 8,676,209 
Source:  Madagascar (INSTAT), Imports et Exports Effectuées par Madagascar vers et Aupres les 
Dix Principaux Pays. 
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Table 9: The growth of Madagascar’s mineral exports to China. 
 
Source:  Madagascar (INSTAT), Imports et Exports Effectuées par Madagascar vers et Aupres les 
Dix Principaux Pays. 
FDI to Madagascar has also increased. Not accounting for the investments 
in the extractive industries, in 2008 China held the 10th biggest stock of FDI in 
Madagascar, behind the UK, Canada, Japan, South Korea, France, Mauritius, 
Bermuda, Italy, and Bahrain, giving it a 7% share of FDI in Madagascar for that 
year.417 The noticeable spike in 2010 indicates that the monetary value of Chinese 
investments in Madagascar rose substantially after 2009 at a time when other 
sources of FDI fell, but this rise in due to the large investment made by WISCO 
that year. Before 2006, the distribution of Chinese FDI stock in Madagascar was 
dominated by the telecommunications, financial, commerce, and manufacturing 
sectors, which includes textiles. Since 2008, Chinese FDI inflows have 
increasingly moved towards the manufacturing and construction sectors. Table 10 
demonstrates the growth of Chinese FDI to Madagascar between 2006 and 2010, 
and tables 11 and 12 show that the nature of Chinese investments in Madagascar 
has evolved. Since non-extractive industries FDI from China to Madagascar 
initially decreased after 2009, 2006 and 2008 are given as examples. 
 
 
 
                                                
417 Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana, and Rajaobelina, Impact of Investment Relations. 
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Table 10: Chinese FDI to Madagascar 2006 - 2010, US $ million. 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
2010 
 (1st quarter) 
FDI inflow 3 1.4 2.3 8.5 61.4 
FDI stock 14.7 26.5 27.6 36.3 99.1 
Source: Madagascar (INSTAT), Etudes sur les Investissements Direct Etrangers a Madagascar.  
 
Table 11: The structure of Chinese FDI stock by sector, 2006. 
 Value (US $ million) Percentage 
Telecommunications 13,822,401 83,27 
Financial 24,695,97 14,88 
Manufacturing 224,492 1,35 
Commerce 64,976 0,39 
Real Estate 10,334 0,06 
Transport 6,155 0,04 
Construction 978 0,01 
Source: Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana, and Rajaobelina, Impact of Investment Relations. 
 
Table 12: Structure of Chinese FDI stock by sector, 2008. 
 Value (US $ million) Percentage 
Mining 8,5 0,01 
Telecommunications 13,362,71 22,03 
Financial 553,63 0,91 
Manufacturing 27,153,54 44,76 
Commerce 345,93 0,57 
Real Estate 276,04 0,46 
Transport 7,73 0,01 
Construction 18,952,36 31,24 
Agriculture 2,66 0,00 
Source: Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana, and Rajaobelina, Impact of Investment Relations.  
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Chinese SOEs and infrastructural growth in Madagascar 
 
 As Sino-Malagasy aid, trade, and investment relations have grown 
Chinese SOEs have increasingly entered the Malagasy market. Chinese SOEs can 
marshal substantial amounts of capital, people and expertise, and in many cases, 
they have proven themselves to be competent, cost-effective, and fast in 
delivering the projects for which they have been contracted.418 Determining the 
number of Chinese SOEs in the country is difficult for a number of reasons. There 
is some uncertainty over which Chinese companies are state-owned, which 
operate under some degree of state influence, and which are truly private. Chinese 
SOEs are considered to receive preferential treatment when bidding on contracts 
because they enjoy the support of the Chinese government. According to Colas, a 
leading French road construction firm with significant interests in Madagascar, 
“the Chinese firms outmanoeuvre Western companies with personal relationships 
and sheer money. The French embassy would not intervene to help Colas get a 
contract, but Chinese companies do not hesitate to get their government to 
intervene on their behalf and lobby in the background. In some cases this even 
goes all the way to the top of their governments”.419  
Many of the larger Chinese companies and corporations who are operating 
in Madagascar as private sector entities also enjoy the protection afforded by 
diplomatic visas, suggesting a close connection between the Chinese state and 
ostensibly private Chinese companies in Madagascar. A higher number of 
diplomatic visas are issued for Chinese nationals than for any other foreign 
representation in Madagascar, even though the Chinese embassy is not the largest. 
Private Chinese companies are also known to have imported vehicles that are 
registered with the Chinese embassy.420 Compounding these issues is the fact that 
some Chinese companies do not register with the Malagasy Ministry of the 
Interior as prescribed by Malagasy law, and the bigger Chinese companies who 
do register with the Malagasy authorities generally do so at different Ministries.421 
Most likely, all of the large Chinese companies and multinationals operating in 
                                                
418 See Alden and Davies, “Chinese Multinationals in Africa”, 83-96, for a profile of Chinese 
SOEs in Africa.  
419 Interview with the managing director of Colas, August 29, 2011. 
420 Interviews with the directors of the Asia Pacific section and diplomatic visa services at the 
Malagasy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2010 and October 20, 2010, respectively.   
421 Interview with the senior private sector development specialist at the World Bank, September 
22, 2010.  
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Madagascar have connections to the Chinese government.422 Membership in the 
Association of State-Owned Companies in Madagascar (ASEM), created in 2010 
to group together Chinese SOEs in Madagascar, suggests that there are currently 
15 to 20 SOEs operating in the country.423  
 
Chinese firms in Madagascar contribute to local employment and training 
opportunities, which may facilitate skills transfers and the maintenance of 
infrastructure projects. Chinese construction companies rarely compete with 
indigenous construction companies, which usually lack the capacity for large-
scale construction projects, in the initial stage of their engagement in an African 
country, but often hire local labourers.424 In Madagascar, employment generated 
by Chinese investors represented 10,7% of employment created by all foreign 
investors in 2008, especially in the manufacturing and telecommunication 
sectors.425 This is relatively small but significant, especially considering that there 
is no legal requirement for foreign investors to employ a certain percentage of 
local labour in Madagascar. The Chinese SOEs that are members of the ASEM 
employ between 30,000 - 50,000 Malagasy.426 The percentage of local labour 
employed depends on the type and size of the Chinese firm in question. CRCC 
employs around 900 Malagasy employees and six Malagasy engineers at its road 
construction sites every day.427 Upper management at SMATP is both Chinese 
and Malagasy, but most of its employees and unskilled labourers are Malagasy.428 
SOGECOA and COMPLANT are both labour-intensive companies that have 
technical training and management programs for their Malagasy staff. 
COMPLANT’s investment into Madagascar’s agriculture sector has resulted in 
the employment of approximately 8,000 Malagasy and 100 Chinese workers, 
most of which are in managerial positions. COMPLANT provides training to its 
employees on an annual basis through cooperation programs with the universities 
in Antsiranana and Mahajanga. 429  SOGECOA employs approximately 2,000 
Malagasy and 300 Chinese, and trains Malagasy labourers where necessary. 
                                                
422 The Chinese government typically appoints their directors. See McGregor, The Party, for an 
interesting account of the various mechanisms through which the Chinese government overtly 
and covertly influences its SOEs.  
423 Interview with the economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, September 
21, 2010. 
424 Corkin and Burke, “China’s Interests and Activities”. 
425 Razafindravonona, Rakotomanana, and Rajaobelina, Impact of Investment Relations. 
426 Interview with the commercial and economic counsellor at the Chinese embassy, September 
21, 2010. 
427 Interviews with two managers at CRCC, August 31, 2011. 
428 Interview with the manager of SMATP, September 1, 2011. 
429 Interview with the director of COMPLANT, August 19, 2011. 
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SOGECOA offers local employees US $100 per month, which is a good wage in 
a country where the annual medium income is less than US $400.430  
Chinese SOEs in the country source most of their capital inputs from 
China, and in some cases from Europe instead of from the local economy, which 
is mainly due to a lack of technological and production capacity in Madagascar. 
CRCC has acquired close to US $8 million worth of equipment from China, 
including excavators and other hydraulic machines, to service its operations in 
Madagascar. 431  SMATP obtains the majority of its equipment from France and 
other European countries.432 COMPLANT and SOGECOA try to source inputs 
locally where they can due to the high costs of importing machinery and the 
difficulty of locating spare parts for foreign machines in Madagascar, which 
provides opportunities for the local private sector through backward links into the 
economy, but they import the more specialist and high-tech equipment from 
China as well.433  
 Often, these SOEs receive funding for their projects in Madagascar from 
foreign and multilateral development agencies, including the World Bank, the 
ADB, the EIB, and the BADA. The majority of financing is for road rehabilitation 
or sanitation projects. CRCC, the Guangdong Group, and China Geo-Engineering 
have all been hired by these agencies. CRCC has built several roads and bridges 
in Madagascar after winning tenders from the World Bank and the ADB, 
including a 110-km long stretch of the RN34 that connects the towns of 
Miandrivazo with Malaimbady between Antsirabe and Morondava on the 
country’s western coast. CRCC bid on the tenders after it received news of a US 
$700 million loan from the World Bank to the government of Madagascar 
destined for the rehabilitation of the country’s transportation infrastructure.434 
Both Guangdong Group and China Geo-Engineering also have three ongoing 
projects in the country that are financed by the World Bank. SMAPT similarly 
mostly sources its financing through the World Bank, the ADB, and the BADA, 
the latter of which is currently the only financial institution that continues to 
receive funding for new projects in Madagascar despite the persistence of the 
political crisis. SMATP recently constructed the national road known as the RN44 
connecting the town of Moramanga to the RN7, as well as the main thoroughfare 
called the "hydrocarbure" road in Antananarivo.435 Sinohydro, the world's largest 
                                                
430 Interview with the spokesperson for SOGECOA, August 18, 2011. 
431 Interviews with two managers at CRCC, August 31, 2011. 
432 Interview with the manager of SMATP, September 1, 2011. 
433 Interview with the director of COMPLANT, August 19, 2011, and the spokesperson for 
SOGECOA, August 18, 2011. 
434 Interview with two managers of the CCRC, August 31, 2011. 
435 Interview with the manager of SMATP, September 1, 2011. 
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hydroelectric company, first entered the Malagasy market in 2006 after it won 
several bids from the World Bank and the ADB. In 2008, the BADA and the 
Kuwaiti Development Fund contracted the Chinese SOE to build a third turbine at 
the Andekaleka dam on the Betsiboka River, which provides the Antananarivo 
region with 30% of its energy, for US $32 million. Construction on the turbine 
began in December 2008 and was completed in 2010. The new turbine has raised 
the energy output of the dam from 60 to 94 megawatts and reduced the 
operational costs of the other, smaller thermal energy plants in the country. The 
construction of a fourth turbine, which would be financed by the EIB and be 
capable of providing an additional 34 megawatts at a cost of US $28 million, is 
being considered.436  
Contracts between the Chinese and Malagasy governments involving 
loans or credit lines to the Malagasy government are also sometimes subject to 
external donor regulations. This means that Chinese companies who are financed 
by the Exim Bank or one of the other Chinese agencies do not always operate in 
isolation from Western financing and development aid standards.  The example of 
how China was conditioned by the IMF to change the terms of its agreement with 
Ravalomanana to construct the ICC and five-star hotel in 2008 is instructive in 
this regard. The constructions of the ICC and hotel were both negotiated at the 
same time, but they were originally conceived as two separate agreements. The 
ICC was a grant by the Chinese government, and the hotel was a commercial 
agreement between the Malagasy government and SOGECOA. SOGECOA’s 
payment was to be funded by an Exim Bank loan to the Malagasy government, 
which meant that for Madagascar to construct the hotel it had to assume a public 
debt to China. This required the agreement to be consistent with the IMF’s 
concessionality rules. 437  When representatives from Exim Bank arrived in 
Madagascar to finalise the loan, the IMF informed the parties that it could not be 
extended because the terms of the agreement were too high for Madagascar. 
Finally, the ICC grant and the hotel were fused into one project so that the grant 
element exceeded the loan component.438  
Increased management of the sustainability and positive side-effects of 
Chinese infrastructure projects is possible through public-private partnerships 
such as the one described above, and through enhanced quality control on behalf 
of the Malagasy government. It is also contingent on the intensification of 
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Chinese and Malagasy interactions through joint ventures, and on stipulations on 
local labour components, technology, and training capacities. With adequate 
equipment, oversight, and control mechanisms, Chinese companies perform at the 
same level of quality as Western companies, but often at a cheaper rate. This has 
occurred to such an extent that the ADB prefers to contract Chinese companies 
because they are cheaper than many companies from other countries, and because 
they complete their projects in a timely, effective manner. In Madagascar, the 
ADB even intervened on the behalf of a small Chinese construction firm after the 
Malagasy government had turned down its offer to build a road. The Malagasy 
government is wary of companies that it is not familiar with, making it more 
difficult for smaller, less-known Chinese construction companies to enter the 
market for government contracts. Once the ADB offered to oversee the project, 
the government agreed, and the project was completed to its satisfaction. 439  
 
Conclusion 
 
Malagasy recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan in 1972 paved 
the way for diplomatic relations and the subsequent formulation of trade and 
technical agreements. Sino-Malagasy development ties, once defined by small, 
targeted development aid projects in health and two large infrastructure projects, 
have expanded into a political and business partnership. China’s engagements in 
Madagascar have increased substantially throughout the 1990s, and especially 
since they were cultivated by Ravalomanana after 2002. Since 2009, diplomatic 
relations have been somewhat dampened, but Sino-Malagasy trade and 
investments have continued. Today, Chinese engagements at the state level still 
retain an emphasis on agriculture and health, but the confluence between Chinese 
aid, trade, and investment projects demonstrates that China’s approach has shifted 
from an ideologically motivated engagement to a more commercially minded one. 
Figures depicting the Sino-Malagasy trade relationship, rising FDI from China to 
Madagascar, and the type of development projects being implemented in 
Madagascar demonstrate the size, growth, and evolving nature of the Sino-
Malagasy economic relationship. Yet what is remarkable about China’s political 
and economic relations with Madagascar is not so much their size, but rather the 
ways in which Chinese aid, trade, and investments in Madagascar function in 
tandem. Many Chinese development aid projects are being carried out by SOEs 
who have an explicit profit-making incentive, rendering them as donor and client. 
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In stressing the crucial role of public investments in infrastructure and 
agriculture as a basis for private sector growth, China is contributing to the 
foundations needed for economic growth in Madagascar. Investments in 
infrastructure alleviate supply-side constraints to Madagascar’s integration with 
the global economy, and each of the different components of infrastructure 
development are mutually reinforcing. A network of roads, railways, and ports 
facilitate the movement of goods and services. To certify the efficient functioning 
of technical equipment, commodity processing, and the day-to-day business of 
companies more generally, Madagascar needs good and efficient power 
infrastructure. Productivity, in turn, is enhanced by investments in health facilities 
that ensure an able-bodied workforce. If the real solution to Madagascar’s 
problems are not a matter of the right monetary and fiscal policies, but of roads, 
fertilisers, hospital beds, and malaria nets, which are characterised as “readily 
available technocratic solutions which are missing only for lack of funds”, then 
China’s engagement in Madagascar might help bring about practical solutions to 
pressing and fundamental development issues in the country.440 
Over the past decade, a growing acceptance of China’s role as a provider 
of infrastructure finance is manifest in the number of Chinese SOEs that are 
winning construction contracts from multilateral development agencies. This 
suggests that concerns about China’s developmental impacts in Africa are both 
hypocritical and exaggerated. It could also create new pressures for Western 
development agencies to be more effective in the disbursement of their finance, 
and to more explicitly expand development cooperation beyond aid without 
compromising its own principles. Both the ways in which China conceives of 
development aid and the manner in which it distributes it are arguably already 
affecting traditional donor policies towards Africa. Western donors have recently 
rediscovered infrastructure on their agendas for development cooperation. 
Agriculture is also becoming a component of Western development aid again and 
increasingly features in discussions on a new World Bank strategy since late 
2010.441 This highlights the complementarities between China and other economic 
actors in Africa. It also alters the prevailing discourse from one that is intent on 
deciphering whether or not China has a particular development aid model, or how 
this influences governance in various African countries, to how the Chinese state 
itself can be engaged to improve developmental prospects in places like 
Madagascar.   
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Chapter 5: Chinese migrants: “les anciens et les nouveaux” 
 
Introduction 
 
Since state-to-state relations between China and Africa can be 
opportunistic and politicians sometimes prone to promote their personal interests 
over those of the nation, private links between Chinese migrants and Africans are 
equally as important as those between their leaders. As more Chinese SOEs are 
seen building roads and buildings, small-scale traders from China are also 
becoming a common sight throughout African cities. Most Chinese migrants 
reside in their host country on a temporary basis and tend to expatriate their 
earnings back to China, which raises doubts about the extent to which their 
presence exerts positive spill-overs into indigenous communities. Yet Chinese 
migrants generally utilise kinship and business networks established in China to 
identify and exploit economic opportunities in Africa. When they settle in their 
host countries, these networks are transported to African societies. This has 
important and long-term consequences for African entrepreneurs, who can 
subsequently exploit the Chinese networks, integrate with Chinese supply chains, 
and more generally take advantage of new economic opportunities presented to 
them by the influx of Chinese migrants in their countries. In this chapter, I show 
that the inward flow of entrepreneurial Chinese migrants and the proliferation of 
Chinese business networks and supply chains have facilitated local private sector 
exchanges in Madagascar.  
Chinese migration to Madagascar has been conditioned by several factors. 
Whereas China once actively discouraged the emigration of its citizens, since the 
1990s it has implemented a variety of regulatory changes to facilitate the 
movement of Chinese migrants abroad. 442 More specifically, the signing of a 
Sino-Malagasy immigration agreement in 1996 eased entry procedures for 
Chinese nationals wishing to live in Madagascar. Madagascar’s relative proximity 
to China also means that travel and transport times and costs between the two 
countries are relatively low compared to, for example, West African countries. 
The inauguration of a flight between Antananarivo and Guangzhou (via Bangkok) 
in 2008 then offered a fast connection between Madagascar’s capital and China’s 
                                                
442 Altogether, China has formulated more than 11,000 laws and regulations dealing with its 
diaspora. See Barabantseva, “Trans-nationalising Chineseness”, 7-28, for a useful account of 
Chinese regulatory support for its overseas diaspora. 
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principal manufacturing hub and traditional emigrant regions in the southern 
coastal areas. Additionally, since successive waves of migration often build on 
earlier trajectories, the fact that Madagascar has a large community of resident 
Chinese made the island more attractive for new Chinese migrants. The existence 
of the old Sino-Malagasy community also differentiates Madagascar from other 
case studies of Chinese migrants in African countries, influences the acuities of 
the Malagasy towards the new Chinese, and more broadly enriches the analysis of 
the new Chinese in Madagascar, since perceptions of the Chinese in Africa 
depend on the unique history of each country with China.443  
The earliest Chinese settlers came to Madagascar in the mid-1800s, after 
which the community grew through the importation of contract labourers, 
subsequent waves of private immigration, and natural demographic growth. 
Throughout the early- to mid-1900s, Chinese immigration rates and economic 
activities were conditioned by French colonial policies. France levied entry fees 
on new Chinese immigrants and imposed work permits and labour quotas on 
existing settlers. These policies limited contact between the Chinese diaspora in 
Madagascar and their relations and networks in China, which led to the 
strengthening of local Sino-Malagasy networks. The immigrants clustered around 
Toamasina and along the country’s eastern coast, where they inserted themselves 
into the local economy as small-scale agricultural traders and shop owners. 
During colonisation, the Chinese settlers acted as intermediaries between 
Malagasy farmers and French industrialists. Since independence, the Sino-
Malagasy community has diversified into more urban areas and other sectors of 
the economy, although it still retains a strong presence in the agricultural trade 
today. The contemporary old Chinese community in Madagascar is the second 
largest group of foreign minority residents in the country, and it is well integrated 
with the local population. 444  However, although the Chinese diaspora in 
Madagascar has an extensive historical geography, significant and multiple 
knowledge gaps remain on the more recent wave of entrepreneurial and informal 
migrants, particularly on the “under the radar flows” and the expansion of new 
Chinese business networks in the country.445 
The new Chinese migrants began arriving in Madagascar in the mid-1990s, 
and especially over the past decade. The majority of them settle temporarily in 
Antananarivo, and to a lesser extent in Toamasina, and generally trade 
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manufactured goods imported from China. This has occurred to such an extent 
that the district of Behoririka in downtown Antananarivo has become known as 
the capital’s Chinatown. 446  All of the new Chinese migrants arrived in 
Madagascar after hearing about economic opportunities from friends, family 
members, or business contacts, and retain strong links to their homeland through 
kinship and business networks. Increasing numbers of Malagasy find employment 
in Chinese shops, and small-scale local entrepreneurs are beginning to purchase 
goods imported from China by the new Chinese in order to launch their own retail 
operations. As members of the new Chinese community become more successful 
and begin diversifying their activities in Madagascar, they also foster contact with 
the bigger Malagasy businesses, who can in turn benefit from new supply links 
introduced by the Chinese and procure machinery and technical equipment 
directly from China.   
I proceed by providing a typology of Chinese migrants in Africa and 
discussing the expansion of Chinese business networks on the continent. Since the 
historical relevance of Chinese migration to Madagascar has helped spur the 
recent surge of new Chinese immigrants, I explore the evolution and economic 
roles of the old Chinese community in Madagascar. Next, I examine the growth of 
new Chinese entrepreneurial migrants and small-scale traders on the island. By 
discussing their levels of integration with the old Chinese community and 
Malagasy society, I show that while the new Chinese remain a relatively socially 
insulated group, their principal contact with Malagasy is through their business 
networks. I then provide evidence that this has enhanced economic opportunities 
for the Malagasy private sector.  
 
Contextualising Chinese migrants and business networks  
 
Three principal types of new Chinese migrants to Africa have been 
identified in the literature: labour migrants, small-scale entrepreneurs, and 
agricultural workers.447 Labour migrants generally work for Chinese SOEs or 
private Chinese companies involved in infrastructure and other construction 
projects across Africa. 448  Labour migrants may evolve into entrepreneurial 
migrants, meaning that these two categories are sometimes interchangeable. 
Independent migrants arrive in Africa seeking their own economic opportunities. 
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They generally launch their own import-export businesses, commonly in retail or 
in the wholesale trade of goods manufactured in China, especially textiles, 
clothing, shoes, household items, electronics, and manufactured trinkets.449 A 
small amount of Chinese migrants are also agricultural workers seeking to 
become landholders in Africa.450 The majority of these migrants are temporary 
migrants, which are defined as those migrants whose duration in their host 
country is limited by pre-determined work contracts, legal opportunities and host 
country restrictions, or by their own choice. Temporary migrants may include 
transit and circular migrants. The term “transit migrants” was originally coined in 
the 1990s to denote Africans migrating to North African countries temporarily in 
order to reach their ultimate destinations in Western Europe.451 The expression is 
now being applied to describe Chinese migrants who use sub-Saharan countries as 
a temporary stop in their journeys to Europe or North America because of 
hardening immigration policies in these countries.452 Circular migrants usually 
return to China. In general, Chinese migrant patterns are based on and create 
further transnational economic networks.453  
Temporary Chinese entrepreneurial migrants use existing kinship or 
business networks developed in China when they expand into Africa. Business 
networks function as a vehicle for kinship or personal relationships to influence 
the success of economic negotiations and transactions. The medium responsible 
for this confluence is called guanxi in Chinese, which translates as connections or 
the process of social interaction.454 The notion of guanxi, and the ways in which it 
has influenced the success of Chinese capitalist networks, alludes to a cultural 
exceptionalism based on the vague notion of “Asian values”, in which personal 
ties play a large role in determining economic outcomes.455 These links exist in at 
least three separate forms: kinship ties that link together components of extended 
family enterprises, social ties formed through shared social histories, and 
professional ties based on connections formed throughout the course of repeated 
business transactions. These three categories span the range from informal to 
formal, and often overlap. The networks themselves are woven together with 
strands of information, shared contacts, sometimes finance, and a degree of 
trust.456 The ambiguous concepts of guanxi and Asian values can invoke a 
commonplace but misconceived assumption that the use of personal ties in 
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business is based on historically rooted and culturally conditioned processes, and 
that it is therefore a uniquely Chinese phenomenon.  
The informal and flexible nature of Chinese business networks implies 
that they are easily transferable to new social contexts and organisational 
structures, and that they function well in the type of informal economies found in 
many developing countries. 457  Since economic transactions within Chinese 
networks are based on relationships, they can be concluded without resorting to 
law or other formal rules. Where domestic regulatory or enforcement mechanisms 
are weak, Chinese networks help deter opportunistic behaviour such as contract 
violation through the enforcement of community sanctions.458 The role of Chinese 
entrepreneurship and business networks in industrialisation processes has 
therefore been credited with significantly contributing to the growth of local 
entrepreneurship and global economic integration in East Asia throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. “The local, regional, and global connections…of the Chinese 
diaspora, and their talent to spin local, regional, and global business webs, 
preferably based on long-term, non-contractual trust relationships with kinsmen 
are almost legendary”.459  Yet, as observed by Meagher, “too few questions are 
asked about what happens when Asian business networks are extended into new 
regions, with different states, different institutional histories, and different social 
and economic realities”.460   
Since networks are by definition informal, they are assuming complex 
forms of interactions with local entrepreneurs in Africa. Chinese migrants are not 
a homogeneous group of actors, and the manners in which migrant communities 
use their networks in African countries vary. African societies can connect to the 
global economy through “human capital that will have to come mainly from the 
developing world, particularly from China”, but this connection must be 
constructive in order to be developmental.461 On the one hand, Chinese traders 
can use their networks to exploit increasingly fluid comparative advantages in 
their particular host countries without many positive spill-overs to indigenous 
entrepreneurs.462 In general, the Chinese entrepreneurs who use business networks 
can depend on financial, technical, and informational support from their wide-
ranging connections within these linkages. Improved access to informational and 
financial networks provides a faster approach to credit, information, and 
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technology for the Chinese members of the networks, which is not the case for 
their African counterparts. On the other hand, contact with Chinese networks 
could help to invigorate African entrepreneurship through the inflow of models, 
ideas, and resources from outside the region. 463  Chinese business networks 
“facilitate the exchange of inputs critical to global capitalism, including finance, 
technical knowledge, and marketing information” for African businesses. 464 Via 
formal and informal contact, they accelerate information sharing in their host 
economy. In the case of trade, information sharing helps match buyers and sellers, 
and in terms of investments, it helps identify new and potential opportunities.465 
The Chinese community in Mauritius provides a useful example of how 
Chinese business networks facilitated the creation of a development-oriented 
regime, but the case of Mauritius differs from that of Madagascar in important 
respects. In the late-1970s, the old Chinese community in Mauritius played a vital 
role in the establishment of the EPZ on the island by harnessing their business 
links with Asian entrepreneurs. The idea for the EPZ originated with a local Sino-
Mauritian university professor who was familiar with the experience of Taiwan 
and who believed that the East Asian industrialisers possessed a surplus of capital 
that could be invested in Mauritius.466 Influential members of the Sino-Mauritian 
community subsequently convinced the Mauritian government to establish an 
EPZ by travelling to China and inviting co-ethnics from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Malaysia to invest in the scheme. These investments lead to dynamic, export-
oriented manufacturing growth in the EPZ, and simultaneously exposed 
Mauritians (both Chinese and non-Chinese) to the intricacies of global production 
and export processes. Eventually, local entrepreneurs used the knowledge 
acquired from joint ventures established with foreign investors to launch their 
own enterprises. In contrast to Madagascar, the old Chinese in Mauritius had 
helped settle the island, which was uninhabited until the 1600s. Early on, they 
contributed to the growth of local industry by creating tobacco processing and 
alcohol distillation factories, and they maintained close connections to their 
homeland.467 When the new Chinese migrants began investing in Mauritius, it 
was often through existing kinship ties with the old Chinese community.468 In 
Madagascar, the early Chinese settlers arrived in a country that was already 
populated by the Malagasy, and politically and economically under Merina and 
then French control.  
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Early Chinese migration to Madagascar 
 
It is generally thought that Chinese navigators had first sighted but not 
visited Madagascar during one of Chinese explorer Admiral Zheng He’s 
expeditions along the coasts of East Africa as early as the 1400s. The display of 
Chinese pottery from this era at the archaeology museum of Antananarivo 
suggests that there might have existed Sino-Malagasy contact and perhaps trade 
during this time. However, Zheng He’s pioneering explorations around the world 
did not result in any Chinese settlement. It would be another 400 years before the 
first waves of Chinese immigrants and labourers ventured to Madagascar, and 
another 500 years until the Chinese state and its people would actively pursue 
global aspirations and migrate to Africa in more substantial numbers. According 
to the earliest available records, independent Chinese migrants began arriving in 
Madagascar in the mid-1800s. 469  An English missionary observed the first 
Chinese-run shop in Toamasina in 1862, and Bardonnet noted that there were 40 
Chinese living in Toamasina in 1893.470 By 1904, 452 Chinese were believed to 
be residing in Madagascar as private entrepreneurs.471  
The growth of Chinese immigrants during this time is due to the defection 
of Chinese migrants from the neighbouring Mascarene Islands such as Reunion 
and Mauritius. Mauritius has been cited as the original starting point of the 
Chinese diaspora in the Indian Ocean.472 British colonial authorities had originally 
transported 40 Chinese contract labourers to Mauritius in 1828, and subsequent 
British and French colonial governments continued importing workers from 
China until the late-19th century.473 Many of the Chinese who had worked in 
Mauritius as contract labourers fled to Madagascar voluntarily after a drop in 
global sugar prices in the mid-1800s had resulted in an economic recession in 
Mauritius.474 In addition, after 1890 a wave of new Hakka Chinese immigration to 
Reunion and Mauritius prompted the movement of the first wave of Cantonese 
Chinese to points farther west, such as Madagascar.475 Consequentially, the 
majority of the old Chinese community in Mauritius today is Hakka Chinese, 
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whereas the majority of the resident Chinese in Madagascar are Cantonese. 
Rivalries between groups of Hakka and Cantonese remain a common feature 
among overseas Chinese communities.476 
In 1896, France had also begun to import Chinese contract labourers to 
Madagascar after discovering that the Merina’s federal system of socio-political 
organisation and animosity towards Madagascar’s other ethnic groups had 
resulted in the relative isolation of the capital from other main towns. Out of 
strategic calculation, the Merina had chosen not to build roads or significant 
transport routes in the country. France’s first governor general in Madagascar, 
Joseph Gallieni, identified the construction of vital infrastructures as a 
prerequisite of French economic success in Madagascar. 477  However, the 
Malagasy population was hostile to any system of centralised rule and small in 
size and density, which meant that Gallieni’s ambitions to improve the country’s 
infrastructures were initially thwarted by a shortage of local labour.478 The 
movement of Chinese contract labourers to Madagascar coincided with the 
abolition of slavery by the European powers, economic expansion and labour 
shortages in Asia, and an official authorisation by the Chinese emperor in 1860 
(following defeat in the Second Opium War) to legitimise the previously 
clandestine activity of hiring Chinese contract labour for large European colonial 
construction projects.  
Six contingents of Chinese contract labourers arrived in Madagascar 
between 1896 and 1901.479 The original four convoys were hired to assemble a 
railway connecting Toamasina to Antananarivo, which is still in operation today 
and remains one of the country’s two functioning train tracks. The first group of 
499 Chinese workers docked in Toamasina in August 1896, followed by the 
disembarkation of 614 workers a few days later. Two further contingents totalling 
3,003 Chinese labourers arrived in Madagascar in 1897.480 The French authorities 
employed another 500 Chinese to erect military installations in the city of Diego-
Suarez at the northern tip of the island in 1900. The sixth and final unit of around 
1,000 labourers arrived in Toamasina in 1901 to construct another railroad 
connecting the towns south of Toamasina along the eastern coast, and to work on 
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French plantations.481  
Although there was a noticeable spike in Chinese immigration to 
Madagascar following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1937, French-
imposed restrictions on Chinese immigrants resulted in a slowdown of arrivals 
throughout the first half of the 20th century. Shortly after colonisation, France 
began implementing administrative controls over the Chinese population through 
the use of immigration fees, residency authorisations, and administrative grouping 
requirements. In 1903, every Chinese wishing to reside in Madagascar was 
required to pay security fees and register with the authorities. Soon after, each 
Chinese resident had to apply for a written authorisation of residency on a yearly 
basis. After 1939, Chinese immigration was severely limited by the doubling of 
immigration fees and the imposition of new regulations, which required all 
immigrants to obtain a written authorisation from the French governor general 
and to present a “certificate of morality” before disembarking in Madagascar.482  
The subsequent enlargement of the Chinese community occurred through 
simple demographic growth, with many Chinese men marrying Malagasy women 
or sending for wives from China. Intermarriages were common and at least 60% 
of the Chinese in Madagascar today are of mixed Sino-Malagasy heritage.483 This 
evened out the previously skewed male to female ratio within the Chinese 
community, and paved the way for the development of the community without 
significant new immigration. Most of the Chinese immigrants remained on the 
eastern coast, as well as in Antananarivo and Fianarantsoa. Often, an extended 
Chinese family or clan would cover an entire region. The Chinese who settled in 
the rural areas along the eastern coast can be grouped into roughly two types of 
descendants. In Toamasina, these are categorised into those belonging to the “Son 
of Sam” (Sung Sam) clan and the “Son of Chan” (Sung Chan) clan. Chinese 
family names in Madagascar also vary according to the geographical location of 
the clans, so that the name “Sam” is frequently found in the central highlands and 
“Lock” along the southeastern coast.484 Map 2 shows the main areas of Chinese 
settlement in the 1900s.485 
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Map 2: Areas of early Chinese settlement in Madagascar. 
 
 
 
 
 146 
The origins of the old Chinese community in Madagascar are a contested 
subject. Some members of the community today can trace their ancestry back to 
one of the roughly 5,500 contract labourers that had arrived at the turn of the 
1900s. The theory is that several hundred of them, discouraged by the hard work 
under the hot Malagasy sun, had deserted their posts to engage in private business 
in the eastern countryside. Bardonnet argues that the first semblance of a 
significant Chinese community in Madagascar resulted from the disappearance of 
around 500 contract labourers from their posts and their subsequent engagement 
with small local commerce.486 According to Le Bourdiec, spontaneous, private 
immigration to the country did not occur in significant numbers until the 1930s.487 
Others argue that Madagascar’s old Chinese community developed through 
independent waves of private migration. Slawecki maintains that the French 
authorities enforced a policy of locating deserters and returning them to China and 
that many labourers returned home by their own volition after their contracts 
ended. Furthermore, he shows that the contract labourers and the old Chinese 
community in Madagascar hailed from different regions in China. Most private 
Chinese immigrants in Madagascar came first from the provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong, while the contract labourers were imported from the province of 
Guangxi, 700 km to the west of Guangzhou.488 According to Gallieni, “although a 
small number of skilful, intelligent, and hard-working artisans among the 
labourers were encouraged to stay after having completed their period of 
industrial residence, none of them accepted to remain in Madagascar. They were 
afraid of the high mortality rate among their countrymen, and all left the country 
at the end of their contract”.489 Members of the contemporary Sino-Malagasy 
community prefer to be viewed as having descended from the private settlers, 
which the majority of them probably did. To substantiate their claim, many were 
able to provide an approximate date chronicling the arrival of their ancestors.490  
 
The old Chinese community in Madagascar 
 
French colonial policies also severely limited the economic activities of 
Chinese settlers throughout the 19th century and restricted them to certain sectors 
of the economy. The economic relationship between the Chinese and French 
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488 Slawecki, “L’Origine et la Croissance de la Communauté Chinoise”, 484-494. 
489 Gallieni, 1905: 514-516. 
490 Interviews and discussions with members of the old Chinese community in Madagascar 
between September 2010 and July 2012.  
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communities in Madagascar during colonialism was formed by geographical 
proximity, since both groups had concentrated their economic activities around 
Toamasina. French policies towards the Chinese immigrants were conditioned by 
anxiety about competition with French business interests. France imposed 
commercial fees and business licenses on Chinese enterprises, and Chinese 
businesses were forced to pay higher commercial licensing fees than French 
firms. More profitable Chinese firms had to pay higher licensing fees than less 
successful enterprises. The Chinese were not allowed to establish manufacturing 
or export businesses. In 1913, quotas for Chinese trade licenses were reduced, and 
after 1932 the colonial administration began denying Chinese entrepreneurs 
business licenses where they competed with French companies.491  
As a result of these policies, the Chinese came to serve as intermediaries 
between Malagasy peasants and French industrialists. A Chinese family would 
settle deep in the Malagasy countryside and set up a post to trade a variety of 
items imported from Mauritius or bought in a bigger town (cloth, soap, salt, 
plastic sandals, tools, and artisanal products) in exchange for produce collected by 
the Malagasy peasants. Chinese family-run businesses typically bought 
agricultural products such as coffee, cloves, litchis, vanilla, and other 
commodities found in eastern Madagascar from the peasants and farmers to sell to 
French or European exporters. In addition to fulfilling the function of retailer, the 
Chinese merchant sometimes became the local banker by providing credit lines to 
Malagasy peasants. This practice became institutionalised, and some have argued 
exploitative, to such a degree that the Chinese community effectively exercised 
control over the local harvest and managed the rural economy along the country’s 
eastern coast.492  
As this system became more entrenched, the relationship between the 
Chinese settlers and French colonialists eventually became structured by 
reciprocal necessity. By limiting their economic activities and paying them low 
wages, the French industrialists who controlled the large export companies could 
exploit the Chinese, who were willing to access remote areas that French traders 
were more reluctant to reach. French and European wholesalers even helped 
Chinese business expand into the interior of the island by directly hiring Chinese 
merchants to retrieve products from the rural areas and transport them to French 
export companies based in Toamasina. A French trader from Toamasina recruited 
800 new Chinese labourers to work in small groups on agricultural posts and 
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public work sites in the mountains and dense rainforests around Toamasina.493 
Chinese agricultural traders thus facilitated the growth of French economic power 
on the island, which helped them consolidate their political control over the 
Merinas. In this manner, the Chinese immigrants made themselves indispensable 
to both local Malagasy and the French sovereigns: “the Asian immigrant trader, 
equipped with the technical knowledge of the peasant economy, devised ways and 
means to satisfy the needs of both the Malagasy producer and the European 
exporter”.494  
After independence, Chinese traders began to diversify their economic 
activities and began moving towards the urban areas. The new Malagasy Republic 
under Tsiranana had sustained many of the French policies towards the Chinese. 
Chinese immigrants were still required to request an authorisation to enter the 
country and continued to be restricted to certain economic sectors and 
professions. Even so, the official departure of the French allowed the Chinese to 
gradually expand their economic activities into other industries. To curb the 
Chinese practice of extending credit lines to Malagasy peasants, which often 
made them indebted to the Chinese shopkeeper for life, the Malagasy government 
instituted a system of cooperatives to purchase agricultural products from the 
farmers directly, which eliminated the need for the Chinese collectors. Many 
Chinese became plantation or farm-owners themselves, and others ventured into 
manufacturing. A saturated employment market in the rural areas, and the 
generally high birth rates in Chinese families, also meant that young men who 
could not be employed in their father’s shop began migrating towards the capital. 
In the 1940s, 60% of the Chinese community still resided in rural areas in the 
province of Toamasina. By the 1960s, there was a discernible shift in domestic 
migration to Antananarivo and more urban areas. In 1965, the resident Chinese 
community in Antananarivo outgrew that of Toamasina, with 1,251 Chinese 
living in the capital, compared to 1,027 in the port town.495 In the 1950s, there 
was one Chinese school in Antananarivo and two in Toamasina. Now there is 
only one Chinese school left in Toamasina, which reflects the demographic shift 
towards the capital.496  
Mr. Parfait Ramilamanana’s experience exemplifies the general trajectory 
of a Sino-Malagasy whose ancestors arrived in Madagascar in the early-1900s. 
Mr. Ramilamanana (known locally as Mr. Sinoui) is a fourth-generation Sino-
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Malagasy whose father had arrived in Madagascar from Mauritius in the 1930s. 
Mr. Sinoui was born in Toalanaro where he grew up helping his father fish 
seafood. Mr. Sinoui eventually moved to live with extended family in Toamasina 
and found work in transportation logistics, where he organised the movement of 
produce from the rural areas to the urban centres. In this capacity, he formed part 
of the Chinese supply chain throughout the eastern part of the country. He 
eventually moved to Antananarivo and used his networks to the Chinese 
sugarcane collectors to launch a small-scale rum distillery. Over the years, he has 
diversified the activities of his company to include 4-wheel drive rentals for travel 
groups from China and the bottling of rum for local companies.497  
 
The Sino-Malagasy Community Today 
 
The contemporary resident Chinese community in Madagascar is close-
knit. A principal reason for this was the French colonial system of organising 
Chinese settler communities into congregations. The control of the Chinese 
community through congregations was a French method of indirect colonial rule. 
To facilitate the enforcement of fees, residency permits, and business licenses, the 
Chinese were obligated to organise themselves into congregations according to 
their geographical locations, which structured their kinship ties inwards to their 
own communities. Once more than ten Chinese lived in the same area, they were 
required to form a congregation and name a chief who would be responsible for 
the actions of all of the congregation’s members. The chief ensured that each 
member paid the correct amount of taxes, fees, or fines to the colonial authorities, 
and thus acted as an intermediary between the French administration and their 
particular Chinese community.498 This system had the dual effect of strengthening 
domestic Sino-Malagasy networks and preventing the Chinese settlers from 
maintaining strong business or kinship links with China. There are 16 Chinese 
congregations in Madagascar today. There are large congregations in both 
Toamasina and Antananarivo, and smaller ones in the towns along the eastern 
coast. The congregations act as the symbolic ideal of the ancestral homeland, and 
serve as the focal point for meetings, business discussions, dances, language 
training, and the celebration of Chinese festivities.499  
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The congregations solidified the sense of community among the Chinese 
immigrants in Madagascar in two important ways. The Chinese used the laws 
governing the congregations to form inner-Chinese mutual aid groups, which 
essentially constituted the equivalent of a Chinese chamber of commerce. 
Paradoxically, the French rationale behind the imposition of the congregations 
had been to prevent the Chinese from organising themselves along their own 
political lines and thus from posing potential threats to French establishments and 
interests in Madagascar.500 Officially, the creation of economic or political activist 
groups by the Chinese was illegal, but since they could be formed under the cover 
of the congregations, the mutual aid groups were fully in accordance with local 
laws at the time. Additionally, the system of congregations facilitated the 
dominance of Cantonese Chinese in Madagascar, rendering the old community 
very ethnically homogenous. Since the leader of a congregation was given 
discriminatory power to accept or refuse members into the congregation, the use 
of congregations as a form of social organisation facilitated the dominance of the 
Cantonese Chinese in Madagascar. Chinese of Hakka heritage were generally 
refused membership to the congregations. Forced to operate outside of the official 
medium of organisation, they were frequently economically disadvantaged.501   
Although they are close-knit, members of the Sino-Malagasy community 
are well integrated with Malagasy society, which is partly because they conceive 
of themselves as Malagasy first and Chinese second.502 Mr. Chen Guo Zhen 
(known locally as Mr. George), who is the vice president of both the Chinese 
Congregation in Antananarivo and the Association of Madagascar-China 
Friendship (created in 1984), for instance, is well known in the capital as the 
owner of a popular Chinese restaurant on Independence Avenue, the main street 
in downtown Antananarivo. His parents arrived in Madagascar in 1910 to escape 
insecurity in China, and he was born and raised on the island. He speaks fluent 
French, Malagasy, and Cantonese (he does not speak Mandarin Chinese, which 
renders interaction with the new Chinese community difficult). He has several 
children with his Sino-Malagasy wife, and all of them have Malagasy citizenship 
and speak Malagasy. At home, however, the family speaks Cantonese, eats 
Chinese cuisine, and celebrates both Chinese and Malagasy holidays.503 Mr. 
Sinoui also decided to change his name from his original Chinese-sounding one to 
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a Malagasy one in order to become better integrated with Malagasy society when 
he started his business in Antananarivo.504 
The Chinese settlers easily integrated with Malagasy society because they 
adopted many of the local customs and religious inclinations of their host 
communities. Historically, the fact that many Chinese decided to settle in the 
countryside where no other vazaha (foreigner) had gone before made them 
favourable in the eyes of the rural Malagasy among whom they lived. The 
Chinese began dressing in Western clothes as soon as they arrived, and consumed 
their Chinese meals with a fork and knife instead of utilising chopsticks.505 Since 
the Chinese migrants were not particularly religious (as opposed to the Indian and 
Pakistani communities), they were able to connect with the Malagasy on a 
religious level by converting to Catholicism. Approximately 60% of resident 
Chinese in Madagascar today are catholic.506 Mr. Sinoui for example, converted 
from Confucianism to Catholicism while living in Toamasina as a young adult. 
The old Chinese also make a concerted effort to be productive members of 
society. Mr. Sinoui and his wife are very active in their local Malagasy 
community through the church. They regularly attend mass and also organise 
social events through their local congregation.507 In Toamasina, the Chinese 
congregation distributes basic needs, such as rice, oil, candles, and soap to the 
poorest families in the city in an effort to demonstrate Chinese solidarity with the 
Malagasy.508 
The extent of integration among the old Chinese community and Malagasy 
society is evident in daily life. In Toamasina and the surrounding rural areas, the 
term sinoa (Chinese) is synonymous with the local trader or the owner of the local 
general merchandise shop, and Malagasy cuisine is infused with Chinese-inspired 
dishes. Almost all food vendors or hotelys (local Malagasy restaurants) offer mi-
sao (Chinese-style noodles), soup sinoa (Chinese-style soup), or riz cantonais 
(Cantonese rice) on their menus. As a result, the old Chinese are, in general, the 
group of foreigners least unpopular with the indigenous population in 
Madagascar.509 The arrival of new Chinese migrants is further entrenching the 
unique identities of the old Sino-Malagasy community and the sense that they are 
different from the new immigrants. This is exemplified by the clear distinction 
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between “les anciens” and “les nouveaux Chinois” and by Mr Sinoui’s 
characterisation of the new migrants as the “Chinese from China”.510  
 
New Chinese migration since the mid-1990s 
 
The rate of new Chinese migration to Madagascar is relatively high 
compared to that of other African states. Based on informed conjecture, the 
number of Chinese nationals currently residing in Madagascar is estimated to be 
between 70,000 and 100,000.511 Most researchers place the total number of ethnic 
Chinese in Africa around 500,000.512 Exact figures on the growth of the new 
Chinese community in Madagascar are difficult to obtain for several reasons. 
Many new Chinese businesses, especially small-scale private enterprises, operate 
within Madagascar’s informal economy, and Chinese entrepreneurs often invest 
in Madagascar through Malagasy subsidiaries or private Malagasy companies, 
especially in the mining sector.513 The new Chinese community in Madagascar is 
also very fluid. Since the majority of Chinese entrepreneurs and traders reside in 
Madagascar on a temporary basis, the number of Chinese nationals in the country 
is in constant flux. Some may work in Madagascar, but still officially live in 
China, and regularly travel back and forth between the two countries on short-
term visas.  
Additionally, there is a dearth of reliable demographic statistics by both 
the Chinese and Malagasy governments. The Chinese embassy in Antananarivo 
encourages all Chinese nationals living in Madagascar to register with it, but not 
very many do so.514 The Malagasy government also requires Chinese nationals in 
Madagascar to chronicle their whereabouts through immigration and 
identification documents such as visas, residency and work permits, and 
temporary Malagasy national identity cards, but this request is frequently not 
honoured. In theory, all private Chinese migrants in Madagascar must obtain a 
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long-term visa from the Ministry of the Interior.515 Chinese migrants however 
sometimes share Malagasy identity and visa documents, and identity cards 
belonging to deceased Malagasy citizens of Chinese descent are often sold to the 
new Chinese on the informal market.516   
It is however clear that the new Chinese immigrant community in 
Madagascar is growing rather rapidly, and available information and personal 
research provides a broad picture of immigration rates to the island. Table 13 
illustrates the growth of the new Chinese population in Madagascar, meaning the 
growth of Chinese nationals who hold Chinese passports residing in Madagascar, 
since 1896, the year of the first census taken by the French colonial authorities. 
This database does not take into account members of the old Chinese community 
who possess only Malagasy passports.  
Table 13: The growth of Chinese nationals residing in Madagascar.  
Year Number of Chinese nationals living in Madagascar 
1896 50 
1904 452 
1909 512 
1921 935 
1931 1,805 
1939 3,372 
1941 3,637 
1951 4,900 
1958 8,039 
1961 8,900 
1967 9,203 
1972 10,000 
                                                
515 Interviews with the directors of the Asia Pacific section and Diplomatic Visa Services at the 
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2010. 
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1996 16,000 
2001 20,000 
2005 20,000 - 50,000 
2007 40,000 - 60,000 
2009 60,000 
2011 70,000 - 100,000 
Sources:  Author’s estimates derived from Fournet-Guérin, “La Nouvelle Immigration Chinoise”, 
45-57 and Vivre à Tananarive, Veeck and Diop, “Chinese Engagement in Africa”, 400-
418, Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor, and interviews with the Chinese deputy chief of mission 
at the Chinese embassy, April 22, 2011, the economic and commercial counsellor at the 
Chinese embassy, August 17, 2011, the vice-president of the Chinese congregation in 
Antananarivo, October 5, 2010, and the president of the Chinese Women’s Association, 
October 29, 2010. 
The growth patterns of official employment and business registration 
records also indicate that the new Chinese community in Madagascar has been 
developing relatively fast compared to other foreign resident groups in the 
country. The Malagasy government classifies the new Chinese (and all foreign 
residents) according to salaried, non-salaried, and inactive actors (which comprise 
the dependents of salaries and non-salaried actors). The majority of Chinese 
migrants in Madagascar are salaried professionals, followed by non-salaried and 
inactive actors. In 1999, the Chinese accounted for 25% of foreign salaried 
nationals in Madagascar. To put this in perspective, the French and Indo-Pakistani 
communities respectively accounted for 40% and 6,8% the same year.517 Between 
January 1st and December 6th, 2010, Chinese nationals lodged 181 applications for 
a Malagasy National Identity Card for Non-salaried Foreign Professionals 
(CIPENS), which all foreign salaried immigrants working in Madagascar must 
obtain. This exceeded the number of applications lodged by French nationals, 
who filed 101 requests, followed by 31 applications from Indian nationals, and 21 
by residents of other African countries (which were all grouped into one 
category).518 All Chinese businesses in Madagascar are also required to register 
with INSTAT when they launch their enterprises in Madagascar.519 As evidenced 
by table 14, the number of Chinese businesses catalogued by INSTAT has also 
grown significantly, especially over the past decade. Between January 1st, 2010 
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and July 20th, 2010, 215 new Chinese-owned businesses were registered. 
According to INSTAT the total number of all Chinese-owned businesses 
registered in Madagascar as of July 20th, 2010 is 1,428.520  
Table 14: Chinese businesses registered in Madagascar, 1990 – 2010. 
Year Number of new Chinese businesses registered in Madagascar 
1990 6 
1991 5 
1992 5 
1993 11 
1994 7 
1995 10 
1996 12 
1997 14 
1998 11 
1999 16 
2000 15 
2001 36 
2002 26 
2003 54 
2004 79 
2005 96 
2006 123 
                                                
520 Madagascar (INSTAT), Liste des Entreprises Chinois Enregistrées à Madagascar. In “Ils Ont 
Choisi l’Afrique”, Jeune Afrique, November 26, 2006, Airault noted that there were around 
2000 small-scale Chinese-owned businesses operating in Madagascar in 2006. Due to the 
factors described above, both INSTAT and Airault’s figures are probably conservative 
estimates.  
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2007 142 
2008 236 
2009 178 
- July 2010 215 
Source: Madagascar (INSTAT), Liste des Entreprises Chinois Enregistrées à Madagascar.  
 
From old to new: Chinese migrants in Behoririka 
 
The concentration of the new Chinese traders in Behoririka demonstrates 
how the existence of the resident Chinese community in Madagascar has 
facilitated the ease with which the new Chinese have been able to enter the 
Malagasy market. Close to 90% of the new Chinese businesses registered in 
Madagascar are concentrated in specific commercial districts in Antananarivo, 
where the urban setting of the new community facilitates interactions with retail 
customers.521 Although the new Chinese are increasingly moving into other 
centrally located districts such as Ampefiloha, Antanimena, and Mahamasina, 
Behoririka, and to a lesser extent Ivato, remain the commercial hubs of the new 
Chinese traders in Antananarivo. The first new Chinese entrepreneur opened a 
shop in Behoririka in the mid-1990s. Between 1998 and 2005, the number of 
Chinese-owned shops in Behoririka increased from 40 to over 500.522 When the 
new Chinese migrants began arriving in Madagascar, they usually launched their 
enterprises in Behoririka because it was the social hub of the old Chinese 
community. 
Behoririka has historically been known as a district with a large number of 
Sino-Malagasy residents. The traditional centre of Chinese social organisation in 
the city, the Chinese congregation of Antananarivo, has been headquartered in the 
area since the 1920s. Before the influx of the new Chinese, the landscape in 
Behoririka was dominated by the presence of slums and low-lying buildings 
around the banks of an artificial lake dating from the colonial era. The area was 
known more as a district with a heavy Chinese population than for its economic 
vibrancy. Behoririka, “once a working class district, characterised by the presence 
of slums on the lakeshore, which contributed to the area’s bad reputation (liquor 
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outlets, shady dealings, families living on the streets) has been given a completely 
new look through the presence of Chinese commercial activity”.523 In 1996, the 
Malagasy municipality tore down the slum structures and instigated a period of 
rehabilitation, during which several of the new Chinese shopping complexes were 
constructed. Map 3 shows the geographical distribution of Chinese traders in 
Antananarivo. The labels in red identify Behoririka and Ivato, and those marked 
in yellow denote the other districts that are increasingly witnessing a smaller 
influx of Chinese traders.  
Map 3: The geographical distribution of Chinese traders in Antananarivo. 
 
 
 
Behoririka is relatively small in terms of area, but it is one of the city’s 
most economically active boroughs. Chinese-built shopping complexes, some of 
                                                
523 Fournet-Guerin, “La Nouvelle Immigration Chinoise”, 45-57, p. 46. 
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them four or five stories high, line its main thoroughfare, which is always bustling 
with vendors and consumers. Each complex harbours hundreds of little shops 
averaging 4 m², and one of them boasts the only public escalator in the city. 
Larger Chinese chain stores cover the upper floors, and several of the complexes 
have opened authentic Chinese-style food courts at the top levels. In Behoririka, 
one can find almost any type of manufactured item, from plastic toys, electronic 
devices, clothes, hats, bags, jewellery, kitchen and household appliances, wigs, 
cosmetics, blankets, to fake flowers. Photographs 4 and 5 show the Avance 
Centre in Behoririka, a large shopping complex dominated by retailers selling 
clothes, toys, and accessories, whose entrance is adorned by Chinese and 
Malagasy flags, and a shopping complex dedicated to selling Chinese electronic 
goods. 
Photograph 4: The Avance shopping centre in Behoririka. 
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Photograph 5: The Tin Qiu Electric City shopping centre in Behoririka. 
 
 
The expansion of new Chinese networks in Madagascar  
 
The majority of new Chinese migrants come to Madagascar through 
personal kinship or business networks.524 Out of the 25 small-scale Chinese 
traders in Behoririka who arrived in Madagascar over the past five years, 23 had 
moved to the island after hearing about business opportunities in the country from 
                                                
524 This section is based on information derived from 25 small-scale Chinese traders that owned or 
worked in one of the shops selling imported goods from China in Antananarivo in 2010 and 
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Chinese and local employees, the origin of their products, from whom they rented or leased 
their shop, how they perceived the Malagasy business environment, what types of interactions 
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what they thought of living and working in Madagascar. 
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a relative or friend who had previously worked in Madagascar. Most of the traders 
live with other Chinese migrants, who are often relatives or friends from China, in 
small apartments, and are solely in Madagascar on a short-term basis to “do 
business”.525 The small-scale entrepreneurial migrants plan to return to China in 
the relatively near future and conceive of their temporary residency in 
Madagascar as something akin to a necessary evil in order to make money 
quickly. As one of the traders stated: “everybody I know in Madagascar is here 
for only one reason: to make as much money as possible and then return to China 
once they think they have made enough”.526 He seemed very adamant that this 
was to him a business opportunity and that he was not particularly interested in 
socialising with the Malagasy or integrating with Malagasy society. Another 
concurred that he does not plan to remain in the country for too long, but if his 
business is good he will stay.527  
The experiences of Sylvain Liu and Ren Yujie in turn exemplify the 
pertinence of Chinese networks at the state level. Mr. Liu arrived in Madagascar 
in 2000 to work for SOGECOA, but resigned from his job in 2004 to become an 
independent businessman. After leaving SOGECOA, he decided to learn French 
and bought “Madagascar Découverte”, a travel agency and tour operator. He 
utilised his business connections in China to promote his company there. In 2005, 
the Chinese government sanctioned Mr. Liu’s company as the sole travel agency 
for official Chinese visitors, and it is today a preferred provider for Chinese 
tourists. After a significant slump in tourism in 2009 and 2010, 2011 was a very 
successful year for Mr. Liu, with around 2,000 clients requesting his company’s 
services. Half of his clients were private tourists, and the other half consisted of 
prospective businessmen scouting the country for economic opportunities. Having 
fostered his connections with the Chinese state, Mr. Liu recently ventured into the 
construction sector and is increasingly contracting projects to Chinese SOEs.528 
Mr. Ren, on the other hand, arrived in Madagascar as part of a Chinese 
government-sponsored medical mission in 1992. Upon his return to China, he 
noted how cheap everyday household goods were in China compared to 
Madagascar, and realised he could profit considerably by importing and selling 
these goods in Madagascar. 529  
After launching their enterprises in Madagascar, the more successful 
Chinese entrepreneurs utilise the Chinese business networks and supply chains to 
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528 Interview with Mr. Liu, August 25, 2011. 
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develop and diversify their economic activities. There are several established 
names among the new Chinese business community, including Mr. Ren.  Mr. Ren 
became an importer when he bought his own retail space in 1997 and began 
selling general merchandise such as clothes, shoes, and blankets from China. As a 
trained neurosurgeon who first visited Madagascar with a Chinese medical 
mission, he was interested in opening his own practice. However, the lack of 
trained staff and equipment in Madagascar rendered this impossible and made it 
more lucrative for him to become involved in the import-export business.530 When 
Ravalomanana cut import taxes on electronic goods after 2002, he began 
importing electronics.531 He now owns Bao Lai Electronics, with storefronts along 
Independence Avenue (the main street in downtown Antananarivo), in Soalala 
(adjacent to Behoririka) and in Toamasina. Bao Lai is today the Malagasy 
distributor for Sichuan Changhong Electric (Changhong). Similarly, Shang Liang, 
a successful entrepreneur from Guangxi who started his career in Madagascar in 
the early-1990s, also began by importing shoes and clothes from China to 
Madagascar. After having accumulated sufficient capital, he created a wholesale 
export company and now exports primary products such as fish, wood, coffee, 
cloves, and raffia from Madagascar to Asian countries, including Vietnam, Japan, 
Singapore, and China, through his new business, Perle Trade Company. 532   
Likewise, Kai Guo Wei, from Fujian, first disembarked in Madagascar as 
a temporary economic migrant at the suggestion of his uncle in 1994 and began 
his career by importing and selling shoes and clothes. Mr. Kai has expanded 
considerably his activities since he first arrived in Madagascar almost two 
decades ago. He began as a small-scale trader, but this undertaking proved 
successful enough for him to eventually begin importing electronic goods, 
household appliances, furniture, and other, larger manufactured items from China 
to Madagascar. Due to the growing numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs who began 
moving to Madagascar to start their own import businesses in the 2000s and the 
increasingly negative image associated with the Chinese products in Madagascar, 
Mr. Kai has recently changed careers. He launched a real estate business and 
created the Globe Company, shown in photograph 6, which leases buildings and 
shops to new Chinese immigrants.  
  
Photograph 6: The Globe Company headquarters in Behoririka. 
                                                
530 Interview with Mr. Ren, October 27, 2010.  
531 Interview with Mr. Ren, October 27, 2010. 
532 Interview with Mr. Shang, November 8, 2010. 
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These Chinese immigrants have become so economically successful in 
Madagascar that they are inclined to remain in the country indefinitely.533 As the 
new Chinese in Madagascar stay longer, have children, and put down roots, a 
community of new Chinese is forming that may begin to expand through natural 
demographic growth in much the same way that the old one did. These migrants 
have proven themselves adept at adapting to both Madagascar’s uncertain 
economic and political environment and the recent increase in competition from 
newer Chinese migrants. Mr Shang, who lives in an affluent district of 
Antananarivo frequented by the expat community with his family, views 
Madagascar as his new home. 534 Likewise, although Mr Liu travels to China 
every three months he plans to stay in Madagascar for at least another five to six 
years since “business is good”. Mr. Kai’s son, who hopes to stay in Madagascar 
because he grew up in the country and believes he has better business 
opportunities there than in China, is another example of a temporary 
                                                
533 See Haugen and Carling, “Baihuo Business”, 639-662, for another example of this occurring in 
Cape Verde.  
534 Interview with Mr. Shang, November 8, 2010.  
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entrepreneurial migrant who may turn into a permanent resident of 
Madagascar.535  
As a result, Chinese business networks in Madagascar are becoming 
formalised through the creation of business associations, which is shifting power 
relations among the old and new Chinese. The Association of Chinese Commerce 
and Entrepreneurs in Madagascar (ACECMA) was formed in 2007 after an 
attempt to install a new, Mandarin-speaking Chinese as president of the traditional 
Chinese congregation failed in 2006.536 The ACECMA currently has about 300 
individual members who represent 90 companies. Members of the old Chinese 
community have been invited to join the association, and occupy positions of 
minor importance, such as “honorary president”.537 When they first arrived in 
Madagascar, the Chinese entrepreneurs who are now leaders in the new Chinese 
community, such as Mr. Shang and Mr. Liu, sought out important figures from 
the old community, such as Mr. George, for advice concerning their lives and 
businesses in Madagascar. New Chinese arrivals seeking guidance now contact 
individuals such as Mr. Shang or Mr. Liu, not members of the old Chinese 
community.538  
Since the old and new Chinese are usually active in different parts of the 
economy, some members of the old Chinese community are also beginning to 
exploit the presence of new Chinese networks in the country. The owner of Sam 
Kocwa, an electronic store on Independence Avenue in downtown Antananarivo, 
provides an example of how this is occurring. His parents are both Chinese 
immigrants who arrived in the 1930s, and he grew up collecting vanilla for his 
father in the rural regions around Toamasina. His family moved to Antananarivo 
in the 1940s so that the children could attend the Chinese school located there. 
Two decades ago, he inserted himself into the small but growing new Chinese 
business community and was one of the first Sino-Malagasy to begin directly 
purchasing large quantities of electronics from manufacturers in China. He 
decided to sell electronic goods from China because he saw a niche in the market 
and realised that new economic opportunities would become available for him in 
the wake of China’s economic opening. His business has been so successful that 
                                                
535 Interview with Mr. Kaz, October 6, 2010. 
536 Interview with the president of the Chinese Women’s Association in Antananarivo, October 29, 
2010. 
537 This information is derived from an ACECMA brochure given to me by Mr Shang. According 
to the brochure, ACECMA was formed to promote Chinese businesses and solidarity in 
Madagascar, ameliorate the image of Chinese business in Madagascar, foster technical and 
scientific exchanges between Madagascar and China, and reinforce collaboration between itself 
and Malagasy business associations as well as the government. 
538 Interview with a private investor from Hong Kong, March 22, 2010. 
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he also sells wholesale to larger companies and rents out three villas that he 
owns.539 In another example, Marcelle Chang created the Malagasy-Chinese 
Business Council (MCBC) in 2004, a loose organisation of businessmen with 
around 30 members, to “bridge the divide between the old and new Chinese 
communities, and between the Chinese and Malagasy populations more 
generally”.540 As a member of the resident Chinese community in Madagascar, 
Mr. Chang was able to call on existing contacts within the Malagasy elite to 
further mutual benefit between the new Chinese and Malagasy business 
communities.541 He created the MCBC with Ntsoa Randriamifidimanana, director 
of Pointe Pacom, an influential Malagasy distributor for construction material, 
Fidy Raharimanana, president of Harson Development, Ramaroson Au Taive 
Paul, a Chinese-Malagasy based in Hong Kong and Shunde, as well as Jacky 
Radavidra, an influential entrepreneur and father-in-law of Marc Ravalomanana’s 
daughter.542  
 
The impacts of Chinese business networks on local entrepreneurs 
 
Malagasy entrepreneurs are also increasingly benefitting from the 
expansion of Chinese business networks in the country, through both the small-
scale Chinese traders and the more successful entrepreneurs. Malagasy employees 
work in many of the Chinese shops, the Malagasy rent property to the Chinese, 
and some Malagasy have begun to purchase Chinese goods from the traders to 
sell themselves. This is occurring to such an extent that Pellerin and Fournet-
Guérin have criticised the use of the term “Chinatown” for Behoririka as 
misleading. 543  Bao Lai Electronics, for instance, employs approximately 80 
Malagasy and three new Chinese (the latter of which occupy the managerial 
positions).544 The Malagasy also legally own the retail space from which the 
Chinese conduct their business. Although Chinese entrepreneurial migrants 
manage all of the shopping complexes, they have to lease the buildings from a 
Malagasy for a maximum of 99 years because a foreigner is not allowed to buy 
land in Madagascar. The Chinese who lease entire buildings thus also rent out 
                                                
539 Interview with the owner of Sam Kocwa, August 30, 2011. 
540 Interview with Mr. Chang, November 24, 2011. 
541  Mr.Chang’s ancestors had arrived in Madagascar in 1900. Interview with Mr. Chang, 
November 24, 2011. 
542 Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor. 
543 Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor and Fournet-Guérin, Vivre à Tananarive.  
544 Interview with Mr. Ren, October 27, 2010. 
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shops inside these buildings to Malagasy entrepreneurs. 545  Local entrepreneurs 
sometimes choose to buy products from the Chinese importers at wholesale prices 
and then sell them in smaller shops or stalls on the streets of Behoririka. By 
moving into wholesale, the Malagasy merchants remove themselves from direct 
competition with Chinese retailers and enhance their competitiveness by being 
able to lower their prices. Photographs 7 and 8 depict Malagasy entrepreneurs 
selling clothes and plastic sandals imported from China from stalls on the street in 
Behoririka.  
 
Photograph 7: Malagasy vendors selling clothes imported from China.  
 
 
Photograph 8: Malagasy vendors selling sandals imported from China.  
                                                
545 World Wildlife Fund, Briefing Note: Madagascar.  
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Although the Chinese traders are themselves concentrated in 
Antananarivo, the expansion of Chinese supply chains to local entrepreneurs also 
means that low-cost consumer items are increasingly reaching remote parts of the 
country. These supply chains are not replacing existing ones, but introducing new 
goods to rural areas and generating options for the Malagasy to work as 
distributors. Chinese phones began arriving in Belon' i Tsiribihina, a small town 
on Madagascar’s northwestern coast, in 2007 through the efforts of local 
entrepreneurs who travelled to Antananarivo, purchased the goods, and brought 
them back to the town. Mobile phones were unknown then, but they are now 
commonplace. More townspeople currently possess cellular phones than they do 
landlines, which were laid in 2006.546 Chinese goods have extended to areas of 
the country that are not frequently accessed by manufactured goods or national 
telecommunication networks. Similar to what has been observed by Kohnert, in 
Madagascar, “notwithstanding the growing divide between today’s Chinese 
entrepreneurial diasporas on the one hand and rival groups of local entrepreneurs 
on the other, there has been long-standing, effective collaboration at the 
                                                
546 Discussion with a resident of Belon ‘i Tsiribihina, October 19, 2010. 
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grassroots level between the different trading diasporas. This collaboration is 
based on the division of labour and on the comparative advantage of each group’s 
innovation culture. This cooperation has also contributed to nationwide poverty 
reduction, particularly through the provision of cheap basic consumer goods to 
even the most remote corners of the hinterland”.547 
The case of the Malagasy Paper Company (PAPMAD) demonstrates how 
Chinese business networks exposed a Malagasy company to global supply chains 
based in China. This allowed the former to increase its productivity and enhance 
its competitiveness vis-à-vis similar Chinese imports on the local market. 
PAPMAD, the only paper company in the Indian Ocean region, has been in 
operation in Madagascar since 1963. PAPMAD was successful for over 40 years 
until it had to terminate its operations due to increased competition from imported 
paper products (paper products feature quite high on the list of Malagasy imports 
from China). In Madagascar, it is rumoured that PAPMAD also suffered from 
Ravalomanana’s economic policies, and that it was one of the companies 
disenfranchised by the growing presence of the TIKO group in many sectors of 
the Malagasy market. With the installation of the HAT, PAPMAD’s prospects 
seem to have risen again. PAPMAD re-entered the market in 2009, having 
decided to produce only recycled paper. It launched a new toilet-paper line, priced 
it beneath the Chinese-imported equivalent, and took advantage of the widespread 
sentiment that Chinese products are of bad quality. It gambled that a lower price 
would induce more customers to choose its product.  
In order to implement this strategy, PAPMAD utilised its growing 
personal connections with Chinese businessmen in Madagascar to purchase three 
new industrial printing machines from a Chinese company based in Beijing. Large 
German and Italian companies dominate the market for industrial printing 
machines, but the Chinese company was better suited to PAPMAD’s needs for 
several reasons. It produced paper-producing machines on a smaller scale than the 
European industrialists, the technology needed to operate the machines was 
simpler and less reliant on expensive parts, and the Chinese were willing to sell 
the Malagasy company the machines at a low price and at the production capacity 
that it needed. In addition, while the deal was being negotiated, the Chinese 
company offered to fly a representative from PAPMAD to China to inspect the 
machines before buying them, exemplifying the importance of personal 
relationships within these business networks. Three Chinese technicians 
subsequently travelled to Antananarivo to install the machines and train 
PAPMAD employees in their usage, raising the potential for skills transfers. Since 
                                                
547 Kohnert, “Chinese and Nigerian Cultures of Innovation”, 1-31, p. 24.  
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these men spoke only Mandarin, PAPMAD hired a young Malagasy woman who 
had studied Mandarin at the Confucius Institute in Antananarivo to act as an 
interpreter. PAPMAD has expressed complete satisfaction with the Chinese 
machines and doing business with the Chinese company in general. PAPMAD 
now produces only recycled paper, which is also very positive for the 
environment, and more generally for sustainable development prospects in 
Madagascar.548  
The Chinese government has played a role in facilitating private Sino-
Malagasy economic exchanges. It indirectly helped PAPMAD negotiate with the 
Chinese company by investing in the creation of the Confucius Institute at the 
University of Antananarivo in 2008. 549  The inauguration of the Confucius 
Institute in Madagascar is a form of Chinese investment in Malagasy human 
capital formation, since the proliferation of the Chinese language in Africa 
through these institutes is itself an example of how China has promoted the 
Chinese language as an economic tool for development.550 Most of the students 
learning Mandarin at the Institute already possess a bachelor’s degree, and are 
studying Mandarin to increase their employability. Several are mature-age 
students from the old Chinese community wishing to connect with their Chinese 
brethren and “stay with the times”, but the majority of them are Malagasy.551 
Every year, the Institute subsidises 20 Malagasy students to continue their studies 
in Han-ban, China. Many students who study Mandarin at the Institute receive job 
offers from both Chinese businesses in Madagascar and Malagasy businesses with 
ties to China. Due to the success of the Institute, it has opened up branches in 
Toamasina and Fianarantsoa as well. 
China actively promotes the fostering of Sino-Malagasy business links. In 
2010, China extended an invitation to Malagasy business associations to attend 
the 11th Western China International Fair in Chengdu in order to explore 
economic opportunities in China and display Malagasy goods. To encourage their 
participation, the Chinese government proposed to pay for transport costs, 
accommodation, and a tour of local tourist sites for one representative of each 
                                                
548 Interview with the director of PAPMAD, March 3, 2012. 
549 Confucius Institutes are Chinese-government-supported language training institutes supported 
by the Chinese Ministry of Education, with headquarters at the Office of Chinese Language 
Council International in Han-ban, China. The Chinese government supplies the Institute’s 
furniture and equipment but the Institute’s budget consists of student fees. A Chinese-
Malagasy woman and a professor from China jointly direct the Institute. Madagascar’s 
Confucius Institute was inaugurated under a partnership agreement with Jiangxi Normal 
University. The Institute offers classes in Mandarin and Chinese cultural and business norms, 
and regularly hosts cultural events with visiting performers from China.  
550 Hoogenbosch, Chinese as a Commodity. 
551 Interview with a teacher at the Confucius Institute, October 4, 2010. 
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Malagasy company that was invited.552 China also offers numerous scholarships 
for Malagasy students and government employees in China, and invites Malagasy 
public servants to participate in forums, conferences, and technical training 
seminars in China. Every year, the Chinese government pays for 120-150 
Malagasy students to receive higher education and training in China. Training and 
workshop themes include business management strategies, training for the hybrid 
rice project, strategies for the promotion of exports, and the management of joint-
venture projects. 
China’s engagement in Madagascar has increased bi-directional business 
and migratory flows between China and Madagascar. Small numbers of Malagasy 
entrepreneurs are travelling to China to engage in business on a temporary basis. 
The director of the Group of Malagasy Enterprises (GEM), a prominent local 
business association, accepted the invitation to attend the trade fair in Chengdu 
and flew to China in October 2010 to showcase her company’s products. This was 
not her first time in China, as she regularly flies to Guangzhou to display her 
wares at other events and to purchase Chinese goods to sell in Madagascar.553 
Some Malagasy have also begun to create new businesses in China that service 
the influx of temporary Malagasy entrepreneurs in Guangzhou. An individual 
from the old Chinese community recently opened several hotels in Guangzhou 
that offer interpretation and intermediation services to Malagasy entrepreneurs 
wishing to conduct business in China.554 Malagasy entrepreneurs thus form part of 
the emerging African trading communities in Guangzhou.555 
By maintaining that Chinese migrants could stimulate local 
entrepreneurship in Madagascar through knowledge transfers and business 
networks, I am  drawing on the “flying geese” model of latecomer development, 
which is arguably beginning to take shape in Madagascar at a small-scale and 
localised level. As Chinese entrepreneurial migration to Madagascar has 
accelerated over the past decade, Malagasy entrepreneurs have profited from the 
increase in economic activity. After markets for a certain product became 
crowded, some Chinese diversified into other areas of the economy and Malagasy 
began to fill the vacuum. Many Malagasy that are originally hired by a Chinese 
become successful merchants themselves because they know the market well, 
they have a better appreciation of local demand, and they are more trusted by the 
Malagasy clients. This shift in market share is currently occurring in the 
electronics industry, which is forcing some of the new Chinese entrepreneurs to 
                                                
552 Interview with the director of the GEM, November 16, 2010. 
553 Interview with the director of the GEM, November 16, 2010. 
554 Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor.  
555 See Bodomo, “African trading Community in Guangzhou”, 693-707. 
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move away from the import-export sector to areas such as fishing and mining.556 
A similar phenomenon occurred with the movement of Chinese entrepreneurs 
from Mauritius to Madagascar in the textile and export sectors. As the Mauritian 
economy began to develop rapidly in the 1990s, local textile factories began to 
move from Mauritius to Madagascar, which by then had much lower wages and a 
significantly larger work force and was benefitting from preferable trade terms 
with the US under the AGOA. Mauritius, on the other hand, has moved into other, 
more mature sectors, such as banking, and is modelling itself as a technology hub. 
Chinese SOEs are now setting up a new EPZ in Mauritius, while many smaller 
Chinese firms have moved on to less mature markets such as Madagascar.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has elucidated the growth and characteristics of 
Madagascar’s two Chinese migrant communities and discussed the relevance of 
Chinese business and kinship networks in Madagascar in enhancing local 
opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship. Relationships are crucial 
factors for success among diaspora communities operating in foreign countries 
with frail regulatory frameworks and little judicial protection of local social safety 
nets, and this also appears to be the case in Madagascar, where personal 
relationships matter at the political and everyday level.557 Although the old 
Chinese community gradually lessened their relations with their homeland 
because of French colonial policies, by virtue of their Chinese ethnicity, the new 
Chinese are slowly re-awakening dormant kinship ties between the Sino-
Malagasy and the “Chinese from China”. The existence of the resident Chinese 
community in the country helps explain the relatively high rate of new Chinese 
migration. The fact that the majority of new Chinese traders chose to open their 
shops in Behoririka, the former bastion of the old Chinese community in 
Antananarivo, implies that they took advantage of the integration between the old 
Chinese community and Malagasy society to position themselves as less foreign 
and thus more amenable to the Malagasy consumer. The new Chinese migrants 
have in turn utilised existing personal connections with family or business 
partners in their homeland to launch their enterprises in Madagascar, and continue 
                                                
556 “Une Petite Vendeuse Chez les Chinois Devient une Grossiste des Produits Electroniques”, 
Xinhua News, August 19, 2011. 
557 See Fafchamp and Minten, “Relationships and Traders”, 1-35, for a treatment of personal 
relationships among rural traders in Madagascar.  
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to rely on business networks to sustain their operations, some of which have 
become very successful.  
The extent to which elements of this success will carry over into the local 
population will depend on the levels of Sino-Malagasy interactions. The small-
scale traders, who are overwhelmingly temporary economic migrants, display 
little desire to integrate socially with Malagasy society. Yet these traders, who 
impact the lives of the Malagasy population on a day-to-day basis and who are the 
most visible aspect of the new Chinese engagement to the majority of the 
Malagasy population, will influence the developmental impacts of Sino-Malagasy 
links in important ways. They provide jobs to the Malagasy and they constitute an 
entry point for Malagasy entrepreneurs to integrate with global supply chains. The 
more successful new Chinese entrepreneurs are beginning to formalise their 
business networks through the creation of business associations. Many of them 
will remain in the country longer than they had originally anticipated, and they 
have already begun to foster closer economic relations with some members of the 
Malagasy economic elite. Their offspring might be born in Madagascar and 
develop similar types of mixed Sino-Malagasy identities that have been evidenced 
by members of the old Chinese community, possibly increasing levels of 
interaction in the future.  
I have argued that Chinese entrepreneurial migrants can help facilitate 
local entrepreneurship in Madagascar by introducing new business networks and 
supply chains into the economy. The issue under investigation is however not 
simply one about business networks, but about information transfers, and 
critically about Malagasy entrepreneurs rising to the multitude of challenges 
presented by the Chinese competition. Malagasy entrepreneurs have not begun to 
move into manufacturing in any serious capacity. So far, the relationship is 
restricted to one of knowledge transfers, which is an important first step, but 
which should not constitute the end goal. Nonetheless, the Malagasy traders who 
are purchasing wholesale goods from the Chinese, the local entrepreneurs and 
companies who are utilising Chinese supply chains business networks to compete 
against the Chinese, or those who are flying to China to locate the source of 
supplies directly, demonstrate that Malagasy entrepreneurs are increasingly taking 
advantage of new Sino-Malagasy links. Since these are both nurtured and created 
by the new Chinese migrants, this particular aspect of China’s engagement in 
Madagascar seems to be providing incentives for local private sector growth.  
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Chapter 6: Mitigating negative perceptions and impacts  
  
Introduction 
 
Despite the existence of positive impacts, the new Chinese presence in the 
country is generally perceived as negative. To the Malagasy public, China’s 
engagement is most palpable through the availability of Chinese products on the 
market and the visibility of the Chinese traders themselves. The low quality of 
Chinese imports is sometimes considered as evidence that the new Chinese “look 
down” on the Malagasy. Negative labour relations and cultural misunderstandings 
between Chinese employers and their Malagasy employees complicate an 
otherwise beneficial relationship in terms of employment. The Chinese are also 
widely viewed as unscrupulously furthering their business interests in Madagascar 
through a myriad of illegal and semi-legal methods, including the evasion of local 
laws and regulations. The growth of Chinese crime syndicates who oversee many 
of these illegal operations and are involved in the trafficking of endangered 
animals, gemstones, and precious woods has done little to dispel negative 
opinions of the new Chinese. Yet while some sources of distrust are real and 
important, others are founded on rumours and unconfirmed accusations, and 
depend to a significant degree on state presence, withdrawal, and policy.  
The underlying issues influencing the negative perceptions and impacts 
arising from the Chinese engagement are structural and political. Several local 
companies have been forced out of the market due to the proliferation of cheaper 
Chinese goods, but the Malagasy state has done little to protect local 
entrepreneurs from excessive or unfair competition from Chinese imports or to 
encourage Chinese investment in local manufacturing instead. The local textile 
industry serves as a good example of how the influx of Chinese entrepreneurs has 
both aided and harmed local production. In the late-1980s, Madagascar 
successfully created an EPZ for low-value exports, which attracted many Chinese 
textile firms that contributed favourably to employment rates, skills transfers, and 
export rates. The EPZ has suffered a tremendous decline since the loss of AGOA 
after the political crisis of 2009, and most of the Chinese firms have moved on to 
other African countries. Today, Chinese textile imports have forced most of 
Madagascar’s major textile producers to shut down. Similarly, the Malagasy state 
plays a large role in managing the environmental impacts arising from Chinese 
investments, especially in the extractive industries. Madagascar’s regulatory 
framework to manage the environmental or social spill-overs is inadequate and 
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frail, and much of the discretion to comply with existing regulations or engage in 
environmentally sustainable investment practices lies with the Chinese companies 
themselves. As China’s engagements in Madagascar’s mining and petroleum 
sectors grow, the issue of environmental degradation will become increasingly 
pertinent for the Malagasy state.   
Although some of the negative impacts that will be discussed in this 
chapter had already arisen during Ravalomanana’s time in office, they were 
minimised because China’s engagement was incorporated into his economic 
development plans, which were broadly successful in enhancing local wellbeing. 
Since 2009, the ability of the state to regulate and manage China’s engagement in 
a manner that benefits the Malagasy population is progressively being eroded. 
This is due to the general deterioration in the rule of law, increased corruption, 
and, with the suspension of most donor support, the need for the HAT to find new 
sources of funding. The politicisation of the mining sector, where Chinese firms 
use their personal contacts with members of the HAT to circumvent 
environmental regulations, is indicative of this. Local authorities and prominent 
members of the HAT have also been directly implicated in trafficking scandals 
involving the Chinese crime syndicates.  
In this chapter, I explore local perceptions of the Chinese engagement, 
assess their validity, and show that the responsibility to mitigate the negative 
impacts arising from the Chinese engagement ultimately rests with the Malagasy 
government. I proceed by exploring how local perceptions of the Chinese among 
the majority of Malagasy are shaped in the marketplace. Next, I ascertain how 
negative perceptions are fuelled by a Chinese disregard for local customs, which 
sometimes translates into tense relations between Chinese employers and their 
Malagasy employees. I then demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs do have a 
tendency to overlook Malagasy laws and regulations, and discuss the growth of 
Chinese crime syndicates in the country. I utilise the examples of the textile sector 
and the extractive industries to demonstrate that the impacts of Chinese 
investments on the local economy are to a large degree contingent on government 
policies. Lastly, I examine the ways in which the Chinese presence has become 
especially politicised under the HAT.  
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The shaping of local perceptions  
 
Despite the familiarity between the Malagasy and the old Chinese, the new 
Chinese immigrants are received as strangers, and as the “other”. 558  An 
interviewee noted: “they [the Malagasy] don’t really know yet how to act with 
them [the Chinese]. They do not really understand their culture and logic yet.”559 
The Karana community once posed an identity threat by virtue of its dominant 
economic position, but the new Chinese have increasingly assumed this role: “the 
arrival of a new group of immigrants, who clearly stand out owing to the fact that 
they live in urban areas and make their presence felt in economic spheres to do 
with consumerism, has led to a partial shift in the position of outlets for Malagasy 
frustrations with the new Chinese now taking on the role of scapegoats”.560 This 
occurred in 2009, when pro-Rajoelina demonstrators looted several Chinese 
shopping centres in Behoririka as the coup d’état was unfolding in the capital.  
Local anger towards the Chinese is largely shaped by features of the 
Chinese presence that are tangible to the majority of Malagasy, such as the low 
quality of many of the Chinese goods on the market.561 The Malagasy believe that 
the majority of Chinese wares bound for Madagascar constitute the lowest, or “3rd 
tier” of Chinese goods made for export. It is held that “1st and 2nd tier products go 
to the European, American, and other Asian markets, and 3rd tier goods, the so-
called Africa-grade, are explicitly produced in China for export to Africa”.562 
Other wares are often thought to be counterfeit, which is viewed as evidence that 
the Chinese traders are “tricking” the Malagasy consumer into buying false 
products.563 As a result, Malagasy consumers purchase Chinese goods with more 
trepidation than they do other foreign or locally produced products. For instance, 
a local grassroots consumer organisation (FIMPA), formed in response to 
numerous complaints against the low quality of Chinese products and the 
circumventions of laws by Chinese traders in 1998, was alerted to the case of a 
rural villager who had complained to the village chief about a strange smell 
emanating from flour he had bought at a Chinese grocery shop. The villager 
                                                
558 Amadhila, “Grassroots Perceptions”, 17-45, p. 25.  
559 Interview with the president of the Platform for the Organisation of Malagasy Civil Society for 
the Environment, September 16, 2011. 
560 Fournet-Guerin, “La Nouvelle Immigration Chinoise”, 45-57, p. 53. 
561 Midi Madagasikara, 2012.  
562 Interview with the director of consumer protection at the Malagasy Ministry of Commerce, 
December 2, 2010. 
563 Interview with the director of Sipromad, September 29, 2011.  
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acknowledged that while he would have been cautious about using flour that had 
an unusual smell, he only made a formal complaint because the product had been 
imported from China.564 An especially galvanising incident occurred in 2007 
when FIMPA was asked to assist a young boy who had to be admitted to hospital 
after a plastic yo-yo manufactured in China and sold in Madagascar leaked a 
hazardous liquid substance onto his skin.565  
It is also widely believed that Chinese companies prefer to utilise convict 
labour from China rather than hire local Malagasy workers for their large 
construction projects in the country. 566 It is rumoured that 800 Malagasy and 400 
Chinese criminals who had been brought over to work off or reduce their 
sentences in China built the five-star hotel and ICC in Ivato. By importing their 
own labour, Chinese companies are thought to be contributing to unemployment 
rates in the country.567 This position was iterated not only by Malagasy citizens, 
but also by employees of the IFIs in Antananarivo, which indicates a severe lack 
of knowledge concerning China’s engagements in the country among both the 
locals and foreign residents. 568 As Sautman and Yan argue, “while the rumour 
[that the Chinese import convict labour] often originates at the grassroots in 
developing countries, it is promoted locally and globally by political, economic, 
and media elites with distinct agendas that often involve building support for 
opposition parties, competition in obtaining contracts, or geo-strategic and 
ideological rivalry”.569  
Some of the new Chinese traders and companies do have a propensity to 
disregard local customs.  A story involving COMPLANT’s apparent indifference 
for the customs of the Sakalava, who inhabit the region around the company’s 
sugar plant in Morondava, reveals how the behaviour of members of the new 
Chinese community sometimes fuel the proliferation of negative perceptions. 
There exist many different fady (social taboos) among the various ethnic groups 
in the country that are based on ancestral worship. Pointing with your index finger 
may be forbidden in one region, but not viewed as offensive in another. Among 
the Sakalava, it is customary to ask the local queen for her blessing before 
undertaking any major new project or important activity. Upon being awarded the 
rights to manage the sugar plant in Sakalava territory, COMPLANT began 
upgrading the factory with significant construction work without having first 
                                                
564 Interview with the director of FIMPA, December 6, 2010.  
565 Interview with the director of FIMPA, December 6, 2010.  
566 Interview with a member of the old Chinese community, September 22, 2010. 
567 Interview with a professor at the Catholic University of Antananarivo, August 16, 2011. 
568 Interview with a former Malagasy employee of the IMF, October 28, 2010. 
569 Sautman and Yan, “Chasing Ghosts”, 398-418, p. 398. 
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sought the blessing of the Sakalava queen. Sugar production at the factory 
initially suffered from a poor sugarcane harvest, but once COMPLANT requested 
an audience with the queen, the sugarcane flourished. Since then, production rates 
at the factory have increased exponentially. Several Malagasy have attributed this 
to the fact that the Chinese company had angered the local spirits by not adhering 
to the custom of soliciting the queen’s goodwill. Allegedly, once they relented 
and followed the “Malagasy methods of doing business”, they prospered. 570 
Other provocative events tend to involve the treatment of Malagasy 
employees by their Chinese employers. This occurred in 2010 when a Chinese 
production manager at a sugar plant owned by COMPLANT reversed a cooking 
pot in which Malagasy workers had been preparing their lunch. The latter 
responded by collectively striking for 48 hours. The regional boss of the 
company, a Malagasy, subsequently fired the Chinese manager of production. The 
incident became a national political scandal and culminated in the deportation and 
permanent expulsion of the Chinese production manager from Madagascar in 
September 2010. 571 The discovery at the end of 2010 by agents from the 
Malagasy National Fund for Social Welfare that a Chinese manager of a building 
project in Behoririka had hit a female employee also degenerated into a national 
scandal.572 Although the events described above did not cause violent public 
outrage, others have resulted in large-scale hostility against Chinese 
entrepreneurs. In 2011, a confrontation between a Chinese shop owner and his 
Malagasy employee resulted in the rioting of 3,000-5,000 increasingly agitated 
Malagasy on the streets in Behoririka. The Chinese employer, who owned a store 
selling shoes in the Venice shopping complex, had accused his employee of 
attempting to steal sandals. According to the shop owner, a client had bought 
seven pairs of sandals, but the employee had taken 26 pairs out of the stockroom 
and planned to peddle the spare shoes himself. The employee denied the 
allegation, and the discussion escalated until the Chinese shop owner struck his 
Malagasy worker, who had to be evacuated to a hospital. The Malagasy rioters 
eventually pillaged several Chinese shops and attacked three other European 
foreigners (suggesting that while actions of the new Chinese community 
represented the immediate impetus for the uproar, underlying social and economic 
discontents may have played a role in the escalation of events and resulted in the 
targeting of other “others” as well).573 The Chinese embassy consequentially 
issued a press statement expressing its regret at the incident and urging all 
                                                
570 This story was recounted to me in a discussion with a German PhD student in Madagascar and 
a member of the old Chinese community, September 22, 2010. 
571 Madagascar Tribune, September 24, 2010. 
572 Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor. 
573 L’Express de Madagascar, 2011. 
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Chinese living in Madagascar to respect the law and live peacefully with the 
Malagasy.  
Chinese traders and companies in Madagascar also have a tendency to 
ignore local laws and regulations. Many Chinese retailers do not comply with the 
rule that hygienic and nutritional products in Madagascar must have clearly 
marked labels in either French or Malagasy.574 Almost all of the Chinese products 
sold in the Horizon supermarket owned by SOGECOA in Ivato retain their 
Chinese labels, and even the receipt tendered is in Mandarin characters. Although 
this may suggest that the supermarket caters to the new Chinese community in 
Antananarivo and not to the local Malagasy (who may find it difficult to travel to 
the outskirts of the city to buy groceries), this phenomenon is not exclusive to 
SOGECOA. All of the Chinese goods found in Behoririka, other parts of 
Antananarivo, or the village of Belon ‘i Tsiribihina boast Chinese labels, which 
the Malagasy consumers cannot read. 575 
Furthermore, local Chinese crime syndicates have become quite pervasive 
throughout the country. The presence of the Chinese mafia, which began arriving 
in Madagascar as private Chinese migration to the island accelerated, has become 
more widespread as the rule of law has deteriorated under the HAT.576 Between 
80% - 90% of the casinos in Antananarivo, which are owned by new Chinese 
entrepreneurs, are rumoured to serve as fronts for illegal activities such as money 
laundering, identification falsifications, and the illegal drug trade. 577  The 
interlinked syndicates are also involved in the smuggling of endangered animal 
species, gemstones, and precious woods. The animal species comprise mainly 
sharks, sea turtles, and sea cucumbers. Shark fins and sea turtles are culinary 
delicacies in China, and turtle shells are used for medicinal purposes. 578 Chinese 
prospectors have also become highly influential in the trade for rubies and 
sapphires and have overtaken the Thais and Sri Lankans who have traditionally 
dominated the illegal market. Chinese gemstone prospectors migrate around the 
country without informing the authorities of their movements, leaving one area 
where gemstones deposits are becoming depleted and moving on to the next 
                                                
574 Interview with the director of SIM, November 22, 2010. 
575 Interview with the director of FIMPA, December 6, 2010.  
576 La Gazette de la Grande Île, 2011d. 
577 Interview with Mr. Sinoui, October 26 , 2010. See La Gazette de la Grande Île, 2011d.  
578 World Wildlife Fund, Briefing Note: Madagascar. Legal Chinese shrimping trawlers operating 
in the Mozambique Channel off Madagascar’s Western coast provide cover for Chinese 
fishermen who seek to exploit other endangered maritime resources. Legal Chinese fishing 
activities also cause frictions between Malagasy and Chinese fishermen. 
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promising area.579 In mid-2011, many of them migrated from an area along the 
east coast to the northern region of Andapa, where they buy gems from locals 
who extract them from the Anjanaharibe national park.580 Although Madagascar’s 
boom in gem mining since the late-1990s has largely been driven and controlled 
by mining and transnational gem trafficking since its inception, the situation is 
becoming increasingly complex with the proliferation of Chinese networks.581  
The trafficking of precious woods has however attracted more domestic 
and international attention than either that of the endangered animals or the 
gemstones, mainly because of the scale on which it is occurring and the danger 
that this represents for Madagascar’s rainforests. China is purchasing enormous 
quantities of unprocessed timber from various countries, including Madagascar, 
where the export of rosewood has become an especially pertinent issue. 582 In 
2001, 98% of precious timber from Madagascar was exported to China.583 Before 
2005, rosewood exports were legal and constituted a significant amount of 
Malagasy sales to China. In order to slow the growth of deforestation and the 
smuggling of precious wood within the realm of legal exports, Ravalomanana 
banned the sale of wood by closing forestry sites.584 In late 2009, Rajoelina’s 
government granted an exceptional authorisation to export small amounts of raw 
and semi-processed hard wood from Madagascar, which effectively provides a 
loophole for the sale of illegally cut and collected wood. This allows for the 
potential embezzlement of funds in the name of environmental protection, and 
constitutes a legal incentive for further corruption in the forestry sector.  
In 2009, more than 52,000 tonnes of Malagasy rosewood were obtained 
from between 15,000 and 75,000 trees, 60,000 of which were located in protected 
areas. Approximately 36,700 tonnes of rosewood have been exported almost 
exclusively to China, for a total export sale price of US $220 million. The 
transport of logs was openly conducted on the roads around the main regional 
town of Antalaha, in full view of the local authorities, suggesting “a serious 
deterioration of the law and collaboration between the law enforcement agencies 
and illegal traders”.585 In the northeastern Sava region, members of the trafficking 
syndicates earned 76% of these revenues, and the Malagasy state only 24%.586 
                                                
579 Interview with a mining consultancy, November 4, 2011. 
580 Unpublished UNDP report on the social impacts of mining by Luke Freeman.  
581 See Duffy, “Gemstone Mining in Madagascar”, 185-206, for a discussion of trafficking 
networks in the mining sector.  
582 Kozak and Canby, “Why China Prefers Logs”. 
583 Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, 11-22, p. 15. 
584 Ramiandrisoa, Razafindravonona, and Rafalimanana, 2008: 23. 
585 Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, 11-22, p. 12.  
586 Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, 11-22, p. 11. 
 179 
Members of local communities who reside in the areas of rosewood conservation 
also derive very little benefit from timber harvesting, which severely 
compromises the integrity of the protected areas and their ecosystems, while 
nearly all the profits accrued go to those who run the illegal operations.587  
 
The role of the Malagasy government: the textile sector 
 
The negative perceptions afforded to the Chinese engagement in 
Madagascar bear some validity, but placing excessive blame on the new Chinese 
actors limits investigations into the role of the Malagasy state in managing their 
activities. The state has an important function in harnessing the engagement 
where it benefits the local population and mitigating the negative impacts when it 
harms them. The example of the textile sector shows that some low-cost Chinese 
commodities in Madagascar have attracted a large pool of low and medium-
income consumers away from local enterprises, forcing the latter to adopt 
competitive pricing strategies (incurring significant profit losses) or shut down.588 
The Malagasy Blanket Company (SOMACOU), Savonry Tropicale, a local leader 
in soap manufacturing, and Aigle D’Or, a shoe and sandal producer have all been 
unable to withstand the increased competition. Chinese products are considered to 
have “basically ruined the local textile industry”, and they are “in the process of 
ruining the artisanal industry (items such as raffia bags, purses, children’s toys, 
etc.), the plastics industry, the blanket industry, and the little agricultural 
industries”.589  
In the 1980s, Madagascar counted six major textile companies.590 By the 
late-1990s, three of these companies had been squeezed out of the market, and by 
2006 SOMACOU was the only one left out of the remaining three that still 
possessed a significant market share of 80%. Between 2006 and 2011, 
SOMACOU’s local production rates diminished by 90%, and its market share fell 
from 80% to 20%. The company has not been able to counter the influx of 
cheaper Chinese blankets, which sell for around 10,000 Ariary (US $5) instead of 
the 30,000 – 70,000 Ariary (US $15 – US $35), depending on the quality, that a 
                                                
587 Shuurman and Lowry, “The Madagascar Rosewood Massacre”. 
588 Gadzala, “Chinese Entrepreneurs”, p. 6. 
589 Interview with the economic counsellor at the French embassy in Madagascar on November 
10th, 2010. 
590 These include SOMACOU, La Cotonniere d'Antsirabe (COTONA), Société Sud Madagascar 
Textile (SUMATEX), Société Anonyme Malagasy des Applications du Fil (SAMAF), Societé 
Textile de Majunga (SOTEMA), and Fanavotana. 
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blanket by SOMACOU retails for. The under-declaration of the value of goods by 
Chinese importers, which enables the Chinese retailer to sell their wares to 
Malagasy consumers at a price below the market rate, has often been cited as the 
primary reason for the decline of some local industries. 591 Table 15 shows the 
value of one unit of locally produced goods when they leave a local factory and 
the value of a similar product imported from China, according to a Malagasy 
newspaper report.  
Table 15: The value of Malagasy goods compared with Chinese imports. 
 Local Production (US$) Chinese Imports (US$) 
Blankets 2,47 0,50 
Batteries 0,25 0,12 
Lubrications 1,350 533 
Biscuits 2,20 0,59 
Household soap 0,69 0,29 
Cement 14,0 9,0 
Source: “Produits Importés: Les Fausses Declarations Affaiblissent l’Industrie locale”, La Gazette 
de la Grande Île, October 20, 2010. 
Neither Ravalomanana nor the HAT initiated steps to control the 
importation of Chinese imports or limit them where they compete directly with 
traditional Malagasy manufacturers or key industries. FIMPA has raised these 
issues with the Ministry of Commerce, but it has not received much support from 
the Malagasy government.592 The Malagasy Industrial Syndicate (SIM), a more 
prominent business organisation, has also lodged official complaints with both the 
Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Commerce concerning the loss of 
market shares for Malagasy producers through unfair and unlawful Chinese 
business practices. This resulted in the formation of a National Committee of 
Corrective Commercial Measures housed at the Ministry of Commerce in 2010. 
However, there have not been any tangible changes to the current customs regime, 
such as tighter customs controls, increased oversight and industrial subsidisation, 
                                                
591 Interview with the director of the Malagasy Industrial Syndicate (SIM), November 22, 2010 
and the Malagasy minister of commerce, November 29, 2010. 
592 Interview with the director of FIMPA, December 6, 2010. FIMPA encourages consumers to 
voice their opinions in public service sectors such as health and education and bolsters public 
opinion against products imported from China.  
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or import quotas on specific goods, which would alleviate pressure on domestic 
producers.593 Madagascar’s dilapidated infrastructures also mean that it is often 
cheaper for the Chinese to produce a product in China and have it shipped to 
Madagascar than for the Malagasy to produce it domestically. 594 
Conversely, government stability and policy is also crucial in attracting 
Chinese investors and encouraging knowledge transfers and employment. Chinese 
involvement in Madagascar’s textile industry commenced in 1989 when an EPZ 
(known locally as the Zone Franche) was set up in the capital to facilitate foreign 
investments in labour-intensive consumer products. The establishment of the 
Zone Franche helped Madagascar branch into the production and trade of low-
value manufactured goods, namely textiles, resulting in Madagascar’s apparel 
exporting industry becoming one of the fastest expanding sectors in Sub-Saharan 
Africa over the last twenty years.595 At its peak, the Zone Franche used the appeal 
of low wages and generous tax exemptions to attract over 300 Malagasy and non-
Malagasy firms to launch operations. In the process, it provided direct 
employment to over 100,000 individuals.596 The success of this scheme was 
largely dependent on preferential trade arrangements, including exemption from 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangements (MFAs) and inclusion in the SADC protocol on 
trade, the Everything But Arms Agreement, and, crucially, the AGOA, which 
opened up the market for Malagasy textiles in the US. 597 Madagascar had already 
become eligible for the AGOA during Ratsiraka’s second regime in 2001, but the 
political crisis of 2002 slowed the full extension of the agreement. Political 
stability under Ravalomanana led to the complete implementation of the AGOA, 
and Madagascar was allowed to use third country textile inputs in the production 
of AGOA-eligible products in 2004.  
This drove Chinese (as well as French and Mauritian) investments in the 
Zone Franche and Madagascar’s textile sector more generally. Over the past four 
years, the loss of the AGOA has led to a severe decline in the number of firms 
operating in the sector, Madagascar’s export volume, and local employment rates. 
Madagascar’s disqualification from AGOA after the political crisis in December 
2009 caused many Chinese companies to move their production centres to 
                                                
593 Interview with the director of SIM, November 22, 2010. 
594 Interviews with the owner of Globe, October 6, 2010 and the resident representative of the IMF 
to Madagascar from 2008 -2010, September 28, 2010. 
595 N’Diaye, Adjusting to Chinese Ascendancy. 
596 Cling, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud, Export Processing Zones in Madagascar, p. 3.  
597 N’Diaye, Adjusting to Chinese Ascendancy. The MFAs imposed quotas on textile imports to 
industrialised economies from the Third World that benefitted the poorest developing countries 
such as Madagascar. 
 182 
elsewhere in Africa.598 Table 16 shows that there was a noticeable decrease in the 
number of Chinese companies registered in the Zone Franche between 2008 and 
2011. While 11 companies from Hong Kong and China closed down since 2008, 
only one new company was registered during the period under review. Table 17 
demonstrates that textile firms consider political instability and ineffective 
governance more generally as hindering growth in the sector.  
Table 16: The number of Chinese companies in the Zone Franche.  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Belgium 0 0 1 0 
Malaysia 1 1 0 0 
Holland 1 1 0 1 
Canada 1 1 1 0 
Tunisia 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 
Sri Lanka 1 1 1 1 
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 
Madagascar-India 1 1 1 1 
Germany 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 3 2 1 1 
Korea 3 3 1 0 
USA 4 4 4 3 
Italy 5 5 5 4 
China 11 9 8 6 
Hong Kong 12 9 9 6 
Other 11 13 18 19 
                                                
598 Interview with the employee in charge of the Zone Franche at the Malagasy Ministry of 
Commerce, August 19, 2011. Madagascar’s textile sector had also initially experienced a 
decline when the MFAs expired in 2005. See Cling et al., Export Processing Zones in 
Madagascar. 
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Mauritius 32 25 28 27 
Madagascar 26 25 28 27 
France 47 44 40 35 
 Source: Madagascar (Ministry of Commerce and Industry), Liste des Entreprises Franches 
Operationelles. 
  
 
Table 17: Obstacles to the growth of the export-oriented clothing industry. 
Obstacle Affirmative responses, % 
Political instability 100 
Inadequate policy and structural support 83 
Customs regulations 56 
Administrative procedures 56 
Corruption 44 
Credit access constraints 33 
Regulatory instability 28 
High logistical costs 28 
High tax rates 28 
AGOA ineligibility 28 
Exchange rates 22 
Inadequate port and airport infrastructure 22 
Financial audit 11 
Lack of technical training centres 11 
Source: N’Diaye, Adjusting to Chinese Ascendancy. 
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Environmental and social regulations in the extractive industries 
 
Existing government regulations are also inadequate to address the 
negative environmental and social issues arising from China’s engagements in 
Madagascar’s extractive industries. The decades-long mismanagement of the 
country’s mining sector has resulted in a situation where political and economic 
imperatives take precedence over environmental concerns. The history of the 
legal framework governing Madagascar’s mining sector can be divided into five 
periods, which roughly correspond to the country’s political climate since 
independence: 1960 to 1972, 1975 to 1992, 1993 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, and 2002 
until 2009. In 1960, 100% of mining sector activity and regulation was informal 
and unstructured, with little attention paid to it by the central government in 
Antananarivo. The period between 1975 and 1992 witnessed early developments 
in industrial mining and attempts to nationalise the mining sector and formulate a 
national mining policy that would include artisanal mining. With the introduction 
of the SAP in 1983, local, decentralised administrative offices for mining 
activities were created. However, the responsibilities of these offices remained 
limited to representational roles. After 1993, the mining sector was partially 
liberalised, which amplified illegal mining operations and augmented the 
prevalence of opaque mining structures and deals. In 2004, around 80% of 
production sites in Madagascar were illegal, 50% of miners were informal, and 
90% of the trade was illegal.599  
In the 1990s, Madagascar began developing more stringent environmental 
and social codes for foreign investors, but these are still poorly formulated and 
enforced. The Malagasy Environmental Charter (CEM) governs any public or 
private investments that may impact the environment in Madagascar. Article 10 of 
the CEM states that the Foreign Investment Environmental Accountability 
Scheme (MECIE) contains the rules and procedures related to the environment to 
be followed by investors. Under the MECIE, firms must undertake an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and have this approved by the Ministry 
of the Environment before they can be issued an exploration permit by the 
BCMM. The National Office for the Environment (ONE) is then responsible to 
ensure compliance with the environmental and social regulations. Once a 
company lodges a government-approved EIA with the ONE, the latter works with 
the former to develop a cahier de charge (social plan) tailored to that particular 
                                                
599 Rakotonomenjanahary, “De la Mine Artisanale”, 1-20, p. 2. 
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company. These social plans usually include the clearest set of social and 
environmental obligations that Chinese companies must adhere to.  
Chinese companies active in the extractive industries are further subject to 
Madagascar’s Law of Big Mining Sector Investments (LGIM) and the 1999 
Mining Act. Neither of these contains a direct provision related to the social 
obligations of foreign companies with operations in Madagascar. References to 
the socio-economic impacts of these companies are related to employee rights and 
open to interpretation. For example, Article 1033 of the LGIM recommends that 
mining companies prioritise the hiring of Malagasy labourers but it does not 
specify a percentage or obligate firms to do this. Article 104 then states that 
mining companies must provide theoretical and practical training for Malagasy 
employees. In another section, the LGIM refers to the concept of “civil 
responsibility”, but this is in reference to the provision of assurance to hired 
workers.600 The Mining Act is equally as ambiguous as the LGIM and the 
MECIE. It imposes specific obligations on medium-sized companies and small-
scale miners in terms of public usage of infrastructures, labourer-related hygiene 
and safety standards, accident policies, environmental impacts, and restrictions on 
mining in protected areas. Article 39 of the 2000 amendment to the Act merely 
states that mining companies ought to contribute to the wellbeing of local 
populations by implementing socio-economic development programs and 
providing compensation for when communities are displaced. It is also unclear in 
its suggestion that companies attempt to reduce the harmful side effects of the 
mining operations (such as shock, noise, dust, etc.) on the activities of the 
surrounding human and animal populations.601  
The Malagasy state uses three principal feedback mechanisms to monitor 
public satisfaction with a foreign company’s social and environmental 
performance, which suffer from significant enforcement limitations. These 
include a consultative process, the creation of a public register where local 
communities can lodge official complaints, and an environmental monitoring 
report that assesses compliance with the EIA. Investors are required to regularly 
update the community on the status of its social plan and to inform them about 
employment opportunities, environmental preservation techniques, and best 
health practices including methods for preventing and combating HIV/AIDS 
through a consultative process. This process is a three-way dialogue between the 
mining firms, the communities impacted by the mining operations, and the 
government, and consists of a series of meetings usually held in the local 
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fokontany (the smallest-level administrative grouping in Madagascar). In April 
2011, for instance, three consultative meeting were held between members of 
three different communities and representatives from WISCO, including its 
general director.602 The consultative process persists throughout the duration of 
the mining operation. Chinese companies are also required to submit an 
environmental monitoring report to the ONE every few months.603 
The shortcomings of the enforcement mechanisms stem from the fact that 
they are not tailored to Madagascar’s social reality and limited by a dearth of 
political will. Illiterate villagers cannot read letters detailing their rights, and may 
not have the ability to travel to the provincial offices to lodge complaints. They 
are often unaware or uneducated about their rights vis-à-vis foreign companies, 
and are therefore unable to make useful demands at the consultative processes. As 
a result, communities use this opportunity to make unrealistic demands on the 
former two entities, which effectively leads to an impasse that is advantageous to 
the investors. 604  The primary institution tasked with the enforcement of 
environmental and social regulations, the ONE, appears committed to abiding by 
international standards and is eager to acquire the necessary expertise to develop 
the institutional framework responsible for the protection of vulnerable societies 
and the environment where they are adversely impacted by mining activities. It 
however lacks the financial, technical, and administrative capacity to do this. 
Since repercussions from the state against environmental or social infractions by 
Chinese companies are largely absent, much of the initiative to comply with 
existing laws is at the discretion of the Chinese investors themselves. 
China’s approach to environmental sustainability 
 
China has made noteworthy efforts to rise to environmental standards for 
overseas investments set by the international community, but these have not been 
sufficient to respond to the trade-offs between the country’s rapid rates of 
industrialisation and ecological conservation overseas. Having felt some 
international and increasingly domestic pressure to meet global benchmarks, 
China began adopting Western environmental production standards in the 1990s. 
Since then, Beijing has attempted to raise awareness of its environmental and 
social impacts at home and abroad, especially within the upper levels of 
government. It established the China Council for International Cooperation on 
Environment and Development in 1992 to research global perceptions of the 
                                                
602 Interview with the employee in charge of the WISCO folder at the ONE, June 7, 2011.  
603 Interview with an employee of the ONE, August 31, 2011. 
604 Interview with CSR director at Sherritt, August 26, 2011. 
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environmental and social practices of Chinese companies and make 
recommendations to rectify negative perceptions or practices by influencing 
policy and regulations. 605 More recently, China has sought to promote both 
sustainable domestic and foreign environmental policies within a “new path for 
environmental protection”. In March 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Environmental Protection jointly issued a “Guideline on 
Environmental Protection in Investment and Cooperation Overseas”. The 
Guideline aims to further standardise environmental protection in foreign 
investment and cooperation. It calls on its companies to prevent or minimise 
environmental risks while still finishing their projects in a time frame and to the 
standard of quality expected by the host country. Specifically, it requests that 
Chinese companies “actively fulfil their social responsibility for environmental 
protection, establish a good external image for Chinese enterprises, and support 
the sustainable development of the host country”. 606 
 The reference to a “social responsibility for environmental protection” 
raises the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is an abstract 
notion of voluntary and partnership-based approaches to tackling social and 
environmental problems that occur when foreign firms invest in developing 
countries. The adoption of CSR has improved the responsiveness of Western 
corporations (especially those accountable to shareholders) to the social and 
environmental impacts of their operations to a certain extent, but there are doubts 
about the transferability or relevance of CSR in many developing countries. 607 
From the perspectives of local communities pursuing corporate accountability, 
CSR initiatives have limited results in the absence of donor, NGO, or government 
pressure for company reform, which is the case in both China and Madagascar. 
The CSR programmes of Western companies in Madagascar, including QMM, 
Sherritt, and Colas, have all been reproached for a variety of reasons, from not 
respecting indigenous land rights and the forced displacement of local 
communities without respecting social and family structures, to not doing enough 
to offset a loss in biodiversity.608  
 Chinese SOEs generally do not subscribe to CSR initiatives, and their 
understanding of social responsibility differs from that of the West. In 
Madagascar, Chinese companies tend to have less awareness of their impacts and 
fewer social responsibility programmes than their foreign counterparts. In general, 
                                                
605 Edmonds, “Evolution of Environmental Policy”, 13-25, p. 18. 
606 China, “Actively Explore New Path for Environmental Protection”. 
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 188 
the larger Chinese SOEs have a better reputation in terms of their environmental 
impacts than the smaller, private Chinese enterprises. Chinese companies are 
inclined to give “presents” to the communities surrounding their projects in the 
forms of classrooms, schools, and roads, and they sometimes distribute necessities 
such as rice.609 CRCC has no specific CSR provisions in its contracts with the 
Malagasy government or with other multilateral agencies it has worked with. 
Instead, the company engages in social and environmental activities out of its own 
volition. It has constructed classrooms, sports fields, and 120 housing units 
around its road rehabilitation projects. The firm does not determine who lives in 
which house, how surrounding communities are relocated, or how the schemes 
should be maintained or used. This, it argues, is the prerogative of the Malagasy 
authorities.610 SOGECOA cites its Horizon supermarket in Ivato as an example of 
how it is providing the Malagasy with access to affordable consumer and 
nutritional products, and interprets this as constituting socially aware investment 
practices.611 
 
Chinese activities in the extractive industries  
 
Chinese interests and activities in Madagascar’s extractive industries 
accelerated significantly after 2006, when a preliminary inventory of 
Madagascar’s natural resources was published in conjunction with the World 
Bank. The majority of new companies investing in Madagascar’s mining sector 
are currently Chinese (although Mauritian, French, and Australian companies are 
also exerting an increasing presence).612 Chinese actors include a multitude of 
artisanal miners, several small and medium-sized companies, and two large 
multinational companies, including WISCO and the Sino Union Petroleum and 
Chemical International (SUNPEC). The latter are exploring for iron-ore and oil, 
while the smaller companies are principally exploiting gold and ilmenite, and 
exploring for coal, zirconium, and quartz.613 Map 4 shows the location and type of 
major Chinese mining projects in Madagascar in 2011. 
 
                                                
609 Interviews with the economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, August 18, 
2011, and the general director of Sino-Afrique, August 30, 2011. 
610 Interviews with two managers at CRCC, August 31, 2011. 
611 Interview with the spokesperson for SOGECOA, August 19, 2011.  
612 Tahiny, Les Investissements de la Chine.  
613 Shaanxi Yangchang Petroleum, backed by the Shaanxi provincial government, purchased 15% 
of SUNPEC in 2010.  
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Map 4: Major Chinese mining projects in Madagascar. 
 
 
The lack of regulatory enforcement by the Ministry of Mines and the ONE 
may result in especially negative repercussions for Madagascar’s environment in 
the cases of SUNPEC and WISCO, since both firms have operations near 
important areas of wildlife conservation. SUNPEC negotiated exploration permits 
to blocks 2101, 2104, 3112, and 3113 through its four wholly owned subsidiaries 
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in 2008.614 Blocks 2104 and 3113 have estimated oil reserves of 3,6 and 2 billion 
barrels respectively, and block 2104 is believed to contain 66,24 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas reserves. Although the company is not yet in production, it 
struck oil on block 3113 in October 2009. Oil blocks 2104 and 3113 are located in 
areas of important conservational value that harbour native birds, plants, and other 
endangered animals.615  
The WISCO project was also first negotiated in 2008, although the group 
did not obtain the exploration rights to its iron-ore mine in Soalala, south of 
Mahajanga, until September 2009.616 WISCO will begin production of iron 
concentrate and iron pellet between 2013 and 2017, and steel and pure iron after 
2018. To service its operations, WISCO plans to build a port with a handling 
capacity of 11 million tonnes in Soalala with the aim of exporting 14 million 
tonnes of iron-ore annually. In addition, it proposes to install a 60-megawatt 
thermoelectric power station, which will simultaneously supply electricity to the 
WISCO plant, the entire Soalala district, and surrounding rural communities. 
WISCO is operating in an ecologically sensitive area next to an endangered turtle 
habitat. The construction of the port will attract further industrial developments 
and could facilitate the quick and direct exportation of other illegal flora, fauna, 
and natural resources, notwithstanding the immediate dangers to the turtles.  
 Some of the other mining companies are also building infrastructures to 
service their mines, suggesting that not all of the impacts arising from Chinese 
mining activities are necessarily negative. The LGIM states that 30% of the 
capacity of public utilities built to service a mining operation (including 
communication, transport, electrical, gas, water, and sanitation infrastructures) 
must be made available for use by the Malagasy population. 617  Important 
medium-sized Chinese companies include Pan African Mining Madagascar 
(PAMM), a Malagasy subsidiary of Pan African Mining Corporation, Mainland 
Mining (Mainland), and Sino-Afrique. PAMM has made significant investments 
in Madagascar’s southern coal-producing region and owns permits to 15 mining 
projects in Madagascar, which accounts for close to 7,500 km² of diversified 
mineral properties and 5,000 km² of uranium properties.618 It plans to construct a 
                                                
614 SUNPEC is represented in Madagascar by four subsidiaries: Madagascar Energy International 
Ltd, Madagascar Petroleum International, Madagascar North Petroleum, and Madagascar 
North Petroleum. It also retains the rights for petroleum transport, import, and distribution in 
Madagascar through its wholly owned subsidiary Madagascar Energy International Gas Station 
Group Limited. 
615 Scott, “Chinese Extraction Activities”, 11-16. 
616 Pellerin, Le Nouvel Essor.  
617 Madagascar, “Law Governing Big Mining Sector Investments”. 
618 See http://www.panafrican.com/props.htm. 
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port in the south of the country, a 140-km road connecting its mine site to the 
port, a thermal power station at Sakoa, and a pipeline from the local river to carry 
water to the Sakoa coal fields.619 Sino-Afrique, a relatively small player and 
subsidiary of Chongyi Zhang Yuan Tungsten, a private Shenzhen-based company 
that is mainly active in China, began gold exploration in 2007. It owns the rights 
to a 26,5-hectare mine consisting of eight exploration sites near the town of 
Maevatanana, northwest of Antananarivo, and has made an initial investment of 
around US $300 million. The company has offered equipment and machinery to 
local farmers to support agricultural development in the areas surrounding its 
mine sites. It also distributed stationary to schoolchildren, built classrooms, and 
donated money for local festivals.620  
Nevertheless, there are significant environmental and social issues arising 
from the increasing presence of Chinese firms in Madagascar’s extractive 
industries. Although Chinese companies must obtain an EIA before they 
commence their exploration activities in Madagascar, they do not necessarily 
comply with the stipulations set forth in their assessments, and some companies 
have repeatedly infracted against local regulations. Mainland Mining (Mainland), 
a subsidiary of China Geo-Engineering, has breached its EIA and other 
regulations several times and has been heavily criticised for these violations. 621  
Mainland was the first Chinese company to invest in Madagascar’s mining sector 
in 2006. It extracts around 1,250 tonnes of ilmenite per month at its mine north of 
Toamasina and possesses exploration permits for ilmenite in 22 other sites around 
the country. In 2009, Mainland was caught declaring that it was exporting 
ilmenite when it was shipping zircon, a radioactive material and mineral offshoot 
of ilmenite that is five times as valuable, and which it is not licensed to export. 
Mainland was not taking any precautions in this respect, nor had it undergone an 
EIA to mine this particular mineral. Ilmenite was also being separated from soil 
with seawater (which will make vegetation in the surrounding earth more difficult 
to grow) and the minerals were being stockpiled for longer than the two month 
period allowed. The company had also extended its mining operations all the way 
to the border of their perimeter, which is on the beach, increasing the potential for 
dangerous chemicals to leak into the ocean.622 In addition to the infractions 
against its EIA, the company had its authorisation to use the RN5 revoked for a 
month and a half in October 2011 because its trucks had been overloaded beyond 
                                                
619 See http://www.panafrican.com/props.htm. 
620 Interview with the director of Sino-Afrique, August 30, 2011. 
621 See Tahiny, Les Investissements de la Chine.  
622 Interview with an employee at Malagasy Ministry of Mines, November 23rd, 2010. 
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the allowed weight and were damaging the road, which services the tourist traffic 
towards a popular beach destination and many surrounding rural communities.623  
Mainland has attempted to ameliorate its extremely negative image in 
Madagascar because it is operating in Madagascar with a long-term view. The 
situation had reached a pinnacle when the company had its environmental license, 
and by extension its mining permit suspended in July 2011 for three months. 
When the company continued to mine despite the suspension of its license, the 
Malagasy government halted its activities completely, demanded a financial re-
evaluation of its exports, and fined it US $150,000.624 In 2012, Mainland hired a 
new leadership team and announced a series of legal, technical, and social 
improvements on which it will spend US $1,3 million. It intends to launch a 
socioeconomic development plan for local areas affected by its operations in 
Analanjirofo, Atsinanana, Vatovavy-Fitonany, Atsimo-Atsinanana and Anosy, 
and has announced that it will devote US $12 million on local development 
projects in these regions. In total, Mainland plans to spend US $1 billion to 
upgrade its mining projects and reach an annual production target of one million 
tonnes of ilmenite until 2026. The company has also signalled its willingness to 
participate in the EITI. 625  To help settle its disputes with the Malagasy 
government, Mainland, a nominally private company, has enlisted the assistance 
of the Chinese embassy.  
This points to the existence of a close government-business nexus between 
Chinese interests in Madagascar’s natural resources and the Malagasy elite, which 
is further exemplified by relationship between Mr. Hui Chi Ming, SUNPEC’s 
director, and members of the Malagasy government. Mr. Hui, a businessman from 
Hong-Kong, is one of the 400 richest businessmen in China and a naturalised 
Malagasy. He controls Chinese interests in the mining and petroleum sector in 
Madagascar: the mining sector through Gahood Holding International and several 
subsidiaries, and the petroleum sector through SUNPEC. He also created 
Madagascar Chromium Co., Madagascar Copper Group, Madagascar New 
Mineral Development and Madagascar Non Ferrous Resources as joint ventures 
with the Malagasy state in 2010. Through his joint ventures, Mr. Hui accesses 
mining and exploration permits, which are then bought back by Gahood Holding 
International so that in effect these permits belong solely to the Chinese 
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company.626 Through SUNPEC’s concessions in Madagascar, Mr. Hui is the first 
Chinese national to hold a 100% stake in an overseas oilfield. The extent of Mr. 
Hui’s connections within the Malagasy government enabled SUNPEC to begin 
mining without having submitted an EIA. The petroleum company had hired an 
independent Malagasy consultant to conduct its EIA and instructed her to 
complete it in the shortest time possible in order to accelerate the project’s start 
date. Normally, mining firms receive their exploration permits 60 days after 
submitting their EIAs to the ONE. After the consultant informed the company of 
the 60-day stipulation, Mr. Hui appealed directly to the Ministry of Mines and 
SUNPEC received its permit without submitting an EIA at all.627 
In addition to his interests in the extractive industries, Mr. Hui has 
acquired a range of other business ventures by cultivating relationships with 
members of the Malagasy political and business elite. Mr. Hui is the controlling 
shareholder in Madagascar’s second largest bank, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of Madagascar (BICM), which he bought in 2003 when it was known as the 
China-Madagascar International Bank. This bank serves as the port of entry for 
Chinese companies preparing to invest in big projects in the country, notably in 
the domains of agriculture and construction. It also consults smaller Chinese 
companies in the import-export sector and facilitates their entry into Madagascar 
by providing them access to small loans.628 Ravalomanana had appointed Mr. Hui 
as the honorary consul of Madagascar in Hong Kong and as the special envoy for 
Sino-Malagasy relations at the Malagasy embassy in Beijing. Shortly after the 
coup d’état in 2009, Mr. Hui was introduced to Rajoelina through a mutual friend. 
He then hired Rajoelina’s father, Yves-Roger Rajeolina, as a special counsellor 
for SUNPEC’s relations with the Malagasy government. He manages his affairs in 
Madagascar through William Chan Kong, who is Mr. George’s nephew (the 
president of the Chinese congregation in Antananarivo), and is thus well 
connected to the old Chinese community in Antananarivo, and to the China-
Madagascar Friendship Association.629 SUNPEC is also member of the ASEM, 
suggesting that Mr. Hui retains connections with the Chinese state. Mr. Hui thus 
exerts substantial economic influence in Madagascar through his mining 
activities, the financing mechanisms of the BICM, and his personal relationships 
with a variety of key actors, including members of the Sino-Malagasy 
community, new Chinese entrepreneurs, the Chinese embassy, and influential 
stakeholders within the Malagasy elite.  
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An increasingly dubious Sino-Malagasy relationship under the HAT 
 
The mining sector in Madagascar has traditionally been subject to political 
machinations, but the short-term and anti-developmental mentality of the HAT 
resulted in its increasing politicisation. The ministers and government officials in 
charge of issues relating to the oil sector change frequently, suggesting that there 
is significant competition to hold one of these lucrative posts, which also 
compounds the level of political risk for investors. Major stakeholders in the 
industry include the National Office of Mines and Strategic Industries (OMNIS), 
the Minister of Mines, the Minister of Hydrocarbon, and the president. 630 
Technically, the director of OMNIS exercises control over exploration and 
exploitation permits issued by the BCMM, and thus the rent-seeking element on 
the government side. As a result, OMNIS suffers from heavy pressure by 
politicians and stakeholders vying for more control over the oil sector and future 
oil rents. Since 2009, power has been diverted away from OMNIS towards the 
Office of the President and the Ministry of Mines. The titles of Minister of Mines 
and Hydrocarbon had been held consecutively by two different people prior to 
being split into separate portfolios, with one minister heading mines and the other 
dealing exclusively with oil, and the director of OMNIS has also been replaced 
with someone close to the HAT. 
The lack of stability and transparency within the mining sector resulted in 
Madagascar’s suspension from the EITI and two of its biggest oil investors 
terminating their operations. Having been accepted as an EITI candidate country 
in 2008, Madagascar was excluded from the initiative in 2011 because the 
governance structure of the mining sector was not deemed suitable for effective 
EITI implementation. The suspension was intended for the duration of the 
political crisis. The HAT submitted a request to lift it in late 2012, which was 
denied. Additionally, foreign investment in this sector suffers from concerns over 
the ultimate legal standing of contracts and concessions negotiated by the current 
government, from the revision of contracts signed by the previous government 
and ministers, and from fears that the HAT plans to appropriate the sector for 
itself. In 2010, the HAT had begun to re-assess contracts with foreign owned 
mining companies in Madagascar and began auditing them to evaluate their 
compliance with their commitments. Since 2009, the majority of new investors in 
the mining sector have a direct connection with individual members of the 
                                                
630 OMNIS, created as a state-owned agency in 1976 and re-structured in 1993, represents the 
Malagasy state in the management, development, and promotion of Madagascar’s petroleum 
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HAT.631 The increasing costs and political risks associated with investing in 
Madagascar’s oil sector resulted in Total and ExxonMobil, the biggest investors 
in the country’s oil industry in 2009, discontinuing their operations in 
Madagascar. 632  Some Chinese companies have also expressed regret at the 
situation. Ravalomanana’s attempt to “clean up” the mining sector and the 
political stability offered by his regime was a primary reason Sino-Afrique 
decided to invest in Madagascar. The current instabilities have made the operating 
environment significantly more difficult, with the firm contemplating moving to 
another country. 633 
 
Yet despite these difficulties, significant amounts of FDI continue to flow 
in the mining sector, and many other Chinese companies are consolidating their 
presence. The HAT is thought to seek the nationalisation of the mining industry 
so it can sell properties to Asian investors in order to finance Rajoelina’s election 
campaign.634 It is also believed that the establishment of profitable business deals 
between Malagasy politicians and Chinese companies, such as that concluded 
with WISCO, removes incentives for a quick resolution of the crisis and the return 
to multiparty democratic politics in Madagascar.635 Several issues surrounding the 
HAT’s deal with WISCO have in particular fuelled allegations of corruption 
between Chinese investors and the current Malagasy administration. The exact 
terms of the agreement are unclear, as is the amount disbursed and the location of 
the funds. The HAT claims it received US $100 million, but WISCO maintains 
that it paid the HAT US $140 million. 636 The World Bank has unsuccessfully 
pressed the Malagasy government to let it see the contract.637 The bonus paid by 
WISCO to the HAT is widely viewed as providing the regime with a financial 
cushion to resolve the political stalemate and follow SADC’s Roadmap.638  
The WISCO project has a number of controversial features to begin with. 
Kam Hing International Holdings, a Hong Kong-based garment company with 
operations in both China and Madagascar, had announced in 2011 that it planned 
to sell 75% of Kam Hing International Limited, which holds 20% of the Soalala 
mine, for US $30 million. Under the deal, Kam Hing will receive an additional 
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sum of up to US $70 million if the mine yields more than 200 million tonnes of 
ore. The identity of the new owner of the 75% stake has not yet been disclosed, 
but it is rumoured to be a Chinese SOE waiting for China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission to approve the deal. WISCO has also not 
yet obtained its exploitation permit from the Malagasy government, although it 
has lodged the required paperwork.639 The HAT’s inability to expedite WISCO’s 
mining permit is directly slowing the collection of revenues for the state and 
undermining progress to streamline foreign investment procedures in the country.  
The HAT’s negotiations with the CIF have also been quite damaging to its 
reputation. CIF, a Hong-Kong listed company that has stirred much controversy 
due to previous scandals in Guinea, was set to invest in several major and high 
profile infrastructure projects in Madagascar in 2010. The proposed projects were 
to be financed by the funds given to the state as part of the WISCO deal, and 
constructed by CIF. According to the arrangement, CIF was to receive 85% of the 
equity and the HAT 15%.640 The day after the announcement that the HAT and 
CIF had created the MDC was made public, the Malagasy Ministry of Mines 
verbally notified Madagascar Oil that it was interested in acquiring four of its 
blocks and that it was sending an auditing team to assess if the company had been 
complying with all of its regulations. Allegedly, the HAT had hired CIF to audit 
the operations of Madagascar Oil in a deal that would potentially allow the 
government to expropriate the company’s Tsimiroro block, which is currently the 
most viable petroleum well in Madagascar, and sell it to CIF. 641 This agreement 
appears not to have materialised, and none of the projects have been constructed.  
More generally, there are numerous examples of Chinese projects that 
have stalled due to existing political uncertainties in the country. The planned 
construction of a highway from the airport to downtown, negotiated between the 
SMATP and the Malagasy government in 2008, has been put on hold. SMATP 
also made headlines when its general director sent a letter to Rajoelina in August 
2011 requesting an audience and an inquiry into the alleged abuse of power and 
corrupt practices of his Minister of Public Works.642 The minister had demanded a 
10% fee for procuring a project worth US $10 million to build a road on the 
eastern island of Saint Marie financed by the BADA.643 CRCC has likewise 
encountered problems with the Malagasy government. Until the coup of 2009, 
CRCC was tendering around US $50 million worth of projects every year. This 
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has decreased significantly since 2009 due to a lack of donor and government 
funds for construction projects.644 In 2008, China and Madagascar signed a 
memorandum of understanding for Sinohydro to construct a second hydroelectric 
dam on the Betsiboka river, with 70% and 30% financing, respectively. However, 
progress on the dam has stalled due to the inability of the Malagasy regime to 
provide its 30% share.645 COMPLANT has also encountered difficulties operating 
under the new regime. Responding to the increase in international sugar prices, in 
early 2011 the HAT forbade the firm to go through with a large sale of sugar it 
had already negotiated with a local distributor because it was reviewing options to 
confiscate the sugar from the company itself in order to distribute it in 
government-subsidised groceries for the very poor in the capital. 646 Further 
disagreements between COMPLANT and the HAT led to a review of its existing 
contract, which resulted in the negotiation of a new 10-year contract in September 
2012 that increased the amount of rent paid to the government from 4% to 6% of 
total company revenue.647  
The HAT has also been heavily implicated in the rosewood scandals.648 In 
late 2010, Global Witness and the Environmental Investigation Agency released 
an online video in which a Chinese businessman stated that he conducts his 
business directly with Rajoelina. The individual in the video owns a company 
based in Beijing that sells manufactured rosewood products, as well as an import 
company based in Guangzhou. He claimed to have exported more than 1,000 
containers of rosewood from Madagascar to China since 2009. He further alleged 
that the Malagasy government has resorted to illegally selling him and other 
exporters like him rosewood because they do not have enough means to pay state 
employees due to donor budget cuts. This video was streamed on the World Wide 
Web for a few days in Madagascar before the Malagasy authorities removed it. 
Other central figures from the HAT have been incriminated in the trafficking as 
well. Madagascar’s former prime minister under the HAT, Camille Vital, and a 
Malagasy business man with close ties to the current regime, have been named as 
important figures in the rosewood industry.649  In November 2012, a Malagasy 
environmental association claimed that it was in possession of customs documents 
for ten shipping containers, which show that timber was being exported by a 
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freight company belonging to Mamy Ravatomanga, a close confidant and 
informal advisor to President Rajeolina.650  
 
Conclusion 
 
There are many assumptions that by circumventing local laws and 
regulations the Chinese engagement in Madagascar benefits the Chinese investors 
and Malagasy elite more than it does the wider local population. Negative 
perceptions concerning the manner in which Chinese employers treat their 
Malagasy employees or the ways in which the Chinese engagement is impacting 
local industries and the environment are sometimes untrue or exaggerated, but 
they are not always inaccurate. Some Chinese entrepreneurs and businesses do 
circumscribe existing regulations, for example by purchasing false government 
identification documents from resident Sino-Malagasy or by disregarding local 
labelling laws, selling counterfeit goods, and under-declaring the value of their 
imports at customs. This has contributed to the crowding out of some local 
producers, notably in the shoes, soap, and blanket industries. The harmful impacts 
that Chinese prospectors and companies are exerting on Madagascar’s fragile 
ecosystem are also real and important. Since 2009, illegal fishing, logging, and 
mining activities have accelerated. Often, Chinese crime syndicates and 
trafficking networks, which have increased their presence in Madagascar over the 
past few years, oversee these activities.   
While some of the culpability for this can be placed on the Chinese, 
structural and political issues endemic to Madagascar itself largely condition the 
negative impacts that do arise from the growing Chinese presence in the country. 
The Malagasy government has to set parameters and make sure that they are 
being followed. The example of the textile industry demonstrates that where there 
is political stability and Chinese companies operate within a clearly defined 
regulatory environment such as the Zone Franche, they enhance employment 
opportunities for Malagasy, which could lead to skills and technology transfers 
and help Malagasy producers compete on the international market themselves. 
Conversely, the example of the extractive industries suggests that where 
environmental and social reporting are not standardised and there is limited 
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political capacity and will to follow up on most cases of non-compliance, Chinese 
companies have significant freedom to choose what they report and how they 
behave. As stated by a diplomat at the Chinese embassy: “the bottom line is that 
our firms need to make a profit. If they must make more social commitments, 
someone needs to finance these commitments. If the Malagasy government 
pressed them about their social or environmental engagements, they would be 
more inclined to indulge”.651  
The capacity of the Malagasy state to manage the Chinese engagement 
seems to have deteriorated under the HAT. This is largely due to a need for 
alternative sources of funding after the curtailment of donor funding and the exit 
of many investors. Many Chinese companies consider the current policy 
environment in the country as an impediment to the smooth functioning of their 
business and the propagation of their negative images among the Malagasy and 
have expressed contempt with the current situation in Madagascar. While some do 
leave the country, the lack of stringent oversight from the local government 
means that Madagascar has attracted less reputable investors such as the CIF and 
WISCO, which has constituted a major reason for the negative causal links 
between China’s engagements in the country and the lack of progress on the 
political situation. Ultimately, although some Chinese companies, entrepreneurs, 
and traffickers take advantage of the political vacuum in the country, the primary 
responsibility to effect an improvement in the regulatory framework lies primarily 
with the Malagasy state. 
 
                                                
651 Interview with the economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese embassy, August 18, 
2011.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that China’s engagements in 
Africa can positively impact local processes of development if they are 
appropriately harnessed by the host government. On a geopolitical level, China’s 
increasing presence as a development partner for African states and societies 
enlarges the policy space and opportunities for African countries to determine 
their own development policies. China’s engagements thus weaken the bargaining 
position of established donors who still condition their aid on democratic 
governance indicators. China’s commercial approach on the continent grants a 
large amount of discretionary power in terms of how Chinese aid, trade, and 
investments are managed to the African state, irrespective of regime type. 
Moreover, China’s engagement offers African societies tangible, practical tools to 
further economic exchanges and private sector growth. This occurs principally 
through China’s emphasis on infrastructural growth as a lever for development 
and through the installation of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants and business 
networks in African societies.   
I have explored this hypothesis through a case study of China’s 
engagements in Madagascar, which are particularly under-researched. I discussed 
the social, economic, and political dynamics particular to Madagascar and showed 
how they have influenced the local politics of development from independence 
until today. I then examined Madagascar’s politics of development from 2002 
until 2008 more closely, and sought to demonstrate that under Ravalomanana’s 
presidency the Malagasy government broadly displayed some of characteristics 
commonly associated with those of a developmental state. I then explored China’s 
engagements in the country, including Sino-Malagasy diplomatic relations, 
Chinese aid, trade, and investments in the country, Chinese migration to 
Madagascar, local perceptions of the Chinese presence, and the role of the 
Malagasy state in mitigating the negative impacts that arise from it. Based on my 
research, I conclude that the developmental effects of China’s engagements in 
Africa are invariably mixed and ultimately depend on how they interact with the 
local politics of development.  
 In this final chapter, I summarise my key findings and examine their 
implications. I discuss the self-perpetuating tendencies of negative stereotypes, 
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and argue that the propagation of negative perceptions about the activities of the 
Chinese in Madagascar obscures a balanced appreciation of China’s engagements 
in the country. I highlight how the lack of knowledge concerning the Chinese 
engagement is partly due to an absence of interactions and suggest that increased 
dialogue and mutual understanding would help close the gap between the negative 
and potentially positive impacts arising from the Chinese engagements in 
Madagascar. Through the Malagasy case, I have also addressed two broader 
issues: the role of “African agency” in Sino-African development relations, and 
the issues that China’s engagement raises for democratic governance in Africa, 
and I discuss each of these issues in turn. Although the suggestion that China may 
help further local processes of development affords external actors an important 
role in internal development processes, my emphasis on the Malagasy 
government highlights that of local agency, and I maintain that local Malagasy 
actors drive the Sino-Malagasy relationship to a significant degree. I also expand 
on my argument that China is not directly supporting a rogue state or thwarting 
democratic processes in Madagascar. Finally, I explain the limitations of my 
research subject and methodology, suggest areas for further research, and offer 
concluding statements.  
 
Key findings 
  
 This dissertation was structured into seven chapters. In chapter two, I 
contextualised the politics of development in Madagascar. I elucidated how 
Madagascar’s socio-economic dynamics that originated in the pre-colonial era 
and were reinforced through colonial policies have manifested themselves in a 
contemporary politics of development that is determined by the intricacies of elite 
bargaining. I provided an overview of Madagascar’s economic, social, and 
political history, analysed the difficult transition to democracy in 1993, and 
discussed relations between state and civil society. I showed that Madagascar 
remains one of the poorest countries in the world despite having a low population 
density, access to land and sea, and significant mineral and metal endowments 
that are sustaining the growth of a still largely informal extractive industries. 
Since independence from France on June 26th, 1960, the majority of the 
population has remained poor while a small group of elites has prospered. Rather 
than being developmental, democracy seems to have strengthened the persistence 
of neopatrimonial political structures and the power of Madagascar’s elites to 
undermine the political decision-making process to suit their own needs. None of 
Madagascar’s democratic presidents have left office through a peaceful transfer of 
power after losing an election, all of them have subverted the democratic process 
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to consolidate their own power, and each of Madagascar’s “democratic” 
leadership transitions have been accompanied by severe political and economic 
crises. 
In general, the central issue in Malagasy politics is one of power sharing 
among a group of approximately 30 “big families”. A Francophone - Merina elite 
from the central highlands around Antananarivo in turn dominates bargaining 
processes within this group. Limiting politics and ethnicity in Madagascar to a 
highlander versus coastal dichotomy however risks simplifying a complex issue. 
Malagasy politics is further distinguished by an urban bias, class divisions based 
on ancestral hierarchies, and historical animosities between the Merina and the 
island’s 17 other ethnic groups. These issues were already endemic to Madagascar 
before the advent of colonialism, but French policies served to exacerbate and 
further politicise them. Extensive poverty and the dominance of the elite means 
that Malagasy civil society is unorganised and politically marginalised. Religious 
institutions, whose presence extends deep into the countryside, are the exception, 
but the power of the churches is sometimes manipulated for political purposes. 
The army is also a key player, but it has generally been relatively restrained 
during the various political crises, and seems to intervene in politics only when it 
is paid to do so by a political faction. Since the 1990s, the Malagasy political and 
economic elite has increasingly been joined by a very small and new group of 
industrialists who prospered in the wake of economic liberalisation, but as 
evidenced by the rise and fall of Ravalomanana, despite their growing influence, 
members of this group remain outside of the nucleus of power.  
In chapter three, I emphasised the importance of local politics for 
development by investigating Madagascar’s politics of development under 
Ravalomanana between 2002 and 2008 and the unravelling of his government 
more closely. Within the framework of the African developmental state literature, 
I explored to what extent the Malagasy government under the leadership of 
Ravalomanana could be considered developmental. I showed that when adapted 
to the modern African context, a flexible interpretation of the developmental state 
concept is relevant to help explore the tensions between state, society, and 
development in Africa. I then demonstrated that Ravalomanana’s government 
broadly displayed characteristics commonly associated with a developmental 
state, such as a vision for long-term growth, the articulation of a development 
plan, an emphasis on infrastructural growth, education, and the attraction of 
foreign investment, a mechanisms to centralise rents, and the attainment of 
economic growth. Ravalomanana’s desire to create a Malagasy developmental 
state was implicit in his assertions that he sought to emulate the type of state-led 
industrialisation witnessed during his trips to China. He had a long-term vision for 
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economic growth that centred on the expansion of infrastructure, investments in 
education, the attraction of foreign donors and private sector investors, and 
mining sector reform, which are fundamental elements of the developmental state 
paradigm. He centralised rents in his company, and created the EDBM, a one-
stop-shop for foreign investors. I demonstrated that after 2006, his policies had 
started to exert positive impacts on GDP and GNI, as well as on less traditional 
measures of wellbeing such as life expectancy.  
However, while Ravalomanana’s government strove to be developmental, 
the Malagasy state as a whole was not because there was no unified elite backing 
his agenda for development, and because Ravalomanana excessively appropriated 
public goods for himself behind the veneer of national development. A common 
joke in Madagascar is that Ravalomanana entered politics in order to remove 
some of the red tape impeding the growth of his private businesses, which is what 
he proceeded to do when he first became mayor of Antananarivo in 1999 and then 
president of Madagascar in 2002. Born into a family of modest means on the 
outskirts of Antananarivo, Ravalomanana made his own fortune selling dairy 
products around the country through the Tiko Group, which became the largest 
indigenous company in Madagascar. The accumulation of wealth catapulted him 
onto the political stage, firstly by providing financial support to candidates, and 
then by giving him an incentive to run for mayor of the capital himself. However, 
instead of embedding the state within an industrial society and maintaining the 
clear distinction between the state and the market needed for economic growth, 
Ravalomanana’s personal businesses became the country’s industrial society. He 
created new companies, incorporated them under Tiko, and disproportionately 
awarded them government contracts to implement his development projects. In 
time, his business interests had begun to monopolise many of the country’s key 
industries. By maintaining a tight grip on economic process in the country, 
Ravalomanana was able to rapidly and effectively implement his industrial 
growth policies, but this excessively centralised rents in Ravalomanana’s personal 
assets instead of in a state-run company or institution. This alienated influential 
factions of the Malagasy elite, many of whom had already disliked Ravalomanana 
to begin with.  
Most likely, Ravalomanana was ousted from power by a group of Merina 
elites who operated with the tacit support of the French and prominent members 
of the Indo-Pakistani community, who saw their economic rents threatened by his 
policies. Although he was a Merina himself, Ravalomanana was not a member of 
one of the big families, and he was widely considered an anomaly in Malagasy 
politics. His power and legitimacy was based more on a popular acceptance rather 
than on a consensus among the traditional elite. Following increasing 
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apprehension over the confluence between Ravalomanana’s personal interests and 
those of the state, as well as several public scandals involving the purchase of a 
new presidential jet and a controversial land-lease agreement with a Korean firm, 
Ravalomanana’s political and economic opponents were able to mobilise the 
masses against him. The underlying social and political dynamics that have 
repeatedly undermined development processes thus also thwarted the long-term 
viability of the economic growth that commenced under Ravalomanana’s  regime. 
In chapter four, I turned to China’s engagements in the country and 
examined Sino-Malagasy relations at the state level. I sought to demonstrate the 
historical and diplomatic pertinence of the relationship, and the more recent turn 
towards Chinese aid, trade, and investments and its strategy of promoting 
economic development based on infrastructural growth. China has had 
longstanding development aid projects in Madagascar since diplomatic ties were 
first established in 1972. A Sino-Malagasy construction company built the 
highway connecting Antananarivo with Toamasina in the 1980s, which still today 
symbolises Sino-Malagasy friendship, and a Chinese SOE constructed the sports 
stadium in Antananarivo in 1997. I also explored China’s engagement in 
Madagascar under Ravalomanana since 2002 in more detail and discussed the 
major projects initiated by China between 2002 and 2008. Large-scale projects 
include the construction of the ICC, a five-star hotel, a compound of luxury villas, 
the rehabilitation of the highway between the international airport in Ivato and 
downtown Antananarivo, and the upgrade of Madagascar’s largest hydroelectric 
dam. I also considered China’s diplomatic relations with the HAT and showed 
that while China has sought to placate the international community by not 
formally recognising Madagascar’s transitional government, diplomatic relations 
have continued, and following a small respite, aid, trade, and investment relations 
have in some cases grown.  
I then discussed Chinese development aid to Madagascar and provided an 
overview of Chinese development projects in the country. Since 1990, China has 
disbursed over US $102 billion in non-military development aid to Madagascar, 
mostly in the form of grants to support infrastructure, education, rural 
development, and health projects. Madagascar is also one of 20 African countries 
with a Chinese hybrid rice centre. I examined this venture more closely because it 
represents both the opportunities and caveats within Sino-Malagasy development 
relations. Next, I examined trade and investment data and showed that there is a 
complementarity between China’s quest for natural resources and Madagascar’s 
infrastructure needs. China’s role as a provider of infrastructure in Madagascar, as 
elsewhere in Africa, is controversial. Chinese development finance is often 
conditional on the hiring of Chinese contractors to implement the projects, and 
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critics postulate that the loans essentially benefit the Chinese companies and the 
Chinese government more than the local populations. This is partly due to the 
alleged low quality and unsustainability of Chinese-built construction projects. 
However, as I discussed the operations of Chinese SOEs in Madagascar, I showed 
that Western and other development agencies regularly finance Chinese-built 
construction projects. This suggests that criticisms against China’s role as a new 
development partner in Africa are more superficial than they initially appear.  
In chapter five, I moved from state-to-state relations to the private sector 
by discussing the growth of the two Chinese migrant communities in Madagascar 
and the concomitant transfer of Chinese business networks to Malagasy 
entrepreneurs. I maintained that the high number of new Chinese entrepreneurial 
settlers in Madagascar and the resulting growth of interactions between Chinese 
capitalists and local actors benefit local employment and entrepreneurship. I 
opened this chapter by discussing how Chinese business networks become 
implanted in Africa and the manners in which they could theoretically facilitate 
access to new supply chains and knowledge for African entrepreneurs. I then 
examined the growth of the old and new Chinese communities in Madagascar. I 
maintained that the existence of the old Chinese community on the island is an 
important reason for the high rates of new Chinese migration. China and 
Madagascar have a history of migration that dates from the mid-1800s and the 
importation of Chinese labourers by French colonial authorities in the late-1800s. 
The growth of the old Chinese community in Madagascar accelerated 
significantly around the turn of the 20th century, peaked just prior to World War 
Two when Japan invaded Manchuria, and then dropped significantly in the post-
war years due to French-imposed immigration restrictions. Next, I discussed the 
growth of the new Chinese migrants since the mid-1990s and showed how kinship 
and business networks helped determine their choice of host country and 
economic activities. I estimated that as of 2011, approximately 70,000 - 100,000 individuals 
with Chinese passports were residing in Madagascar. Most of the migrants settle temporarily as 
small-scale traders in Antananarivo, although there are by now a number of older 
and more economically successful new Chinese in the country who put down 
roots and may end up remaining longer than originally anticipated. The new 
Chinese arrive in Madagascar predominantly through kinship or business ties. 
Once in Madagascar, these links are expanded and intensified among the new 
Chinese business community, and gradually extended into Malagasy society.  
Finally, I explored how Chinese migrant networks are impacting local 
entrepreneurs. I discussed several examples of Malagasy entrepreneurs who have 
found ways to exploit the presence of new Chinese business networks and supply 
chains in the country. Some Malagasy lease real estate to Chinese merchants, 
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while others purchase goods imported by the Chinese entrepreneurs and sell them 
from stalls on the streets of Antananarivo themselves. I highlighted the case of the 
Malagasy paper company, PAPMAD, which took advantage of the new supply 
chains with Chinese companies being formed in Madagascar to procure new 
printing machines from China. Access to these machines allowed the company to 
produce its wares more cheaply and thereby compete with the influx of Chinese 
goods on the Malagasy market. I also demonstrated that China’s engagements in 
Madagascar are leading to increased bi-directional flows. Malagasy entrepreneurs 
are increasingly flying to China to attend trade fairs, buy Chinese goods directly, 
or showcase their products on the Chinese market. Often, this type of activity is 
supported by the Chinese government, which subsidises Malagasy to attend trade 
shows and technical training workshops in China. In response to the increased 
presence of Malagasy in China, a few Malagasy have launched freight forwarding 
and translation businesses in Guangzhou. The increasing presence and dynamism 
of Chinese human and financial capital in Madagascar thus represents important 
economic opportunities for Malagasy entrepreneurs through the creation of new 
business links.  
In chapter six, I argued that the manner in which these engagements will 
influence economic processes in the country depend to a significant degree on 
state presence, withdrawal, and policy. Despite the positive impacts that arise 
from China’s presence in Madagascar, the new Chinese migrants, and China’s 
engagement more generally, continue to be vilified by the majority of Malagasy. I 
first explored how local perceptions are shaped by Sino-Malagasy interactions in 
the marketplace and then analysed the validity of these perceptions. The low 
quality of Chinese products and several incidents involving disputes between 
Chinese employers and their Malagasy employees have resulted in widespread 
discontent with the new Chinese community, and in one case, a public riot in 
Antananarivo’s Chinatown. I found that Chinese traders and companies do have a 
tendency to circumvent local customs, laws, and regulations. I discussed how 
COMPLANT had disregarded local traditions when it set up its sugar factory in 
Sakalava territory and angered the local population. In another example involving 
the sugar company, I explained how a misunderstanding between a production 
manager and his Malagasy employees had caused a national scandal that 
culminated in the former’s deportation. I also investigated the false custom 
declarations concerning the value of Chinese imports and demonstrated that an 
abundance of low-cost Chinese blankets have helped obliterate the local blanket 
industry. Finally, I showed that Chinese mafia groups have become increasingly 
entrenched in Madagascar and that local authorities as well as prominent 
members of the HAT have been implicated in helping to sustain the trafficking 
networks. This is especially damaging to the reputation of the new Chinese 
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engagements in the country, not to mention Madagascar’s sustainable 
development prospects themselves.  
I then discussed the role of the Malagasy government in managing the 
Chinese engagement. I utilised the examples of the textile industry and the 
environmental sector to demonstrate the importance of government policy. 
Madagascar’s government has done little to protect Malagasy producers from 
unfair or excessive competition from cheaper Chinese imports. Although 
Malagasy civil society is weak, several consumer and business organisations have 
been formed in response to this and have raised the issue with the Malagasy 
Ministry of Commerce. Up until now, there have been no tangible changes at the 
policy level that would protect or even help established Malagasy producers find 
ways to compete. I also showed that Madagascar’s textile sector had been a very 
successful industry when there was political stability in the country, which ended 
when Madagascar lost its preferential trade agreement with the US after AGOA 
was terminated in 2009. Chinese textile firms had made significant investments in 
the free trade zone known as the Zone Franche, contributing to employment and 
manufacturing growth, but the political events that led to the stagnation of the 
textile sector caused most of the Chinese firms to leave Madagascar and seek 
opportunities elsewhere.  
Regulating China’s environmental and social impacts in the extractive 
industries in Madagascar is also problematic. Madagascar’s regulatory framework 
for mining companies was improved in the late 1990s and under Ravalomanana’s 
regime, but existing policies remain inadequate, and their enforcement is often 
subject to political will and sometimes determined by political intricacies. China 
has also made some efforts to meet international environmental standards for its 
overseas investments, but given the frail regulatory framework inside 
Madagascar, the discretion to manage their impacts on surrounding communities 
rests largely with the mining companies themselves. I then examined Chinese 
interests and activities in Madagascar’s extractive industries. I showed that 
Chinese companies are currently the largest group of new investors in this sector. 
Although WISCO and SUNPEC are the most well known, there are a myriad of 
medium-sized and smaller companies exploring for mainly gold, ilmenite, quartz, 
zirconium, coal, and gemstones in Madagascar. Many of them do not respect the 
terms of their contracts and utilise their personal connections to the Chinese state 
to negotiate with the Malagasy government. I also show that the politicisation of 
the mining sector has become more acute since the HAT has assumed power and 
discussed the controversies surrounding the WISCO and CIF deals in more detail. 
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Stereotyping versus learning about “the Chinese”  
 
When members of a dominant group such as the Malagasy can point to the 
actual negative behaviours of individuals within a minority group, they can be 
used as evidence for the validity of certain characteristics, which often become 
accepted stereotypes. Often, negative stereotypes risk becoming self-fulfilling 
prophesies as an erroneous trait attributed to a particular group becomes accepted 
as common knowledge.652 This appears to be the case in Madagascar, where the 
unscrupulous behaviour by some members of the new Chinese community is 
often extended to all of the new Chinese businesses and one undesirable aspect of 
their presence is utilised to explain the Sino-Malagasy relationship as a whole. 
The allegation that China used Chinese prison labourers to construct the ICC is an 
example of this occurring. The international press tends to concentrate on the 
negative aspects of China’s activities in Madagascar, and local reports highlight 
disputes between Malagasy employees and their Chinese employers, the illegal 
activities of Chinese entrepreneurs, or their lack of respect for the country’s 
traditions and environment. The pervasiveness of negative stereotypes and 
perceptions concerning the impacts of China’s engagement obscures an 
appreciation of those components of China’s engagement that are less 
immediately visible to the average Malagasy, but are nonetheless influencing 
development processes in important ways. Accepting China’s negative 
development impacts in the country as an established fact also burdens the 
distribution of knowledge concerning those aspects of China’s engagements in the 
country that do exhibit the potential to have positive impacts on processes of 
development in Madagascar. While stories circulate about the exploitative nature 
of the Chinese engagement among local residents, comparatively little effort is 
made to understand how and why Chinese actions are impacting processes of 
development in Madagascar. 
Underlying the negative perceptions of China’s engagement in 
Madagascar is a fundamental lack of knowledge concerning the new Chinese on 
the part of the Malagasy and vice versa. The new Chinese remain something of an 
enigma to the Malagasy. An employer-employee or a vendor-customer dichotomy 
structures local level Sino-Malagasy relations, and the average Malagasy 
conceives of “the Chinese” in terms of how their presence impacts their daily 
lives. Those who have strong views on the long-term impacts of the Chinese 
                                                
652 Fleming and Jussim, “Self-fulfilling Prophesies”, 161-192. 
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engagement, who are generally found within the elite families and the 
government, appear to be somewhat in awe of China’s rapid industrialisation. As 
noted by Jones et al., “China is increasingly exerting an ambiguous ideological 
impact on the political-economic imaginations of African elites. Chinese political 
and commercial actors are increasingly assertive in advertising China’s domestic 
achievements and suggesting to Africans that they too can transform their 
economies if they follow their model, the specifics of which are often left 
vague”.653 This analysis is correct for the Malagasy case, where the elites do not 
seem to be very erudite about the specifics of China’s economic growth model or 
the organisational structures and mechanisms of the Chinese state. Inside 
Madagascar, the Chinese engagement is narrowly conceptualised in terms of its 
impacts, but the political drivers of the engagement outside of Madagascar are not 
properly understood. This is partly based on contempt for a disproportionately 
profit and results- focussed business culture among the Chinese investors that 
juxtaposes the Malagasy veneration for the Chinese, and partly because issues of 
governance and politics of development are not widely debated in Madagascar.  
Conversely, Chinese investors were found to display a limited 
understanding of Malagasy culture, which is because they view their stay in 
Madagascar as a short-term business venture. While many of the small-scale 
traders have learned Malagasy to communicate with their customers and 
xenophobia against the Malagasy appears to be relatively low, the Chinese in 
general have made little effort to learn about Malagasy politics, society, business 
culture, or local customs in their regions of investment. Establishing trusting and 
effective working relationships with rural Malagasy or with Malagasy from 
different ethnic backgrounds depends to some extent on an adequate knowledge 
of local customs. The example involving COMPLANT’s neglect of Sakalava 
customs exemplify the cultural divide and differences in business ethics between 
Malagasy society and the new Chinese community in Madagascar. The incident 
between the Chinese shop owner and his Malagasy employee in Behoririka, 
which degenerated into a public riot, demonstrated the fragile nature of the Sino-
Malagasy relationship among the local population. To promote an understanding 
of local customs, it was suggested that Chinese investors teach their foreign 
employees and contractors being sent to Madagascar about the customs of the 
communities located in the zones of investment.654  
The diplomatic and donor community in Madagascar is only gradually 
beginning to view the new presence of China in the country as having serious 
                                                
653 Jones et al., Illiberal Statebuilders, p. 20.  
654 Interview with the employee in charge of the WISCO folder at the ONE, June 7, 2011. 
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implications for local development prospects. South Africa, the US, and France 
largely continue to conceive of the growing Chinese presence in Madagascar as a 
strategic issue relative to their own interests on the island, and as detrimental to 
their efforts to promote an end to the crisis. However, as I have discussed, 
multilateral development organisations, including the ADB, BADA, and the 
World Bank often award tenders for construction contracts to Chinese SOEs. In 
addition, the goal of the study commissioned by the UNDP and UNICEF in 
Madagascar to explore the presence of Chinese investors in Madagascar in 2011, 
described in the introduction, was to learn more about Chinese social and 
environmental policies in Madagascar in order to initiate dialogue with Chinese 
companies on the topic of CSR. This project has not materialised, but the fact that 
it was launched is a positive development in the right direction. Slowly, the 
international development organisations in Madagascar are accepting that China’s 
presence in Madagascar is long-term and that an understanding of China’s 
motivations and conceptions of development aid furthers mutual interests. 
 
Promoting knowledge about the Chinese engagement 
 
Increasing levels of knowledge between the new Chinese actors and 
Malagasy society can occur at all strata of society through a number of channels, 
but principally through increased dialogue and interaction. Public debate on the 
impacts of Chinese investments on the local economy, and the role of the 
Malagasy government in managing the new Chinese engagement, in the form of 
workshops, seminars at the University in Antananarivo, the Confucius Institute, or 
at the Chinese congregations, would open up avenues for increased mutual 
understanding. The WWF representative in Madagascar had recounted a story 
about his first-hand experience debating the values of environmental protection 
with Chinese investors. When he met several Chinese companies at a conference 
on the environmental impacts of foreign investments in Africa, they were 
reluctant to talk with him simply because they could not comprehend the very 
essence of the WWF’s mission. After several hours of discussions and the 
exchanging of viewpoints, however, relations thawed and the two parties enjoyed 
a constructive debate on the merits of environmental protection.655 Similarly, both 
Sino-Afrique and SOGECOA were not aware that Madagascar was a signatory to 
the EITI. Several Chinese SOEs also acknowledged that their business practices 
follow different values than those of other investors and demonstrated an interest 
                                                
655 Interview with the WWF representative in Madagascar, September 16, 2011.  
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in learning about Western social and environmental standards in an effort to 
enhance the reputation of their business practices in Madagascar.  
The Chinese government also appears to be interested in ameliorating the 
largely negative image that its companies and entrepreneurs have acquired in 
Madagascar, and in Africa more generally. This is implicit in the fact that it 
publicly apologised for the behaviour of the Chinese vendor whose behaviour 
resulted in a riot in Behoririka. The former Chinese ambassador also approached 
Madagascar’s most important business association, the GEM, to initiate a working 
relationship in early 2010, and in 2008 and 2012, the Chinese embassy organised 
fairs at the Sports Stadium in downtown Antananarivo to showcase Chinese 
products and dispel the myth that they are all of bad quality. 656  I have also shown 
that many Chinese stakeholders in Madagascar are amenable to complying with 
local rules and regulations where these are clearly communicated. Enhanced 
debate concerning China’s impacts in individual countries would ensure that 
when Beijing apologies for the actions of some its if countrymen abroad, these 
translate into tangible changes at the street level.  
Another principal means for knowledge transfers to occur is through the 
formation of joint Sino-Malagasy business ventures. As I have discussed, 
Mauritian entrepreneurs were able to move into manufacturing themselves after 
they acquired new skills from joint ventures with Chinese firms in the country’s 
EPZ. In Madagascar, most of the joint ventures between local and Chinese 
enterprises occur in the formal mining sector. Chinese investors often form joint 
ventures, partnerships, or financial agreements with Malagasy-registered 
companies who hold the actual mining permits, but this relationship serves to 
legitimise the Chinese company rather than promote Sino-Malagasy interaction or 
knowledge transfers.657 Despite the fact that the mining sector accounts for the 
largest number of Sino-Malagasy joint ventures, interactions among the Chinese 
and wider Malagasy population in this sector are further limited due to the rural 
setting of many of the mining and petroleum projects, and the fact that almost all 
of them are still in phases of exploration that requires the companies to import 
skilled technicians. The formation of joint ventures between traditional investors 
with a longer history of CSR and emerging investors such as China would also be 
effective in promoting a transfer of both operational and CSR skills between 
Madagascar’s development partners.  
The theme of interactions also extends to the Chinese SOEs and the 
Malagasy state. In chapter five, I showed that the benefits of Chinese 
                                                
656 Interview with the director of the GEM, November 16, 2010. 
657 Interview with the deputy director of the Malagasy mining registry, October 22, 2010. 
 212 
infrastructure and development projects for Madagascar as a whole are enhanced 
when these projects involve adequate oversight from the Malagasy government or 
from other development agencies. There is currently no requirement for foreign 
investors in Madagascar to employ a certain percentage of local labour in their 
operations, there is no adequate monitoring of their social and environmental 
spill-overs, and they are not held accountable to safety or quality standards. The 
illustration of how the ADB intervened on behalf of a small Chinese construction 
company after the Malagasy government had turned down an offer to construct a 
road indicated that, with sufficient oversight and control mechanisms in place, 
Chinese companies perform at the same level of quality as Western companies, 
but often at a cheaper rate. Once the ADB had offered to oversee the Chinese 
project and ensure that its standards were being implemented, the Malagasy 
government relented, and the project was completed in due course to everybody’s 
satisfaction.658 This implies that the Malagasy state should promote partnerships 
between Chinese SOEs and Western development agencies and encourage 
knowledge, skills, and technology transfers by stipulating and enforcing that 
Chinese companies employ a certain amount of local labour, and regulate the 
types of training and local skills transfers that are expected from Chinese 
investors. China’s emphasis on health infrastructure, for example, should be 
welcomed, but Madagascar must ensure that its own labour force can sustain the 
operations once the Chinese technicians have returned to China. 
 
The role of agency in Sino-Malagasy development relations 
 
The issue of agency, which is defined as the capacity of local actors to 
make their own development choices, is a central theme throughout this 
dissertation and in China-Africa development relations, but it is not often 
explicitly discussed in the literature. Since China’s engagements in Africa are 
frequently conceived as exploitative, the ability of local actors to influence the 
Sino-African relationships is routinely underestimated.  Due to the novelty of the 
“China in Africa” field, relatively little policy-oriented research has emerged on 
what Africans themselves can do to enhance their relationships with China. This 
is gradually changing. As argued by Large, the potential “agency” of African 
government to manage their relations with China at optimal levels for 
development is a theme of continuing relevance.659 The concept of African 
agency covers all of the Malagasy who are impacted by China’s engagement and 
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who utilise their contact with the new Chinese actors in their countries to bolster 
their political or economic capital. The Malagasy actors are wide-ranging, but 
they are usefully divided between the private sector and the state.  
I showed that while some elements of the Malagasy private sector have 
found ways to exploit new employment opportunities, supply chains, and grow 
Sino-Malagasy business links, others have not been able to compete with the new 
Chinese entrepreneurs. In chapter six, I revealed how PAPMAD, the largest 
Indian Ocean paper company established in Madagascar in 1963, harnessed the 
increasing Sino-Malagasy commercial network to challenge Chinese competition 
on the Malagasy market for toilet paper. Faced with a loss of market share due to 
the influx of similar and cheaper products imported from China, PAPMAD used 
the Chinese presence to adapt its business strategy. The company began to 
produce recycled toilet paper with new machines purchased from a Chinese 
company based in Beijing, and was able to offer its product at a price below that 
of the Chinese competitors. PAPMAD ensured that Chinese technicians train its 
staff in the usage of the machines. The company hired a Malagasy girl educated in 
Mandarin at the Confucius Institute in Antananarivo to translate the training 
sessions with the three technicians who flew in from Beijing to assist with the set-
up of the machines. However, while the example of PAPMAD exemplifies both 
the success of China’s approach in Madagascar and the positive developmental 
impacts that can arise from the increasing Chinese presence in the country, this 
has not been the case for all of Madagascar’s industrial heavyweights. Other 
companies, such as SOMACOU, one of Madagascar’s premier textile and blanket 
companies, have suffered a tremendous market share loss as a direct result of 
cheaper Chinese imports. Yet the examples of PAPMAD suggests that 
SOMACOU will have to invigorate its business model to compete with the 
Chinese products as well, or that in time, another Malagasy company that does 
have the ability to compete with the Chinese imports might take its place. They 
also imply that domestic producers ought to be the focus of national agricultural 
and industrial policy, and the private sector needs to be given the tools to engage 
in value-added activities, entrepreneurial innovation, and business partnerships 
with Chinese firms. Companies such as SOMACOU that cannot meet the 
challenge of Chinese competition should perhaps be left to fail. The government 
ought to instead support promising local firms such as PAPMAD who have 
exhibited the potential to turn the threat of cheaper Chinese imports into an 
opportunity for innovative business practices.  
In this dissertation, I have also sought to provide an account of how the 
Malagasy state exercises agency in its relations with China. I have argued that 
while Ravalomanana’s regime was able to effectively align China’s engagement 
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and foreign and state incentives with strong development performance, the 
absence of strong political institutions since 2009 have led to a situation where 
Chinese entrepreneurs and the Chinese government are exploiting the country and 
harming the local population. Thus, as Sautman and Yan maintain, the differences 
among countries in attitudes towards China are primarily a function of the extent 
to which national politicians have elected to raise the “Chinese problem”. 660 
Although I have concentrated on the state from a theoretical standpoint, I have 
also emphasised the importance of the Malagasy private sector in harnessing the 
new economic opportunities presented to them by the influx of Chinese traders. 
The development impacts of China’s investments and projects in Madagascar are 
thus contingent on the ability of the central governments to deliver changes at 
both the state and grass-roots level, and to co-ordinate economic activities 
between small-scale traders and supply chains, especially in the conditions of 
poor market access prevalent in Madagascar.  
A key reason why Ravalomanana did not formulate a China-specific 
strategy and fully exploit China’s engagement to Madagascar’s advantage is the 
related issue of relative political and economic power. The economic imbalance 
between China and Madagascar is mirrored by a political imbalance that inhibits 
the extent to which the Malagasy government can exercise agency in its relation 
with China. Although China’s approach to its relations with African countries is 
based on the notion of a developing country partnership, China is at a very 
different stage of economic development than Madagascar. For the time being, 
China is in a position of power, and it will be difficult for Madagascar to assert 
itself when, or if, it wishes to do so. Tellingly, upon being asked why Madagascar 
has not devised a specific strategy for its relations China, the director of the Asia-
Pacific section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that it was a delicate 
matter and that such a strategy would have to evolve over time. 661 
The political situation in Madagascar renders this even more difficult. For 
reasons discussed throughout this dissertation, the HAT has a short-term 
economic outlook and seems intent on exploiting China’s engagement to further 
the interests of its members instead of the Malagasy population. There is a serious 
absence of adequate state capacity and will in the enforcement of laws, 
regulations, or safety standards regarding Chinese investments and economic 
activity in Madagascar: “…the biggest problem is simply in the applications of 
the laws here in Madagascar. With the crisis, this has become even worse and 
                                                
660 Sautman and Yan, “African Perspectives”, 728-759, p. 728. 
661 Interview with the director of the Asia-Pacific section at Malagasy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
October 20, 2010. 
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laws are simply not being implemented”. 662  The government’s neglectful 
approach towards the formulation and monitoring of regulations is most blatant 
with regards to Madagascar’s unique environment, especially in relation to 
Chinese investments in the extractive industries and the role of Chinese 
trafficking networks in the international rosewood trade. Compounding these 
issues is the weakness of both Malagasy civil society and the institutions tasked 
with enforcing environmental and social regulations. Concurrently, regional 
government officials and prominent members of the HAT have been directly 
implicated in profiting from the smuggling of rosewood and other endangered 
species out of Madagascar. A crucial challenge for Madagascar in the coming 
decades will be how to reconcile mining sector growth, which will increasingly be 
driven by Chinese investments, with sustainable development practices. 
Members of the new Chinese community have themselves expressed 
discontent with some of the ways they have been treated by the Malagasy 
government, further implying that state agency under the HAT was not 
developmental. WISCO executives claim that they paid US $140 million as a 
signature bonus in 2010, not US $100 million.663 At the time of the interview with 
the director of COMPLANT in August 2011, the Chinese company that now runs 
Madagascar’s sugar industry was incensed over a government-imposed ban on a 
sugar deal. Responding to the increase in international sugar prices, the Malagasy 
government had forbidden COMPLANT from selling a large quantity of sugar. 
Instead, the HAT ordered it to stock the sugar in its warehouse so that the 
government could buy it at a subsidised rate and sell it back to the population at a 
cheaper price – putting itself in favour with the local population but damaging the 
economy as a whole.664 I also highlighted the corruption case involving SMATP 
and the Minister of Public Works, who had demanded a 10% payoff for helping 
negotiate a construction contract awarded to the Chinese company. 
 
China, democracy, and development   
 
The consensus among the diplomatic and donor community in 
Madagascar is that the continued availability of Chinese funding has played a 
significant role in the failure to resolve the political crisis, the lack of progress on 
the implementation of SADC’s Roadmap, and the HAT’s continued attempts at 
                                                
662 Interview with the WWF representative in Madagascar, September 16, 2011. 
663 “Miner’s Missing Millions”, Africa-Asia Confidential, 2012, 5, no. 9. 
664 Interview with the director of COMPLANT, August 19, 2011. 
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unilateralism. China’s engagement of Madagascar is certainly an example where 
China is doing business “with African ruling regimes that are often not 
representative of their populations and may be violating the human rights of their 
citizens”.665 Despite freezes in diplomatic relations between Western governments 
and the current regime in Madagascar, China has maintained its relations with the 
HAT at the lower state levels and, notwithstanding a decrease in official 
development aid to Madagascar, China’s economic relationship with the country 
has not been dramatically altered by the political crisis on the island. Since 2009, 
when the HAT assumed power, the Chinese government and private Chinese 
entrepreneurs have been increasing their activities in the country while economic 
and social development indicators in Madagascar have deteriorated. China clearly 
interferes in the internal politics of other countries, but it does not promote a 
Western rhetoric of democracy. However, drawing a causal link between the 
Chinese engagement and Madagascar’s democratic stagnation is a hasty inference 
for several reasons.  
China’s engagement in the country may be growing, but it is still 
relatively small compared to that of other foreign donors and investors. I have 
shown that China has decreased the amount of development aid it has given to 
Madagascar since the advent of the crisis, and that it has not been among the top 
five contributors to Madagascar’s aid receipts between 2009 and 2011. To put the 
amount of Chinese aid given to Madagascar into perspective, the US remains by 
far the biggest donor to Madagascar. Even with the curtailment of non-
humanitarian aid deemed non-essential to the survival of the Malagasy, the 
American development aid budget still totalled more than US $91 million in 
2010. 666  According to the AMP, China reported its aid contribution to 
Madagascar for the same year as US $2 million.667 Even if this is a gross 
underestimation, it is still far less than that of the US. Faced with donor budget 
cuts, Madagascar does place great importance on the promotion of Chinese trade 
and investment. However, I have also shown that Sino-Malagasy trade has 
decreased since 2009, that the two biggest investment projects in Madagascar are 
currently Canadian and British, and they are both involved in the country’s 
extractive industries. 
China does not wish to be viewed as explicitly supporting internationally 
ostracised governments in Africa, and has taken steps to mitigate this perception 
in Madagascar. China has not officially recognised the HAT, and Chinese 
diplomats do not attend Malagasy state events nor do they invite Malagasy 
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667 www.amp-madagascar.gov. mg. 
 217 
officials to their own. China even requested that Madagascar not send a 
representative to the FOCAC meeting in Sharm-el-Sheik in late December 2009. 
However, China has continued with diplomatic relations at the lower levels of 
government and has persisted with supporting its private and state-owned 
companies in the country. Low-level Chinese diplomats have openly met with 
HAT members, and the new Chinese ambassador to Madagascar presented his 
credentials to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and met with the prime minister of 
Madagascar in 2012.668 However, China is not the only foreign actor to soften its 
stance regarding Madagascar’s political crisis. Other diplomatic representations in 
Madagascar are also engaging the HAT. The French and German ambassadors, 
for example, have officially presented their credentials to the HAT, and former 
French president Sarkozy granted Rajoelina an audience during a visit to Paris.  
China has also placated the international community by following IMF 
investment rules where applicable. In chapter five I discussed how the IMF had 
intervened in a negotiation between the Malagasy government and the China 
Exim Bank in 2008 because the interest rates proposed by China were too high for 
the IMF. Beijing complied with the IFI and merged two projects into one so that 
the grant component of one project exceeded the loan component of the other, and 
Chinese companies could still be contracted to construct the projects. 
Additionally, Beijing has also distanced itself from the CIF and WISCO. China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs insists that CIF and its Singapore-based sister 
organisation, China Sonangol, are private businesses that are separate from the 
government (yet while Beijing was publicly denouncing CIF, its state-owned 
enterprises were concluding multimillion-dollar deals for train equipment with the 
company from Hong-Kong).669 The Chinese ambassador to Madagascar also 
denies having any knowledge of links between the Chinese government and 
WISCO, despite WISCO having to seek approval from China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission, one of China’s principal economic 
planning institutions, to make the investment, and the fact that it is the third 
largest steel producer in China.670   
My discussions of politics and development in Madagascar in chapters 
two and three suggests that whether or not China is undermining democratic 
political developments in Madagascar is a moot point because the process of 
electoral democracy in Madagascar itself is flawed.  Political power in the country 
ultimately rests in the hands of the executive who can legally act virtually with 
impunity as long as he satisfies the demands of a powerful network of established 
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political families.671 Although a large faction within this network of families 
supports Rajoelina, the current political crisis will most likely come to an end 
once the groups that are being marginalised by Rajoelina’s policies organise 
themselves to stage the next take-over of power. Rajoelina himself seems 
increasingly intent on remaining in office. Despite promises that it will hold 
elections, it is not in the HAT’s interest to do so. The example of development in 
Madagascar under Ravalomanana’s regime between 2002-2008 indicated that for 
the case of Madagascar, political and bureaucratic efficacy matters more than 
participatory politics. In this instance, a developmental government that was 
democratic in name mixed the private interests of politicians with that of the state, 
demonstrating that neopatrimonialism and economic growth are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Corrupt politicians can be developmental so long as rents are 
channelled into productive areas of the economy.672 Any Malagasy politician or 
businessman who negotiates with the Chinese will attempt to advance their own 
interests and profit from the Chinese engagements.  What matters more for 
development is what happens with the remaining profits.  
China is thus not directly harming democratic processes in Madagascar, 
and China’s increasing engagement of Madagascar has not significantly altered 
the political playing field in the country. Put bluntly, different members of the 
same families who were vying for political power at independence in 1960 
continue to exert a disproportional influence in politics and economics today. The 
point is that regardless of the label attached to it (good governance, democracy, 
neopatrimonialsm), the politics of development are a means to an end, which in 
the case of Madagascar is economic and human development. Madagascar will 
have to implement an economic development plan that incorporates China’s 
engagement in a manner compatible with the demands of both the population and 
the local elite. As a Malagasy academic at the Catholic University of Madagascar 
commented: “what works in the West does not necessarily work in Madagascar. 
You have to work with the system. Not recognizing it [the HAT] just stalls 
improvement. It will be a recurring cycle. The international community is asking 
for the impossible. The crisis will last, with or without Chinese investment.” 
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2010. 
672 Bhagwati, 2002. 
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Concluding statements  
 
The contemporary and progressive nature of the topic under investigation 
in this dissertation resulted in the exploration of a forward-looking hypothesis 
supplemented by research at the ground level. A lack of existing analysis on the 
evolving Sino-Malagasy relationship meant that I had to document the Chinese 
presence in Madagascar and disaggregate this relationship before I could explore 
the developmental effects arising from it. This necessitated a broad, countrywide 
parameter to the study, which constrained the extent to which I could examine 
specific sectors of Chinese involvement in more depth. Yet the wide focus of the 
study enabled me to conceptualise the Chinese engagement of Madagascar as a 
whole and to analyse those components that were especially relevant to my thesis. 
Additionally, by focusing on the presence of China inside Madagascar, I did not 
investigate the issues that Chinese exports raise for Malagasy commodities on the 
global market. However, as Chinese firms take on more substantive roles in 
global production networks and become lead firms, there is also a realisation that 
China raises new challenges and opportunities for export industries in developing 
countries. Madagascar can benefit from the growth of Chinese firms by filling the 
vacuum, but many Chinese products on the global economy compete with 
Malagasy products as well. This project was also limited by the difficulties 
associated with accessing reliable information on economic or demographic 
statistics pertaining to the Chinese presence in the country and the activities of 
Chinese companies, which was due to a lack of data collection and dissemination 
by the Chinese and Malagasy authorities and a general sense of opaqueness on 
behalf of the Chinese interviewees.  
As China’s presence in Madagascar evolves, further research will help to 
determine which Chinese actors will be productive members of society and leave 
some of their skills or profits behind, and which will not. Future studies might 
investigate the roles of local customs regulations, and the enforcement of these 
regulations, in influencing the growing competition from affordable Chinese 
goods on the Malagasy market. Concise information concerning China’s projects 
in health and agriculture were also difficult to access. Additional investigations 
into the day-to-day operations and longer-term prospects arising from China’s 
hybrid rice project in Madagascar, or the ways in which Chinese doctors are 
training Malagasy doctors at the malaria centre in Mahitsy, would offer novel and 
interesting insights to complement this study. An interview with WISCO was also 
absent from the research conducted for this study. Despite countless inquiries for 
contact information, and several calls to the company headquarters in 
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Antananarivo, the operating mechanisms of the conglomerate in the country 
remain elusive. A thorough exploration of how the ONE and relevant Malagasy 
Ministries and organisations have handled the country’s potentially biggest 
foreign investment to date would significantly advance the research agenda on the 
Sino-Malagasy relationship. 
Nonetheless, this dissertation has provided an original contribution to the 
rapidly growing body of work on “China in Africa” by analysing how the Chinese 
presence is impacting processes of development in Madagascar, a country that has 
hitherto received limited attention within this field of study. Due to the unique 
history of Chinese entrepreneurial migration to Madagascar, I highlighted the 
particular historical, economic, political, and social contexts in which these 
processes are unfolding. I found that the persistence of rumours and negative 
stereotypes about the new Chinese in Madagascar obstructs the identification and 
promotion of Sino-Malagasy ties in the areas where China is exerting positive 
development effects. These are arising through the creation of practical and 
structural tools needed for development embodies by Chinese-funded and built 
infrastructure projects. Broadly understood, these projects include agricultural, 
health, transport, energy, and communications infrastructures, whose 
developmental effects complement one another. Furthermore, an often-
overlooked but equally important aspect of China’s engagement is the increasing 
flow of non-tangible assets and capital represented by Chinese entrepreneurs who 
migrate to Madagascar. The vast majority of new Chinese entrepreneurs view 
their stint in Madagascar as a short-term opportunity to accumulate wealth with 
which to start a business once they return to China. In the meantime, however, 
many of them learn Malagasy, hire local employees, and transfer knowledge and 
skills to the local economy. Joint partnerships between Chinese and Malagasy 
companies, bi-directional migratory flows, and the hiring and training of local 
staff by Chinese companies, is also evidence of technology and knowledge 
transfers at work. While Chinese manufacturing is competing with Malagasy 
businesses, leading to growing resentments and a need for the government to 
better protect fragile industries, some Malagasy appear to be learning and finding 
ways to benefit from the Chinese business models through Chinese supply chains, 
business networks, and links. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have also aspired to offer some nuance to 
the controversies concerning China’s impacts on economic and political processes 
in African countries. Utilising the example of Madagascar, I have argued that 
because the development impacts of China in Africa are invariably mixed, they 
will ultimately depend on how the Chinese engagement is managed by African 
governments. Under Ravalomanana’s development-oriented government, China’s 
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engagement helped increase economic and human development, while under 
Rajoelina’s government similar engagements have not helped produced the same 
results. I thus maintain that, despite the existence of serious issues regarding 
negative economic spillovers, unfortunate incidents surrounding social and labour 
relations, harmful environmental impacts, and the sometimes questionable quality 
of imported products and infrastructure projects, China’s engagements in Africa 
can be conducive for local processes of development for several reasons.  
First, China’s growing engagements in Africa intervene in orthodox 
development theory at a time when the relevance and efficacy of this orthodoxy, 
especially its emphasis on good governance, is increasingly being called into 
question. Increasing recognition that traditional development aid has not produced 
widespread poverty reduction across the continent and the introduction of new 
development partners in Africa has resulted in a process of self-reflection among 
the established donor community. This is leading to the growing acceptance that 
local contexts not only differ between developing countries, but that they matter 
greatly for their development prospects. The role of the state is thus becoming 
more central to economic development, with the issue changing from whether or 
not the African state is a protagonist in development processes to what kind of 
role it can and should play in these processes. Despite its nominally a-political 
approach to its aid, trade, and investment relationships with African countries, the 
Chinese engagements places a premium on the role of the African state in 
managing its country’s development agenda. This represents a shift from 
orthodox development policy and highlights the prominence of African agency in 
development.  
Additionally, China’s commercial-based relationships with African 
countries, its insistence on practical solutions to the continent’s development 
problems, and its emphasis on vital infrastructures provide African governments a 
platform on which to superimpose private-sector led growth. I have sought to 
show that, coupled with Chinese investments and projects in the infrastructure 
sectors, the creation of new Sino-Malagasy business networks and links can help 
increase opportunities for the production of local goods for sale at home and 
export abroad. Above all, I have argued that the key to harnessing this potential is 
for the Malagasy state as a whole to formulate and enforce a China-specific 
development strategy, encourage multi-directional flows between China and 
Madagascar, and promote improved dialogue and communication in order to 
enhance awareness about the opportunities inherent in the new Chinese 
engagements of the country for both Madagascar’s entrepreneurs and the island’s 
other international development partners.   
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94. Employee, ONE, August 31, 2011. 
95. Director, JIRAMA, September 1, 2011. 
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96. Former academic and retired director of Air Madagascar, September 25, 2010. 
97. Director of SIPROMAD, September 29, 2011.  
98. Director, Nouvelle Imprimerie des Arts Graphiques (NIAG), September 29, 
2010. 
99. Director, Soltec, November 2, 2010.  
100. Owner, Import business, November 9, 2010.  
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101. Director of GEM, November 16, 2010.  
102. President of SIM, November 22, 2010.  
103. Secretary General, Cluster Textile Mada Group, November 24, 2010.  
104. Director of PAPMAD, March 24, 2012 
105. Deputy director of PAPMAD, March 24, 2012. 
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106. Resident and hotel owner in Belo-sur-Tsiribihina, October 19, 2010.  
107. Consumer 1, September 17, 2010. 
108. Consumer 2, September 17, 2010.  
109. Consumer 3, September 17, 2010. 
110. Consumer 4, September 21, 2010.  
111. Consumer 5, September 23, 2010. 
112. Consumer 6, September 27, 2010. 
113. President of FIMPA, December 10, 2010.  
 
From the diplomatic community in Madagascar, excluding China 
 
114. Madagascar country director, World Bank, September 16, 2010. 
115. Cultural attaché, German embassy, September 17, 2010.  
116. Director, Goethe Institute, September 17, 2010.  
117. Resident representative, UNDP Madagascar, September 20, 2010.  
118. Madagascar country director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 20, 2010.  
119. Senior private sector development specialist, World Bank, September 22, 
2010.  
120. Political and economic section chief, US Embassy, September 23, 2010. 
121. Resident representative, IMF, September 27, 2010. 
122. Resident representative, IMF, September 28, 2010.  
123. Former IMF representative to Madagascar from 1989-1992, September 22, 
2012.  
124. Director of operations, ABD, September 28, 2010.  
125. Ambassador, Norwegian embassy, October 4, 2010.  
126. Programme fundraiser, UNICEF, October 14, 2010.  
127. Media relations assistant, UNICEF, October 14, 2010. 
128. American missionary, October 27, 2010.  
129. Chargé d’affaires, US embassy, October 27, 2011.  
130. Resident representative, UNCEF, November 9, 2010.  
131. Chief Economist, World Bank, November 10, 2010.  
132. Ambassador, French embassy, November 10, 2010. 
133. Economic and commercial counsellor, French embassy, November 10, 2010. 
134. Consultant, WWF, August 23, 2011. 
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136. Ambassador, German embassy, June 1, 2011. 
137. Director, WWF, November 16, 2011 
138. CSR consultant, WWF, November 16, 2011.  
139. Media relations chief, UNICEF, November 26, 2011. 
140. Assistant to the deputy chief of mission, South African embassy, August 17, 
2011. 
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142. Political attaché, US embassy, August 23, 2011. 
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2012.  
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144. Director of Airtel Madagascar, September 29, 2011.  
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148. Consultant for Sherrit, August 26, 2011.  
149. Representative, Rio Tinto Madagascar, August, 26 2011. 
150. Managing director, COLAS, August 29, 2011.  
151. Deputy general manager, Madagascar Oil, August 30, 2011. 
 
Other 
 
152. Journalist, Bloomberg, November 17, 2010.  
153. Mauritian Economist at the IMF, August 26, 2012. 
 
